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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
STEVEN EUGENE ROBERTS, III, 
Petitioner-Appellant, 
vs. 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Respondent. 
Supreme Court Case No. 44817 
CLERK'S RECORD ON APPEAL 
Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, in and for the County of Ada. 
HONORABLE STEVEN HIPPLER 
STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER 
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT 
BOISE, IDAHO 
LA WREN CE G. WASDEN 
ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENT 
BOISE, IDAHO 
000002
ADA COUNTY DISTRICT COURT 
CASE SUMMARY 
CASE No. CV-PC-2016-5792 
Steven Roberts, III 
Petitioner, 
§ 
§ 
§ 
§ 
Location: Ada County District Court 
Judicial Officer: Hippler, Steven 
vs. 
State of Idaho 
Respondent. 
DATE 
Petitioner 
Respondent 
DATE 
03/25/2016 
03/25/2016 
03/25/2016 
03/25/2016 
04/01/2016 
04/06/2016 
04/12/2016 
04/12/2016 
04/13/2016 
Filed on: 03/25/2016 
Case Number History: 
Current Case Assignment 
Case Number 
Court 
Date Assigned 
Judicial Officer 
Roberts, Steven E, III 
State ofldaho 
CASE INFORMATION 
CASE ASSIGNl\tENT 
CV-PC-2016-5792 
Ada County District Court 
03/25/2016 
Hippler, Steven 
PARTY INFORMATION 
EVENTS & ORDERS OF TUE COl'RT 
Initiating Document - Post Conviction Relief 
New Case Filed - Post Conviction Relief 
Petition 
Petition and Affidavit for Post Conviction Relief 
Motion & Affidavit 
Hie- Post Conviction Act 
Case Type: Proceedings (District Court) 
Lead Attorneys 
DeFranco, John Charles 
Retained 
208-336- l 843(W) 
Akamatsu, Shelley W. 
Retained 
208-287-7700(W) 
l!'IDEX 
Motion & Affidavit for Permission to Proceed on Partial Payment on Court Fees (Prisoner) 
Motion & Affidavit 
Motion & Affidavit in Support for Appointment of Counsel 
Order 
Order Granting Motion/or Appointment of Counsel 
Prosecutor Assigned 
Prosecutor assigned Kai E. Wittwer 
Motion 
Motion For Extension Of Time For State To File Answer 
Motion 
Motion For Waiver Of Attorney-Client Privlege 
Notice of Appearance 
Notice Of Appearance (Defranco for Steven E Roberts III) 
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04/19/2016 
04/21/2016 
06/28/2016 
06/30/2016 
07/01/2016 
07/11/2016 
08/02/2016 
08/02/2016 
08/02/2016 
10/11/2016 
10/11/2016 
11/03/2016 
11/30/2016 
12/05/2016 
12/19/2016 
12/21/2016 
01/03/2017 
01/03/2017 
01/10/2017 
Order 
ADA COUNTY DISTRICT COURT 
CASE SUMMARY 
CASE No. CV-PC-2016-5792 
Order Extending Time for State to File Answer 
Order 
Order for Waiver of Attorney-Client Privilege 
Answer 
Answer (Jan M Bennetts atty for Petitioner) 
Stipulation 
Stipulation to Allow Additional Time to File Amended Petition 
Prosecutor Assigned 
Prosecutor assigned Shelley W Akamatsu 
Affidavit 
Affidavit of Support for Affidavit for P.C.R 
Order 
Order Setting Status Conference, and Evidentiary Hearing 
Hearing Scheduled 
Hearing Scheduled (Hearing Scheduled O 1/17/2017 02: 30 PM) evidentiary 
Hearing Scheduled 
Hearing Scheduled (Status 01/10/2017 03:00 PM) 
m BriefFiled 
Brief In Support of Motion for Summary Disposition 
mMotion 
Motion for Summary Disposition 
ffl Notice of Hearing 
11/30/16@3:00pm (States Motion for Summary Judgment) 
CANCELED Motion for Summary Judgment (3:00 PM) (Judicial Officer: Hippler, Steven) 
Vacated 
State's Motion 
fflNotice of Hearing 
01/03/2017@ 3:00pm Motion for Summary Disposition 
m BriefFiled 
IN RESPONSE TO STATE'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY DISPOSITION 
fflReply 
State's Reply to Response to Motion for Summary Dispostion 
Motion Hearing (3:00 PM) (Judicial Officer: Hippler, Steven) 
States Motion for Summary Disposition 
ffl Court Minutes 
CANCELED Status Conference (3:00 PM) (Judicial Officer: Hippler, Steven) 
Vacated 
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01/10/2017 
Ol/10/2017 
01/10/2017 
01/10/2017 
01/10/2017 
01/10/2017 
01/17/2017 
02/06/2017 
02/06/2017 
02/08/2017 
02/14/2017 
03/07/2017 
04/13/2017 
DATE 
ADA COUNTY DISTRICT COURT 
CASE SUMMARY 
CASE No. CV-PC-2016-5792 
ffl Memorandum 
Decision and Order Re: Motion/or Summary Dismissal 
ffl Judgment 
Order 
Defranco, John Charles 
Unserved 
Akamatsu, Shelley W. 
Unserved 
Order 
Defranco, John Charles 
Unserved 
Akamatsu, Shelley W. 
Unserved 
Dismissed With Prejudice (Judicial Officer: Hippler, Steven) 
Party (State of Idaho; Roberts, Steven E, III) 
Civil Disposition Entered 
CANCELED Hearing Scheduled (3:00 PM) (Judicial Officer: Hippler, Steven) 
Vacated 
ffl Notice of Appeal 
John DeFranco for Petitioner, Steven Roberts III 
Appeal Filed in Supreme Court 
fflMotion 
MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT OF STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER 
ffl Order 
Appointing SAPD 
ffl Notice of Appeal 
-AMENDED 
fflNotice 
a/Transcript Lodged- Supreme Court No. 44817 
Petitioner Roberts, Steven E, III 
Total Charges 
Total Payments and Credits 
Balance Due as of 4/13/2017 
FINANCIAL INFORi\'IATION 
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REC.EIVED 
' ., 
• ' MAR 2 5 2016 No. ___ Fl~""":":"~"'""'"""-A.M. ____ F_1L1~~ /2. : 05 -
Ada County Clerk 
Inmate Name 5-rt'At.<i £. ~llf>~ 
IDOC No . ...::'a"'"":30~!3=~;;......_ __ _ 
Address ;5'6f ~thQ'9'ti Pl? 
Qtpfi"4, I "-:0, &3f't/'f 
Petitioner 
MAR 2 5 2016 
CHRISTOPHER D 
By CHARLOrre ·w~1g~N Clerk 
DEPUTY 
~!EVEN HIPPLER 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE ___.E'.a .... v~ft-_f .... Z+~ ___ JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ___._A&.MQ'--<-8......._ _ _ 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
Respondent. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
CYPC 
CaseNo. · 
16057 92 
----
PETITION AND AFFIDAVIT 
FOR POST CONVICTION 
RELIEF 
The Petitioner alleges: 
1. Place of detention ifin custody: :rQttt{o Cix?1l.£(;f1pN/tl tiJ$1't(,n,oAI IJl}Dftt./0 
2. Name and location of the Court which imposed judgement/sentence: 6ie:-r£of: 
3. The case number and the offense or offenses for which sentence was imposed: 
(a) Case Number: C '2.-t£ '2.L?J'Z--00170?,q 
(b) Offense Convicted: 6125-f' O[ljglr {1j2P,Q,J 1 (1,iJ(l..L.1}(1:{ 
4. The date upon which sentence was imposed and the terms of sentence: 
a. Date of Sentence: $fR1£M6U 1.. 1 2.0lt./ 
~ '"'"· b. Terms of Sentence: IQ tes rtdO, 11~ i!E9 J t:€J fu.S12"'fltJf 
PETITION FOR POST CONVICTION RELIEF - 1 
Revised: I 0/13/05 
000006
,, 
I 
5. Check whether a finding of guilty was made after a plea: 
[ ] Of guilty ~ Of not guilty 
6. Did you appeal from the judgment of conviction or the imposition of sentence? 
1/(l_Yes []No 
7. 
(a) 
If so, what was the Docket Number of the Appeal?__._)Jp=-·'--'-\ .... 7£""'-'3._Y_,__ ___ _ 
State concisely all the grounds on which you base your application for post 
conviction relief: (Use additional sheets if necessary.) 
I 
A' , 1 
(f)(J;J'>tr[,/"1(iJJif,fi.-;, £14·1h.~ Qt.£!, ~· DP l,/1W 
I 
(b) ~,fST1Tu-r10,/Jt1.,, Rib.tit t1iJ @lfl -r/?Jtftl, tlJ45 &Ut/ 
,Ito l--14 ,£0 
I 
(c) 5ff- iA::tYrl-tC-lf MecJT: 1 {,4.) 
1 
8. Prior to this petition, have you filed with respect to this conviction: 
I 
I 
a. Petitions in State or Federal Court for habeas corpus?___.N_,_'D _____ _ 
b. Any other petitions, motions, or applications in any other court?~N~O~--
c. If you answered yes to a orb above, state the name and court in which each 
petition, motion or applicat,ion was filed: 
PETITION FOR POST CONVICTION RELIEF - 2 
Revised: 10/13/05 
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I •, ( 
9. If your application is based upon the failure of counsel to adequately represent you, 
state concisely and in detail what counsel failed to do in representing your interests: 
t 
(a) C'ii.&r:,-rur,oddL R,d,d~ +-a/1e:rrtu1 vt- flff{lBx/J fftrtrx../ 
@d totJNXL.~ Vlbi.tffffi _, ,1 ' ."' 
I 
Cb) 6t£, A:1"ft3'rC.tiMlHI (Jt) 
1 O. Are you seeking leave to proceed in forma pauperis, that is, requesting the 
I 
proceeding be at county expense? (If your answer is ''yes", you must fill out a 
Motion to Proceed in Forma Pauperis and supporting affidavit.) 
1 [)(I Yes [ ] No 
11. Are you requesting the appointment of counsel to represent you in this case? (If your 
I 
answer is ''yes", you must fill out a Motion 1for the Appointment of Counsel and supporting 
. I 
affidavit, as well as a Motion to Proceed In Fonna Pauperis and supporting affidavit.) 
I 
rA. Yes [ ] No 
I • 
12. State specifically the relief you seek: 
&.iPte. 
PETITION FOR POST CONVICTION RELIEF - 3 
Revised: I 0/13/05 
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13. This Petition may be accompanied by affidavits in support of the petition. (Forms 
for this are available.) 
DATED this z:l-day of (Y\ frltC-lt- ,20J..!L. 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss 
) 
5:tfVlll'' t: ~/JUL~~ 
Petitioner 
I 
~W: f. ~€.fL1S :m:: , being sworn, deposes and says that the party is the 
Petitioner in the above-entitled appeal and that all statements in this PETITION FOR POST 
CONVICTION RELIEF are true and correct to the best of his or her knowledge and belief. 
5fr;.wE~ 
Petitioner 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN and AFFIRMED to before me thi~;? day of 
MIL~ ,20JLP-
PETITION FOR POST CONVICTION RELIEF - 4 
Revised: I 0/13/05 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the Zc1- day of VV\ k(le_ t/ , 20 .it._, I mailed a 
copy of this PETITION FOR POST CONVICTION RELIEF for the purposes of filing with the 
court and of mailing a true and correct copy via prison mail system to the U.S. mail system to: 
~/\--,..=D~Pr~---- County Prosecuting Attorney 
SJw.t,, t W-,,,r 
Petitioner 
PETITION FOR POST CONVICTION RELIEF - 5 
Revised: I 0113105 
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A)jvQ1lJ11tL '3tAS 1N. v104t1ro,._1 Of fl:rtr1&t-1f2s Cgus--r1"1'0-f1D,"~t..- «,Gr,t-r :co 
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_1. Ai f£""1'£i..lc.,~ ,6£1-•e-1::1 'i't21t1:L, ::r -,oU- &>t't\B1ufP "'2<>5t'C.v--ra>@t'fk fl>IO 
-S001 CJ~ 6,i1uC,-r1DNS ·fHB:1 1.£/''1' Htm &1"Ftfo€.:o Ac.,11 N.~ /.\S AN 
"2... 
ii!) 
___ _.rH'ISt~../ 1i\1Pc$1Gll)' mftt1,Jf£ '"' wi.+,CJ/ -1"tlf w1t1tt>i..0 i3RDK£. ::[H,s 
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e,)....:.9-f(l05tC,v-tta~ 1tr1ft:-0ff!+" VoJt&.iJ fie,z. ~1fl12.Y w1:r,Jl-S~ ~1811.-1-r{ 
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' ,, )) 
·3_ wt-r,-.,tss -re.2-rrnltJ :a1_~1i-ffo.l!.ti2- 5.1.»cuc.o L,JX_ a,45 
11,.t ,9 fN_Ktrtu lcrC ON'-" 'ia/li?z ftbm A 6t15 ~fcrn,o,J. 
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\ · (}']t51#klS: ¥11t4t& (J./ otft#1 fR.o5t&><ott. rltJO BfµtJ.1 -rl<tltk 
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{l..1G 1:t--r :::ra OJ~ f.ZCet5$ .. 
000012
G.,) __ ~Jd1:lL>'Ec f'Eft:e-1 at: ac11:2L tc!D:t s, HG u41/U.-'i fewo,l\1'1<-. 
t 
·--· I· tclCLv$101" Of ftID11§Wftf:IC, ,,t,v1p£r-1Cf, 0( :fl.:)L.-1 2.:t, 201t.-
1 
- filJ'4J{,Q. (Wp /j(l£,aJ IN V£5-r1(}1t,1v,J ./NtO ff_'T111PAleR> 
D1~Coll€~i {WO z95 e.11fJ&1~ ff tl-15 -r,2.,Ht-- w'i££- uJfl/}{t)1.1JRY. 
__ __,-z_. ~~·(O~ tt-11 l:Wsf: -,o ·o, 5/jLof,f \.0tt-le.# {!J-lo..,-oll(l{.)frl_S 
k\ )fJ\JL,0 Bt i/SfO lf111l1ntl :0«,tt, 8t1'fJJ Pe1111ilt..Jt[?G /}n.;~£,i- . 
I 
O{f{JJ5(, I 
3 
000013
I 
ft.l .. £6(1 vf- {\f;S1~-tPNt£ of" (!pJ~~-
1 
I 
I 
.A) 1,-.ttf(C,t:(hlt, A456-fAtJU Ot CJ}Jt-l~t..-{fll~:-1"ll1.q.t,') -f,~,t( 11,0tdtt:L: 
I 
L{. I CoutJS(L- (f-!tU,p vfoN JUGJ8S-r --ro 5LJBfo[(# P1"8NC w~ 
I 
Rf_e,{hl~-,b Mt.613}, Zo1Z-- ;£P[~t. ZhJt- mom 
I 
I 
6. Czy\.!Sfl, falkCO dfo"' ff_/1,11o'1J/1l$ ((JL?L"1"tPLf-. @f{xue.s.-(g IQ 
000014
' 
012.. dJfA±{('S 11-s1/ 1110,,;..J. fl:C -rl2-lftL t,.>l'.l::t:i 2:(«B>mt;..1--r.s-
I 
ANO &vvt.S1 fl.&-t" B55vvn p-~-utJ5 R-£C~IJ1.Qu.JC.. 9-P-PW.U w1,.JPVu) 
I 
0.1t'.uJt1 S£tv-r(;Jc; HG. I 
I 
3 · Ci)Jt.JXL, f"ltll4P -(O r¥-,t_ ro€ £-(&f Wl~J.Jcse Ta f!Cl};1y .A$umPfted 
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2 
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~-tLJJenJ lmfvtt1t£ £tJ1'lfl:JJlj: ho flt! £su9au<1.J-ty1~l'K' &erfe. 
' 
t '"'(' ti ,q-o ~c> r-1,:: J..J:oo BlYI-
I 
Z. {\tptu:11£ @1'-'.Sfl..- Pt->1/A-~ co Ct~eu.£i~- :S:JQ6£-z U--<tM-
I 
-S .,;Od:--ni" MJ\f JtJ/ e.Ctt1w&N6: {$~;J Lu/ rJ OP'-"-
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e 
I 
AFFIDAVIT OF FACTS IN SUPPORT OF POST-CONVICTION PETITION 
STATE OF IDAHO 
COUNTY OF t.J.Utw~'Yfy'l. 
) 
) ss 
) 
I 
, being first duly sworn on oath, deposes and says: 
I 
te.'Jffd,-,C/t/ ,,J mt e>wtJ f£u,o Mo ,.., fle&lr?rt1& MO 
I 
:::rl?J-()t fu LL :11(£0"~ tfOO(. 
I 
WtL--L HIA-JE -ro Uc{ o,...I .A Ott C;:Ju,J."<'/ L,4-w L18{tr:,a..J 1]) 
I 
C)a'l ,:)::frt:rt. ~!?- .f()e_ NM ::; ~ (?fd ON Li vVlt-r~tD Ctt,1/Cs dS 
I 
fouows: fe,, C-.'2oi"10S 
AFFIDAVIT OF FACTS IN SUPPORT OF POST CONVICTION PETITION -1 
Revised: 10/13/05 
000017
v.~. v, HA:t.B,,J , 'Z--2D f3d "132., "5<-l'l (-,-,,.. c..112. Zoo\) 
C) f{&}s£.Cr-roe. VOJC:,J\4-..Q ... 
u .~ I \I. WvtU-:rlCf. l ~'i'6 f u 
vs. ~- Gll:K.tJft) 5'2..2. f 3A 
U. '::>. ~. Lu\{..So"I , Z."-10 f. 3 J 
i 
} t./ ~t , J':l lS- l 9 "ft-. c..t/2. I~~) 
59':7 1 le01-0S" l5'-r-H Clll t..o0B) 
3<t, Li~- (c.c. c,12. z.ool) 
p.) £ ~,auce. l,V~ IN C::,uff ,c., If.NI, . . vb. \/. iov...J~ \ t..f'l:o ,, IH'Z- ll'/'6'l) 
I 
tcl L~ W11'1S1t1P 1 ,3'ttf \J.'?. 355 ( l9JD) 
~~d v. VLg&l~tt'l. 4l/~ lJ-S. 303: Q97'f) 
' 
S,,LL..fvaAI v. L°'. 502> u.~. Z"lS',''Z'Jsi (1ciq:5) 
.£) S:(A-rf_ ~J'-'fLf.__.....~,,.,.~..;...;· ''""'-' _ __.._ ________ _ 
6 I G, ldo \/. u.:,. "'IDS:: U.Sc--.---:\ S __ D_.(.._, l'-'-'l_.~-=2-)CL.--_____ _ 
,,.s. V, 'b/l6.1.., lt> '-11:3 v,SJ <Rfl} ( 190s) 
Cf.) \l. S. \/. \l,:r I LLo, '-l'lo € y 31<i, 3Zs:: (&i. C.i!l.- u,~'l) 
.f )_. if!. C/[vrtL.. ·/W'l~...,,_~tf.-._ .-c....., ....... .....,,o,,c.__ ________ _ 
_ '1.16l-lO V, \l_-5, 4(6 v. St I ~o (I97L) 
,2.9 5. C-r- w,o, i'J:3 "'. £di :Zd '3o3 CZtt?'i 
\.\ 
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.. 
',, ·-
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W.B t(wplJ)'lf(S -rt:Si', AW '1tfVK -::C, DiJv MOT Srm'a l1 K;.f'., t11£L) M 
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j 
. f)IS&ff17v ~ 11112.,. M~fJ:lfA''5 Pour£ R.te.f'Qfl,1 'f?::@::(WW-6 fa 
1 
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. f(lec£tur10"15 -r71f_oll1e,g j Piwi.J~ fli1/YJR{o 8fhj SviBProU/MD -ro 
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\/'2R16fo ft-c,::0~ru£tl. wvts ~ -rtll llWB Ber:.-a?&. CuJ51!¥r {},Jo p,f:/ 
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~rf1t40 ,4tJD tn: Ulf?t -::l'QlbJ1'tf1~/J f'i>JZ ~RI>'~~ Pv~~s. Pt-1/:((PIJ{g 
t,vOl.9~ U:ft,£ {¥J(~ WfL. >9: -:f'4't'J.if --r.-u tf,ll, .. 
Further your affiant sayeth not. 
S;/JZ~ (!.~ 
Signature of Affiant 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN AND AFFIRMED TO before me this~ay of 
,fkfafeAk '201-b . I 
l 
s: J;~,4;1011 
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Full Name of Party Filing Document 
.3~, 1fosfrrttk DfL 
Mailing Address (Street or Post Office Box) 
Oflv hNO 1 :r'd, ~?r;,-4£.I 
City, State and Zip Code 
Telephone 
e 
NO._. ---~~-~---,-
FIL~t. £2,.: 0,S:_ A.IV!. _____ 7 
MAR 2 5 2016 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk 
By CHARLOTIE WATSON 
DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE H)vl'2'flf JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
I 
FOR THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ..... AL..l.,Oa;:;..A._. ____ _ 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
frre:!f or :::r-t?ltrlo 
Defendant. 
Case No. ------11C ...... V~P-..,..C----:a111~6~0 5 7 9 a 
MOTION AND Al=FIDAVIT FOR 
PERMISSION TO PROCEED ON PARTIAL 
PAYMENT OF COURT FEES (PRISONER) 
IMPORTANT NOTICE: Idaho Code§ 31-3220A requires that you serve upon counsel for 
the county sheriff, the department of correction or the private correctional facility, 
whichever may apply, a copy of this motion and affidavit and any other documents filed 
in connection with this request. You must file proof of such service with the court when 
you file this document. 
IXJ.. Plaintiff D Defendant asks to start or defend this case on partial payment of court fees, 
and swears under oath 
1. This is an action for (type of case) Pa51 CD.J \I \(.:,·(iQfl '2£L..1£f . I 
believe I am entitled to get what I am asking for. 
2. Ix] I have not previously brought this claim against the same party or a claim based ori 
I 
the same operative facts in any state or federal court. D I have filed this claim against the 
I 
same party or a claim based on the same opera'tive facts in a state or federal court. 
I 
MOTION AND AFFIDAVIT FOR PERMISSION TO PROCEED 
ON PARTIAL PAYMENT OF COURT FEES (PRISONER) 
CAO FW 1-14 6/8/2011 
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e 
3. I am unable to pay all the court costs now. I have attached to this affidavit a current 
statement of my inmate account, certified by a custodian of inmate accounts, that reflects the 
activity of the account over my period of incarceration or for the last twelve (12) months, 
whichever is less. 
4. I understand I will be required to pay an initial partial filing fee in the amount of 20% of the 
greater of: (a) the average monthly deposits to my inmate account or (b) the average monthly 
balance in my inmate account for the last six (6) months. I also understand that I must pay the 
I 
remainder of the filing fee by making monthly payments of 20% of the preceding month's 
income in my inmate account until the fee is paid in full. 
5. I verify that the statements made in this affidavit are true. I understand that a false 
! 
statement in this affidavit is perjury and I could be sent to prison for an additional fourteen (14) 
! years. 
(Do not leave any items blank. If any item does not apply, write "NIA". Attach additional pages if more space is 
needed for any response.) 
IDENTIFICATION AND RESIDENCE: 
Name: 51"fJ€rJ £. fbW:d'Jlf: 
51"t~£~l ~S ~ 
Other name(s) I have used: fy(£.l)f. Roi',(£1$ 1 
How long at that address?_2..=-..... 1"'--fL_S ________ Phone: I\\ {,& 
Year and place of birth: AlXsvS1" '3:, '"~' 
DEPENDENTS: 
I am ~single D married. If married, you must 6rovide the following information: 
Name of spouse:----------------------------
My other dependents including minor children (~se only initials and age to identify children) are: __ _ 
MOTION AND AFFIDAVIT FOR PERMISSION TO PROCEED 
ON PARTIAL PAYMENT OF COURT FEES (PRISONER) 
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INCOME: 
Amount of my income: $ rif per D week D month 
Other than my inmate account I have outside molney from: __.h=l+<."4-----------
1 
My spouse's income: $ ~ /(} per D week D month. 
ASSETS: 
List all real property (land and buildings) owned or being purchased by you. 
Your 
Address 
NI~ 
City State 
Legal 
Description 
I 
List all other property owned by you and state its' value. 
Description (provide description for each item) I 
Value 
Cash~/,.,./J ... O"-'-IC,::z...,.,f;J.......,_1~~-------'-l---~--~~--
I 
Notes and Receivables__.N-~------------------
Vehicles N/'4: 
Bank/Credit Union/Savings/Checking Accounts....:1....;.N-/i....,,:l,'-'-----------
Stocks/Bonds/lnvestments/Certificates of Deposit__.~_,,_.~/A:'-'----------
Trust Funds _ _.1"...........,/f}:....;._ _________________ _ 
Retirement Accounts/I RAs/401 (k)s._....:.;fJ"'"'/t'-"q'-1------'-----------
Cash Value lnsurance_...,N~/e:........_ ________________ _ 
Motorcycles/Boats/RVs/Snowmobiles_._t-.+1/ ..... fl::........_ __________ _ 
Furniture/Appliances_----1-'N::Z..,,_/ .... e ________________ _ 
Jewelry/Antiques/Collectibles_~N--....Li~B~----------------
Description (provide description for each item) 
TVs/Stereos/Computers/Electronics -;::- Pao -fove+\: c,~ lo\1iS\-'t.All't) 
Tools/Equipment NI(} I 
l 
MOTION AND AFFIDAVIT FOR PERMISSION TO PROCEED 
ON PARTIAL PAYMENT OF COURT FEES (PRISONER) 
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Equity 
Value 
er 
I 
@ 
PAGE3 
000023
' .
Sporting Goods/Guns_+tJ-b ....lJ'-'------------------
Horses/Livestock/Tack._L.:!NCL./.,_(}:'-------------------
Other(describe) )Y)N{J Gt211JAL (t,J !..0"1\$1AtJA) 
EXPENSES: (List all of your monthly expenses.) 
Expense 
Average 
Monthly Payment 
Rent/House Payment.__,_~ .... /i-'-f.J-'-------------------
Vehicle Payment(s)_~.,../r.+/ ...... ,9-.,__ ______________ _ 
Credit Cards (List last four digits of each account number.) 
Loans (name of lender and reason for loan) 
HIA 
Electricity/Natural Gas·------------'-----------
Water/Sewer/Trash ____________________ _ 
Groceries _________________________ _ 
Clothing. _____________ __._ __________ _ 
Auto Fuel ________________________ _ 
Auto Maintenance _____________________ _ 
Cosmetics/Haircuts/Salons __________________ _ 
Entertainment/Books/Magazines ________________ _ 
Home Insurance _____________________ _ 
MOTION AND AFFIDAVIT FOR PERMISSION TO PROCEED 
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Expense 
Average 
Monthly Payment 
Auto Insurance ___________ ___,. _______ _..;.. __ _ 
Life Insurance 
------------------------
Medic a I Insurance 
------------,------------
Medic a I Expense ______________________ _ 
I 
Other __________________________ _ e 
, 
MISCELLANEOUS: 
How much can you borrow? $__,_M..;.i...i/4:c..L.-____ _ From whom? _N_,_(J.._..~.__ _____ _ 
When did you file your last income tax return? 2/Jo'J Amount of refund: $ J-1//.r 
------
PERSONAL REFERENCES: (These persons must be able to verify information provided.) 
Name Address Phone Years Known 
!,\-
Typed/printed Signature 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss. 
County of C:<-:tdwa.,.U ) 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN before me on this !)2 day of 111z&'1 , .;2C) j h 
N~~ 
Residing at t)q ~ 
Commission expires ~ ;;i.z; c.20 L 7 
MOTION AND AFFIDAVIT FOR PERMISSION TO PROCEED 
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= IDOC TRUST 
I 
I 
I OFFENDER BANK BALANCES 
I 
• 
03/22/2016 = 
I 
Doc No: 83033 Name: ROBERTS III, STEVEN EUGENE ICIO/A2 PRES FACIL 
Account: CHK Status: INDIGENT TIER-1 CELL-32 
Transaction Dates: 03/22/2015-03/22/2016 
Beginning Total Total Current 
Balance Charges Payments Balance 
2.67DB 34.10 34.00 2.77DB 
================================TRANSACTIONS================================ 
Date Batch Description Ref Doc Amount Balance 
;;7;;7;;i~ i;;;;i;;;=;~; ;ii=;;;~-;;;---1--
08/11/2015 I00722658-300 099-COMM SPL 
08/18/2015 I00723434-194 099-COMM SPL 
09/01/2015 I00725089-014 211-FOOD SVC 
09/08/2015 I00726023-264 099-COMM SPL 
10/05/2015 I00729228-002 071-MED CO-PAY 
10/30/2015 HQ0732634-018 011-RCPT MO/CC 
10/30/2015 HQ0732635-005 063-COURT ORDR 
11/03/2015 I00732920-246 099-COMM SPL 
11/03/2015 I00732920-247 099-COMM SPL 
11/09/2015 I00733926-016 072-METER MAIL 
11/17/2015 I00734930-239 099-COMM SPL 
11/24/2015 I00735702-050 071-MED CO-PAY 
----------
JUL FOOD 
AUG FOOD 
787575 
CR-FE12-17 
71707 
788607 
---------- -----------
8.60 5.93 
3.00DB 2.93 
2.87DB 0.06 
5.40 5.46 
5.46DB 0.00 
3.00DB 3.00DB 
20.00 17.00 
4.00DB 13.00 
0.79DB 12.21 
9.82DB 2.39 
1. 42DB 0.97 
0.74DB 0.23 
3.00DB 2.77DB 
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Full Name of Party Filing This Document 
38( t:b?$f1-rim- 0Z 
Mailing Address (Street or Post Office Box) 
Qll.uf/el~ >'d · 8391':I 
City, State and 1p Code 
Telephone Number 
,,,.. 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE roJ~ .. :(l~ JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF __ A.;_~-'-------
Case No.: _______ _ 
· Plaintiff, 
'NOTICE OF SERVICE 
vs. 5"'( ~ Cf' ;; /Jflf-/0 
Defendant. 
I certify on the · "2. C , ::Z (? I f.p , I served a 
copy of 
to: (name all parties or their attorneys in the case, other than yourself) 
(Name) 
--z..oo uJ. PluJt .Jf 5-c'Uf)1"' 
(Name) 
(Street or Post Office Address) 
(City, State, and Zip Code) 
Date: -----------
NOTICE OF SERVICE 
CAO Cv 4-5 
~By Mail 
[ ] By fax to (number) ______ _ 
[ ] By personal delivery 
[ ) By Mail 
[ ] By fax to (number) ______ _ 
[ ] By personal delivery 
5--rptEY £. /lmsll21'S ~ 
Typed/printed Name of Party Signing 
PAGE 1 
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• 
Inmate name S1fjt;J £. ~rt)et..-t~"11.r 
IDOC No. _'?)=go=3..;:.; ____ _ 
Address 3'd I tn,i't "i'l/!L Dtl, 
0/2.o(uJo, ;J &. ~'{'-I 
Petitioner 
,.. 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE 'TOJP:(,-\ 
-
NO·-----::::-:::::------
A.M. _____ FIL~-~--J Z,• 0::s:::: 
MAR 2 5 2016 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk 
By CHARLOTTE WATSON 
DEPUTY 
JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE ST ATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF --'--'-tl"---0_.4-___ _ 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
Respondent. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
COMES NOW, 5::Jr,1£,J f Qo«/2.-rs 1lf 
C,~;P .C 1605792 -
Case No. 
-----
MOTION AND AFFIDAVIT IN 
SUPPORT FOR 
APPOINTMENT OF 
COUNSEL 
, Petitioner in the above 
entitled matter and moves this Honorable Court to grant Petitioner's Motion for Appointment of 
Counsel for the reasons more fully set forth herein and in the Affidavit in Support of Motion for 
Appointment of Counsel. 
1. Petitioner is currently incarcerated within the Idaho Department of Corrections 
under the direct care, custody and control of Warden itUv~vl 8-Allll,J 
2. The issues to be presented in this case may become to complex for the Petitioner 
to properly pursue. Petitioner lacks the knowledge and skill needed to represent him/herself. 
3. Petitioner/Respondent required assistance completing these pleadings, a~she 
was unable to do i~erself. 
MOTION AND AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT FOR APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL - 1 
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4. Other: _______________________ _ 
DA TED this zt_.. day of __,rV!'---'-/r-'--'fl--'--"'C,""""'Lf:+------' 20 ~. 
S~erilo~-
Petitioner 
AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT FOR APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss 
) 
I 
5--r'f.:i/W £. (2p6tlt1S 1if:: , after first being duly sworn upon his/her oath, deposes 
and says as follows: 
1. I am the Affiant in the above-entitled case; 
I 
I 
2. I am currently residing at the t.:0(1-f.lO &/lfl(.etHJiJ/11,, 1N:,-ft'1'11-r,,,,,J fJUnt.tt, , 
I 
under the care, custody and contrdl of Warden ,t.%-t111~ ~fl.J-1.hl 
I 
3. I am indigent and do not have any funds to hire private counsel; 
4. I am without bank accounts, sto~ks, bonds, real estate or any other form of real 
property; 
5. I am unable to provide any other form of security; 
6. I am untrained in the law; 
7. If I am forced to proceed withqut counsel being appointed I will be unfairly 
handicapped in competing with trained and competent counsel of the State; 
Further your affiant sayeth naught. 
MOTION AND AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT FOR APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL - 2 
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WHEREFORE, Petitioner resp1ectfully prays that this Honorable Court issue 
it's Order granting Petitioner's Motion for Appointment of Counsel to represent his/her interest, 
I 
or in the alternative grant any such relief to which it may appear the Petitioner is entitled to. 
. I 
DATED This .2!f:_ day of l(l'\ /.h2.. (9,, Y: , 20 l!e_. 
Petitioner 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN AND AFFIRMED to before me thi~ay 
of tfttt,e ('~ , 20 _&. 
I 
MOTION AND AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT FOR APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL - 3 
Revised: I 0/13/05 I 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
' 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the <1..,~ day of LM .4-:,??:I-J..- , 201.fL_, I 
mailed a copy of this MOTION AND AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT FOR APPOINTMENT OF 
COUNSEL for the purposes of filing with the court and of mailing a true and correct copy via 
prison mail system for processing to the U.S. mail system to: 
---'-A-~""""4-______ County Prosecuting Attorney 
l 
~c~ 
Petitioner 
I 
MOTION AND AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT FOR APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL - 4 
Revised: I 0/13/05 
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e NO.------:F=,L-::::eo:---=l,-v7.!f""i.f-r--
A.M. ____ P,.M~----'------
APR 0_1 2016 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk 
By EMILY CHILO 
DePUlY 
,,... 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE _ _,_,rO'""'"J--"-r'{:--=1'it_,_t ___ JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF _A~O~'------
Petitioner, 
vs. 
Respondent. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
CIPC 11>05.7 9-2 
Case No.~~----
ORDER GRANTING 
MOTION FOR 
APPOINTMENT 
OF COUNSEL 
'?Be,( ck'( 
IT IS I ARftY ORDERED that the Petitioner's Motion for Appointment of 
ef\ 
l . /. Counsel is granted and ~4-,µ., u,v,.. t::-, Pvb 1c OeW(attomey's name), a duly 
licensed attorney in the State of Idaho, is hereby appointed to represent said defendant in 
all proc(:edings involving the post convictfon petition. (ov-"~ ~c..,\~ f-: ie. a.--)" C<..~ &>- dd 
{7e,f-,\-10,., "'-''h-.~- bO dcAy5 or ""'•50rr:(e,: 
DA TED this 3Q day of·~ re,t-.. , 20 _.!_f. 
ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO APPOINT COUNSEL 
Revised I 0/ 13/05 
000032
e 
JAN M. BENNETTS 
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney 
Kai E. Wittwer 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
200 West Front Street, Room 3191 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Telephone: (208) 287-7700 
NO·---~=,------
FILED !'°\ \~ A.M. ____ P.M. ~~~. 
APR 1 2 2016 
CHRISTOPHER 0. RICH, Clerk 
By TYLER ATKINSON 
DEP''TY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN ANp FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
STEVEN E. ROBERTS III, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Respondent. 
) 
) 
)' 
) 
) 
)' 
) 
) 
) 
___________ ) 
Case No. CV-PC-2016-05792 
MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF 
TIME FOR STATE TO FILE 
ANSWER 
COMES NOW, Kai E. Wittwer, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney, in and for the County of 
Ada, State of Idaho and Attorney for the Respondent, moves this Court for an order extending the 
time for the State to file an answer in response to the Petition for Post-Conviction Relief. 
The Petitioner filed a Petition and Affidavit for Post-Conviction Relief on March 25, 2016, 
together with a Motion and Affidavit in Support for Appointment of Counsel. The Court thereafter 
issued an Order Granting Motion for Appointment of Counsel, dated March 30, 2016, thereby 
appointing the Ada County Public Defender to represent the Petitioner in this action. The Court 
also ordered that appointed counsel must file any amended petition within 60 days of the order 
appointing counsel. 
MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME FOR ST ATE TO FILE ANSWER (ROBERTS III), Page 1 
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e 
The State has not yet responded by ans1er to the petition. Due to the appointment of 
I 
counsel and the Court's order providing that counsel must file any amended petition within 60 days 
I 
of the order appointing counsel, pursuant to I.c.1 § 19-4906(a) the State hereby requests that the 
I 
Court extend the time for the State to answer the petition or any amended petition to within 30 days 
I 
following the filing of any amended petition, or to June 30, 2016, in the event no amended petition 
is filed. 
DATED this 1-z_~ay of April, 2016. 
JAN M. BENNETTS 
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney 
By: Kai E. Wittwer 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME FOR STATE TO FILE ANSWER (ROBERTS III), Page 2 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
~ 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this ---J1 day of April, 2016, a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME FOR STATE TO FILE ANSWER was served, 
in the manner noted below, to: 
ADA COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER 
200 W. FRONT ST., STE 1107 
BOISE, IDAHO 83702 
~By interdepartmental mail 
/ o By hand-delivery 
MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME FOR STATE TO FILE ANSWER (ROBERTS III), Page3 
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JAN M. BENNETTS 
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney 
Kai E. Wittwer 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
200 West Front Street, Room 3191 
Boise, Idaho 83 702 
Telephone: (208) 287-7700 
e 
NO.,----~-·~!!I"! ........ ~--.-~no-, -, 
A.M.--_____ F __ -1~1',.M.,d!L\, -
APR 1 2 2016 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Ctork 
By TYLER ATKINSON 
DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE' FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
I 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
STEVEN E. ROBERTS III, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
ST A TE OF IDAHO, 
Respondent. 
' 
)I 
)' 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
___________ ) 
Case No. CV-PC-2016-05792 
MOTION FOR WAIVER OF 
ATTORNEY-CLIENT 
PRIVILEGE 
COMES NOW, Kai E. Wittwer, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney, in and for the County of 
Ada, State of Idaho, and moves this Court for its Order waiving the attorney-client privilege as to 
the Petitioner and Robert R. Chastain (ISB# 2765) and Jason C. Pinder (ISB # 6661 ). 
The Petition for Post-Conviction Relief alleges, inter alia, that both trial counsel in the 
underlying criminal case and appellate counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel. The 
State is aware that Robert R. Chastain was counsel for the Petitioner during the district court 
proceedings in the underlying criminal case (case number CR-FE-2012-0017029), and that Jason C. 
Pinder represented the Petitioner on appeal. The State cannot adequately explore the claims raised 
by the Petitioner and fully respond to and defend against the Petitioner's allegations at an 
MOTION FOR W AIYER OF ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE (ROBERTS III), Page 1 
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evidentiary hearing without access to informatidn held by and the ability to consult freely with 
the Petitioner's prior counsel. Therefore, the State requests that this Court find that by putting in 
I 
I 
issue the performance of his counsel the Petitioner has waived the attorney-client privilege for 
purposes of these post-conviction proceedings, as to all information held by Robert R. Chastain 
and Jason C. Pintler, which is relevant, or which may lead to evidence relevant to the Petitioner's 
claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. 
It is the State's belief that counsel would' prefer to have an order from the Court waiving 
the attorney-client privilege before counsel will share privileged information. 
DATED this \ 2~ay of April, 2016. 
JAN M. BENNETTS 
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney 
K~w·. 
By: Kai . 1ttwer 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
MOTION FOR W AIYER OF ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE (ROBERTS III), Page 2 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
r-
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this ~ day of April, 2016, a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing MOTION FOR W AIYER OF ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE was served, in the 
manner noted below, to: 
ADA COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER 
200 W. FRONT ST., STE. 1107 
BOISE, ID 83702 
CpBy interdepartmental mail 
/ o By hand-delivery 
I 
I {J Lfj . 
. ' ;a;p&tl..:.:G L ~
LaAssistant ,& 
MOTION FOR W AIYER OF ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE (ROBERTS III), Page 3 
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/ 
NO.- Fl~l:O ? -;; )':;) 
M _P.M.-___.J~--JOHN C. DEFRANCO, ESQ., ISB #4953 
ELLSWORTH, KALLAS & DEFRANCO P.L.L.C. 
1031 E. Park Blvd. 
Boise, ID 83 712 
Phone:(208)336-1843 
Fax: (208) 345-8945 
ATTORNEY FOR PETITIONER CONFLICT COUNSEL 
A. ---
APR \ 3 2016 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clark 
By AUSTIN LOWE 
D:C:PUT\' 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
STEVEN E. ROBERTS, III, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Respondent. 
), 
)1 
)I 
) 
) 
) 
) 
)I 
) 
Case No.: CV-PC- 2016-05792 
NOTICE OF APPEARANCE 
(Conflict Counsel) 
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~)! 
I 
COMES NOW John C. Defranco, and' hereby enters an appearance as the 
I 
I 
Conflict Attorney of Record for the Petitioner, Steven E. Roberts, III, in the above-
entitled case. 
Please direct all notices or pleadings through this office. 
DATED this I tv day of April, 2016. 
Attorney for Petitioner 
ORIGINAL 
NOTICE OF APPEARANCE 1 
000039
I 
CERTFICATE OF SERVICE 
The undersigned hereby certifies that Ion this :) fv' day of April, 2016, a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing document Jas served upon counsel as follows: 
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney 
200 W. Front Street 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Ada County Public Defender 
200 W. Front Street 
Boise ID 83702 
NOTICE OF APPEARANCE 
I 
U.S. Mail 
/Hand Delivery 
Facsimile: 287-7709 
--+US Mail 
__ J Hand Delivery 
Facsimile: 287-7409 
Ji1aW~ 
Stacie Krahn, Legal Assish{nt 
2 
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JAN M. BENNETTS 
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney 
Kai E. Wittwer 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
200 West Front Street, Room 3191 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Telephone: (208) 287-7700 
NO.,"i,";:;:-::;--;:;icn"----
A.M. I I~ ~-r FIL~-~----
APR 1 9 2016 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk 
By EMILY CHILD 
D!!!>UTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE,FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
I 
STEVEN E. ROBERTS III, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Respondent. 
)1 
), 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
________________ ) 
Case No. CV-PC-2016-05792 
ORDER EXTENDING TIME 
FOR STATE TO FILE ANSWER 
THIS COURT, having considered the Motion for Extension of Time for State to File 
Answer heretofore made in the above proceedings of STEVEN E. ROBERTS III v. STATE OF 
IDAHO, and the Court being fully advised in the premises; 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the time in which the State may file an Answer is 
extended to within 30 days following the filing of any amended petition or to June 30, 2016, in the 
event no amended petition is filed. 
DATED this Jtz;-of ;fy~-1 ( , 2016. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this ~ day of _-'~---'-"'-"'..:_'_r \-=-------' 2016, I served a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER EXTENDING TIME FOR STATE TO FILE 
ANSWER to the individuals named below in the manner noted: 
ADA COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER 
200 W. FRONT ST., STE 1107 
BOISE, IDAHO 83702 
/By interdepartmental mail 
o By hand-delivery 
o By e-mail 
KAI E. WITTWER I 
DEPUTY ADA COUNTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY 
/By interdepartmental mail 
o By hand-delivery 
o By e-mail 
I 
Deputy Clerk 
I 
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~() ~ 
' 
,~ 
o<t:, ? ~ <t:, ''\. (}0~ ~~ ~ 
'tl ~N M. BENNETTS APR 2 1 2016 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk 
By EMILY CHILO tt,C'b- Ada County Prosecuting Attorney 
DE:PUTY 
..... ---
Kai E. Wittwer 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
200 West Front Street, Room 3191 
Boise, Idaho 83 702 
Telephone: (208) 287-7700 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE iFOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
STEVEN E. ROBERTS III, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
ST A TE OF IDAHO, 
Respondent. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
________________ ) 
Case No. CV-PC-2016-05792 
ORDER FOR WAIVER OF 
ATTORNEY-CLIENT 
PRIVILEGE 
THIS COURT, having considered the State's Motion for Waiver of Attorney-Client 
Privilege heretofore made in the above proceedings of STEVEN E. ROBERTS III v. STATE OF 
IDAHO, and the Court being fully advised in the premises; 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the attorney-client privilege is waived, as to all 
information held by Robert R. Chastain (ISB# 2765) and Jason C. Pinder (ISB # 6661 ), which is 
relevant or which may lead to evidence relevant to the Petitioner's claims of ineffective 
assistance of counsel. 
ty 
DA TED this //\ day of 4 ,/ c ~ ( ~ I . , 2016. 
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• I 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this~ day of _ ___,At'--'-+;...;:....-..:_•~_,_\ __ , 2016, I served a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER FOR WAIVER OF ATTORNEY-CLIENT 
PRIVILEGE to the individuals named below in the manner noted: 
ADA COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER · 
200 W. FRONT ST., STE. 1107 
BOISE, ID 83702 
~ By interdepartmental mail 
o By hand-delivery 
o By e-mail 
KAI E. WITTWER 
DEPUTY ADA COUNTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY 
~y interdepartmental mail 
o By hand-delivery 
o By e-mail 
;: • ( .J •• 
- • --/ , ~:s:E 
,:. ,..., • 70 rn: 1:--. :: 
-:.~·. •.,"~ 
# A •• • ,\J .. 
, .,,,.. • •• C..',. .. 
... , V.1 ••••••• ,-;, .. . ,, Co '"\\~->' .. . 
,, UNry lJ .. .. ,,, ,, .. 
,,,,,, .... ,,, 
Deputy Clerk 
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JAN M. BENNETTS 
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney 
Kai E. Wittwer 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
200 W. Front Street, Room 3191 
Boise, Idaho 83 702 
Telephone (208) 287-7700 
e 
NO-------:F::::-1L'=eo~?;?"""· ~1~-A.M. ____ ...... M.-.c. ____ _ 
JUN 2 8 2016 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk 
By TYLER ATKINSON 
DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
STEVEN E. ROBERTS III, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
ST A TE OF IDAHO, 
Respondent. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
___________ ) 
Case No. CV-PC-2016-05792 
ANSWER 
COMES NOW, Kai E. Wittwer, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney, in and for the County of 
Ada, State of Idaho, and does hereby answer Petitioner's (STEVEN E. ROBERTS III) Petition 
for Post-Conviction Relief in the above-entitled action as follows: 
I. 
GENERAL RESPONSES TO PETITIONER'S POST-CONVICTION ALLEGATIONS 
All allegations made by Petitioner in the Petition for Post-Conviction Relief are denied 
by the State unless specifically admitted herein. 
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II. 
I 
SPECIFIC ANSWERS TO PETITIONER'S POST-CONVICTION ALLEGATIONS 
I 
1. Answering allegation number 1 regarding Petitioner's place of detention, the State admits 
the allegation contained therein. 
2. Answering allegation number 2 regarding the name and location of the Court which 
imposed judgment and sentence, the State admits the allegation contained therein. 
3. Answering allegation number 3 regarding the case number and the offenses for which 
sentence was imposed, the State admits t~e allegations contained therein. 
' 
4. Answering allegation number 4(a) regarding the date upon which sentence was imposed, 
I 
the State admits the allegation contained therein. Answering allegation number 4(b) 
I 
regarding the the terms of the sentence, t~e State denies the allegation contained therein. 
I 
The State asserts that the sentence imposed by the district court for the crime of Arson 
I 
' 
was thirty (30) years as enhanced by the persistent violator status, with ten (10) years 
I 
fixed and twenty (20) years indeterminate. For the crime of Burglary the sentence 
I 
imposed was for ten (10) years with five (5) years fixed and five (5) years indeterminate. 
5. Answering allegation number 5 regardin~ whether the finding of guilty was made after a 
plea of not guilty, the State admits the allegation contained therein. 
6. Answering allegation number 6 regarding whether an appeal was taken, the State admits 
the allegation contained therein. 
7. Answering allegations numbered 7(a) through 7(c) regarding the grounds upon which 
Petitioner bases his application for post-conviction relief, the State denies the allegations 
and denies that the Petitioner is entitled to post-conviction relief. 
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8. Answering allegation number 8, regarding whether with respect to this conviction the 
Petitioner has filed prior petitions for habeas corpus in State or Federal Court, or filed 
other petitions, motions or applications in any other court, the State admits the allegations 
contained therein. 
9. Answering the general allegations numbered 9(a) and 9(b) that the Petitioner received 
ineffective assistance of counsel, as well any of the specific factual allegations offered in 
support of the general allegation, the State denies the allegations because at this time the 
State does not possess sufficient facts or information so as to be able to adequately and 
fully respond to the allegations. The State reserves the right to seek leave to amend these 
answers, however. 
10. Paragraphs numbered 10 through 12, regarding the request for leave to proceed informa 
pauperis, the request for appointment of counsel, and the prayer for relief, are not factual 
I 
allegations requiring admission or denial. 
FIRST AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
To the extent that Petitioner's claims should or could have been raised on direct appeal 
but were not, the cl~ims are procedurally defaulted. LC.§ 19-4901(b). 
SECOND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
To the extent that any of Petitioner's claims were previously litigated on appeal, they 
cannot be re-litigated in this post-conviction pro,ceeding. LC. § 19-4901(a)(4); Paradis v. State, 
110 Idaho 534, 537 (1986); Whitehawk v. State, 116 Idaho 831, 832-33 (Ct. App. 1989). 
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I 
I 
THIRD AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
I 
To the extent that the Petition contains bare and conclusory allegations unsubstantiated 
by affidavits, records, or other admissible evidence, it therefore fails to raise a genuine issue of 
material fact. I.C. §§ 19-4902(a), 19-4903, 19-4906. 
WHEREFORE, Respondent, the State of Idaho, prays for relief as follows: 
1. That Petitioner's claims for post-conviction relief be denied; 
2. That Petitioner's Petition for Post-Conviction Relief be summarily dismissed; 
3. That the Court grant such other relief as it deems necessary in the case. 
1" 
DATED this Z 1 day of June, 2016. 
JAN M. BENNETTS 
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this Ar June, 2016, I caused a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing ANSWER to be served upon the individual(s) named below in the manner 
noted: 
JOHN C. DEFRANCO, ESQ. 
Ellsworth, Kallas & DeFranco, PLLC 
1031 E. Park Blvd. 
Boise, ID 83712 
o By hand-delivery 
By facsimile transmission to number 
By U.S. Mail, First Class, postage pre-paid 
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,.--'I 
l, 1"1 
JOHN C. DEFRANCO, ESQ., ISB #4953 
ELLSWORTH, KALLAS & DEFRANCO P.L.L.C. 
1031 E. Park Blvd. 
Boise, ID 83712 
Phone: (208) 336-1843 
Fax: (208)345-8945 
ATTORNEY FOR PETITIONER 
f 
e 
~~-- n > 1 FIL~~.----
JUN 3 0 2016 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk 
By TYLER ATKINSON 
DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
STEVEN ROBERTS, III, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Respondent. 
) 
) 
), 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Case No. CV PC 16 05792 
STIPULATION TO ALLOW 
ADDITIONAL TIME TO 
FILE AMENDED PETITION 
Petitioner, Steven Roberts, III, represented by John C. Defranco, and Respondent, 
State of Idaho, represented by Deputy Prosec~ting Attorney Kai Witwer, and hereby 
stipulate to allow Petitioner's counsel additional time to file an amended petition for post 
conviction relief, if such action is necessary. Petitioner is incarcerated in Idaho 
Correctional Institution, Orofino, Idaho. Scheduling times to communicate has been 
difficult. When counsel and Petitioner have had time to discuss the pending case the 
conversations are lengthy. 
Petitioner and Respondent agree an additional ninety (90) days is appropriate to 
prepare and file an amended petition for post-conviction relief if necessary. Lastly, this 
ORIGINAL 
STIPULATION TO ALLOW ADDITIONAL TIME TO FILE AMENDED PETITION 
000050
e 
-
was an unusual case because the matter was tried to the court without a jury. In 
Petitioner's counsel's opinion this reduces the number of potential claims. 
DATED this ~ay of June, 2016. 
Attorney for Petitioner 
DATED this __ day of June, 2016. 
Kai Witwer 
Ada Co~nty Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
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.., 13:53 FAX 
*~OUND NOTIFICATION: FAX RECEJ:VEO S~SFULLY ** 
TIME RECEIVED REMOTE CSID DURATION PAGES 
lune 28, 2016 8:49:04 AM MOT 208 34S 8945 136 4 
06 28 2016 ~UE 6:48 PAX 208 345 8945 EKrD ~~~ Ad~ county FA-Cri~ 
wa.,; an unusual case because the matter w~ tried to the court without a jury, In 
Pelitioner's counsel's opinion this reduces.the number of potential claims. 
DATED this ~ay of June, 2~16. 
!& fa~'"V"'........_;;;;;;;;;;;-;;;;;L......-.. 
Attorney for Petitioner 
I 
I 
DATED this zi: of June, 2016. 
-- . 
~~C:r_....,..._"""'.,_"''\..__.----
Ada County Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
I 
I 
I 
STIPULATION TO AL,LOW ADDITIONAL TIME TO FILE AMENDED rETITION 
ill 003/004 
STATUS 
Received 
C03/C04 
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CERTIFICATE10F SERVICE 
. "°' I I hereby certify that on the L q , day1 of June 2016 I served a true and correct 
copy of the within and foregoing document by the method indicated below an addressed 
to the following: 
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney Kai Witwer 
200 West Front Street, Third Floor 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
US Mail 
./ Hand Delivery 
Facsimile 
\:fi!Uild..i ~ '-"--"'-
t:e Krahn, Legal Assistant 
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'.'! 
\ 
RECE;IVEr;9 
JUL 11 2016 
Ada County Clerk .. 
xe.,u f. fo$fa1's. ::ot -
Full Name/Prisoner Name 
IDOC No. fi5(15'.:3 
'3B\ 1tQ"'iFtf,tk P<-
Complete Mailing Address 
FILED P.M. ___ _ 
JUL 11 2016 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk 
By SANTIAGO BARRIOS 
DEPUTY 
I"-' :1'.itt;. Oiit(lC :( CtN'(KO{ 1Jl:t-: ~~tt ::fvO«l-JttL 01~-fktc,( 
Of :1'.Rt .¢'MC ez€ -:::t:lM:tH11 ,u dt,Q (oa 11u .. UJJt,t1 t <¥ 11011: 
Plaintiff/Petitioner, 
vs. 
Defendant/Respondent. 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss 
County of (A4.N.wA1%l ) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) I 
) 
) 
Case No. tVf'C \CoD5J'lt 
AFFIDAVIT OF j·v{'pt'fi-'f 
~-Af6.oAV,--r ~ ec.R. 
_5:r)><..,Uf. . .. ~/ci.:t=..C__..€,._ • .i.::«.:J<.o,1,LB&Jf2..._...-:a...:4 ,;:....1fr~--· after first being duly sworn upon his/her oath, deposes 
AFFIDAVIT OF SJffi>fl;( 6P- A:ffiOMrr i:P2 (.t-B- pg._/_. _ 
Revised 10/24/05 
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Further your affiant sayeth naught. 
DATED This _a__ day of _J;~,1 t,._'(.~--;----' 20 I 1,,. 
I 
I 3;tl;t~£:P~ 
000069
~ 
" I\:. 
\f 
'c 
~ 
\£ 
c;t 
\l. 
0 
~ 
.. 
~ 
J 
\~ 
Q 
\-
I 
~ 
l 
IA. 
~ 
~ 
000070
000071
~ 
~ 
~ 
~ 
~ 
~ 
<t; 
i 
·~ 
~ 
\:.. 
~ 
~ 
~ ~ 
cl 
t(' 
~ 
~ 
'"" .; 
<!s 
i 
c;t 
t 
"' ~ 
.e 
~ 
~ 
Pr. '~ 
000072 J 
000073
~ 
--.5 
~ 
c,t 
\'.t 
"" 
,,.. 
~ 
,-~ 
ci;;. 
\._ 
'I:) 
~ e. 
'I.;;: 
.., 
"I) 
, .. 
~ 
'I--
~ 
& 
\\:" ~ 
~ 
~ 
~ 
~ \-
~ 
<:::;:. 
~ 
ill~ 
000074
000075
000076
000077
000078
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the _8__ctay of "JLJ L"-l 20_Jk_, I 
mailed a true and correct c~py of 5--r, VfAL I e aU,/1..,'( s".11f:AFFIDA VIT via prison 
mail system for processing to the U.S. mail system to: 
WA-~vlJ-f'( f(1;i)S~,()f2.5 oFp-1&£, 
1 
1-£J o w. (aoi-1f ~=A ) i:fY\ 31 J l 
I 
~~~ 1gnature 
AFFIDAVIT OF Svtrrrz-r ~ ~,1eiat11"1 fl,,i. f.tlfl, - pg.~ 
Revised 10/24/05 
000079
-
NO. 
- J l)_:. '-ID FILED W AM. P.M. ___ _ 
AUG O 2 2016 
CHRISTOPHER D. RlCH, Clerk 
By EMILY CHILD 
Dc'?UTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
STEVEN ROBERTS, Ill, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
CASE NO. CV PC-2016-05792 
ORDER SETTING STATUS 
1 
CONFERENCE, AND EVIDENTIARY 
HEARING 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Respondent. 
This is a civil action. 
I 
THEREFORE, THIS ORDERS THAT:, 
I 
The following is the schedule for this matter. If either party objects to the 
I 
schedule set forth below, such objection mu1st be filed within fourteen (14) days of the 
I 
date of this order. Upon receipt of an objection, the Court will set the matter for hearing. 
The above-described matter is set as follows: if an evidentiary hearing is granted 
it shall be set for a for a one (1) day evidentiary hearing to commence on the 17th 
day of January, 2017 at 2:30 p.m. before the Honorable Steven J. Hippler, at the 
Ada County Courthouse, Boise, Idaho. A status conference will be set for the 10th 
day of January, 2017 at 3:00 p.m. in Boise, Ada County, Idaho. 
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THIS ALSO ORDERS that the following scheduling dates shall be complied 
with: 
(a) Amendment of pleadings shall be completed by Septembe} 9, 2016; 
(b) Any answers or responses shall comply with IRCP 12(a); 
(c) All discovery requests and supporting memoranda shall be.completed by 
October 7, 2016; 
(d) The filing, noticing, and hearing of all pretrial motions, including motions 
for summary dismissal, shall be filed and noticed in compliance with 
I.R.C.P. 56(c); 
(e) The last day for petitioner to disclose witnesses, including experts, 
together with their opinions and reports, shall be by November 1, 2016; 
(f) The last day for respondent ,to disclose rebuttal experts, together with 
their opinions and reports shall be December 1, 2016; 
(g) The court further notifies the parties they must strictly adhere to 
I.R.C.P. 56(a), 56(b), 56(d) and 56(e). If affidavits setting out facts on 
personal knowledge do not demonstrate on their face the evidence 
contained therein is admissible under the Idaho Rules of Evidence (or a 
case on point construing the same) or I.C. §19-4903, the parties must 
file a memorandum in support of the affidavit(s) or applicable parts, 
specifically referencing the evidence in question and citing the court and 
opposing counsel to the rule or case supporting the court's· consideration 
of the affidavit(s) proffered; 
(h) In the event any party elects to move to strike an affidavit as setting 
ORDER SETTING STATUS CONFERENCE, AND EVIDENTIARY HEARING - Page 2 
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forth evidence that is not otherwise admissible, such moving party, in 
either the motion or a supporting memorandum, should direct the 
court with specificity to the paragraph or paragraphs objected to and 
should further cite the court t~ the rule or case that supports the motion 
to strike. 
(i) The court reminds the pa.rties that a motion under I.R.C.P. 37(a) 
requires a certification that t~e movant has, in good faith, conferred or 
I 
attempted to confer with the party not making the disclosure (serving as 
the object of the motion) in an effort to secure the disclosure without 
court action. 
U) Any requests for judicial notice must specifically list the documents for 
which judicial notice is requested. 
(k) Upon appointment, and after consultation with the petitioner, counsel 
shall be given leave to file an amended petition if so needed. Upon filing 
the amended petition, counsel shall verify that he/she has visited with 
the petitioner, reviewed the claims listed in both the initial and amended 
post-conviction petition and obtained the petitioner's verified signature 
for the amended petition. 
THIS FURTHER ORDERS that all parties shall file with the court no later than 
seven (7) days prior to the status conference the following: 
(a) A concise written statement of the theory of recovery or defense, the 
elements of such theory, and supporting authorities; 
(b) A written list identifying stipulated facts, all witnesses, and all exhibits to 
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be introduced at trial, accompanied by a statement pertaining to each 
exhibit on whether each exhibit in question is stipulated as admissible; 
(c) A written statement that the pa,rties have discussed settlement or the use 
of extrajudicial proceedings including alternative dispute techniques to 
resolve the dispute. 
THIS FINALLY ORDERS that: 
(a) Attorneys attending the status' conference must have authority to enter 
(b) 
into stipulations regarding factual issues and admissions of exhibits or of 
I 
' 
other evidence; and, 
I 
I 
Noncompliance with this ORDER may result in the court imposing 
sanctions. 
(c) All exhibits each party intends to introduce at trial will be pre-marked in 
coordination with the court's clerk and under the positive control of the 
clerk throughout the trial. 
(d) Any open or closing presentations shall be pre-marked as demonstrative 
exhibits and provided to the court two (2) business days before trial. 
Dated this 2J ?;ayof July, 2016 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the J,. day o~016, I mailed (served) a true and 
correct copy of the within instrument to: 
Kai Witwer, Ada County Prosecuting Attorney 
Via INTERDEPARTMENTAL MAIL 
John C. DeFranco 
Ellsworth, Kallas & DeFranco 
1031 E. Park Blvd. 
Boise, ID 83712 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH 
Clerk of the District Court 
ORDER SETTING STATUS CONFERENCE, AND EVIDENTIARY HEARING - Page 5 
Electronically Filed
10/11/2016 4:48:56 PM
Fourth Judicial District, Ada County
Christopher D. Rich, Clerk of the Court
By: Rose Wright, Deputy Clerk
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JAN M. BENNETTS 
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney 
Shelley W. Akamatsu 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
200 West Front Street, Suite 3191 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Telephone: (208) 287-7700 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
STEVEN EUGENE ROBERTS, ) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, 
Respondent. 
Case No. CV PC 2016 05792 
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
DISPOSITION OF PETITION 
COMES NOW, the State ofldaho, by and through Shelley W. Akamatsu, Deputy 
Prosecuting Attorney and does hereby provide this brief in support of the state's motion 
for summary disposition of Roberts' petition for post-conviction relief pursuant to Idaho 
Code§ 19-4906(c). 
I. Factual and Procedural History 
Based upon evidence submitted at trial, on September 1, 2012, at 4: 11 a.m., the 
Boise City Fire Department responded to a report of a fire at a residence and firefighters 
were on scene within three to four minutes. Boise firefighters extinguished the fire 
located on a patio in the back of the house and observed several canisters near the fire's 
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origin that smelled of gasoline. A fire investigator observed a broken window near the 
fire damage, which appeared to have been broken from outside the residence. The 
investigator also observed canisters containing gasoline placed around a flower pot with 
one of the canister's nozzles placed directly into the pot. The valve of a fire-damaged 
propane tank attached to a barbeque grill on the patio was turned to the "on" position. 
Based on these observations, the fire investigator concluded that an ignitable liquid was 
poured onto a part of the patio and the fire was intentionally set, but that the fire largely 
burned itself out before it reached the interior of the house. He testified that the fire 
burned for approximately six to eight minutes before it was extinguished. 
Boise police investigators found blood stains around the broken window. Several 
samples of the stains were collected and sent to the Idaho State Lab for testing, which 
presumptively matched the DNA of Steven Roberts. The officers then obtained a DNA 
sample from Roberts, which confirmed his DNA at the scene of the fire. 
Roberts was charged with one count of arson in the first degree, Idaho Code § 18-
802; burglary, I.C. § 18-1401; and a persistent violator enhancement, I.C. § 19-2514. 
Roberts waived his right to a jury trial and requested a bench trial. At trial, Roberts 
testified in his own defense. He testified that on the night in question, he took his 
girlfriend's car without her permission and met up with his friend, J.M., at a bar. After 
meeting up with J.M., he went to the residence in question with a woman he had met 
earlier that night and who told him the house was haunted. He testified that something 
frightened him while he was there so he ran, tripped, and fell through the window on the 
back porch, cutting his arm. He then returned to the bar to meet up with J.M. Roberts 
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denied setting a fire or touching any gasoline cans while at the residence. J.M. also 
testified at trial, stating that Roberts left the bar several times during the evening, 
including a couple of hours before closing time. He testified that Roberts last returned to 
the bar a few minutes before closing, around the time that everyone was leaving, and that 
the business closes at 4:00 a.m. He also testified that Roberts smelled of gasoline and had 
a cut on his arm. When asked, Roberts told him he had been in a fight. Roberts' girlfriend 
testified that he told her he cut his arm by falling against a dumpster. 
The district court found Roberts guilty of burglary and arson in the first degree. 
Roberts then admitted to being a persistent violator. The district court imposed a unified 
thirty-year sentence with ten years determinate for arson in the first degree, and a 
concurrent unified ten year sentence with five years determinate for burglary. Roberts 
timely appealed claiming the State presented insufficient evidence to support his 
conviction for arson in the first degree. Specifically, Roberts claimed that the time 
estimates provided by the State's witnesses did not support a finding that he was involved 
in setting the fire. The Idaho Court of Appeals affirmed Roberts' arson conviction in 
State of Idaho v. Roberts, 2015 Ida. App. Unpub. LEXIS 637. Remittitur issued October 
27, 2015. 
Roberts filed this timely petition for post-conviction alleging 25 claims: (I) the 
court violated his right to due process of law; (2) the court did not give him a fair trial; (3) 
the court was bias during the trial and sentencing; ( 4) the court refused to allow him to 
present expert testimony regarding the force necessary to break the window; (5) the 
prosecutor improperly vouched for witnesses; (6) the evidence was insufficient to 
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establish his guilty beyond a reasonable doubt; (7) the court, defense and prosecutor made 
mistakes that resulted in a guilty finding; (8) he is innocent; (9) the prosecutor failed to 
identify which photos would be used at the trial; ( 10) his attorney failed to locate, 
interview and call as witnesses the employees and owners of the dance club and Charlie 
Brown's bar; (11) his attorney failed to interview or call as a witnesses employee of 
"Cold Clean"; (12) his attorney failed to interview Harry Reiner and call him as a witness; 
(13) his attorney failed to subpoena the phone records of Jesse and Brandi Mcphie 
between August 31, 2012 and September 1, 2012; (14) his attorney failed to object or 
alter the photos the prosecutor disclosed in discovery; ( 15) his attorney failed to recall 
Brandi Degroat as a witness to probe Jesse Mcphie s testimony at the court trial; (16) his 
attorney failed to ask questions of the witnesses about their ability to smell gas on him; 
( 17) his attorney failed to admit Officer Davidson's police report into evidence; ( 18) his 
attorney failed to object to the prosecutor's improper vouching for witnesses during 
closing argument; (19) his attorney did not object to the court's statements during 
sentencing about the broken window; (20) his attorney failed to present an expert during 
sentencing to rebut the court's assumptions about the window; (21) his attorney failed to 
call the bouncer of the dance club as a witness during sentencing; (22) his appellate 
counsel failed to bring up in a reply brief that a dance club would not allow a non-
employee entrance to an establishment after it had closed at 4:00 a.m.; (23) his appellate 
counsel failed to challenge the court's "extra judicial" opinion regarding the force 
necessary to break the window; (24) his appellate counsel failed to challenge the improper 
witness vouching by the prosecutor; (25) his appellate counsel refused to review the 
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legality of photos that were not admitted at trial but were disclosed by the State in 
discovery. 
The court appointed counsel on April 1, 2016. The respondent answered the 
petition on June 28, 2016. On June 30, 2016, the court ordered counsel had until 
September 30, 2016, to file an amended petition. The respondent files this motion and 
brief for summary disposition of the original petition. 
II. 
Applicable Legal Standards 
A. General Standards 
An application for post-conviction relief initiates a proceeding which is civil in 
nature. State v. Bearshield, 104 Idaho 676, 678, 662 P.2d 548, 550 (1983); Clark v. 
State, 92 Idaho 827, 830, 452 P.2d 54, 57 (1969); Murray v. State, 121 Idaho 918, 921, 
828 P.2d 1323, 1326 (Ct. App.1992). An application for post-conviction relief differs 
from a complaint in an ordinary civil action, however, because an application must 
contain much more than "a short and plain statement of the claim" that would suffice 
for a complaint under I.R.C.P. 8(a)(l). Martinez v. State, 126 Idaho 813, 816, 892 P.2d 
488, 491 (Ct. App. 1995). Rather, an application for post-conviction relief must be 
verified with respect to facts within the personal knowledge of the applicant. I.C. § 19-
4903. The application must include affidavits, records, or other evidence supporting its 
allegations, or must state why such supporting evidence is not included. Id. The 
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application must be filed with the clerk of the district court in which the conviction 
took place. LC. 19-4902. 
Summary disposition of a petition for post-conviction relief is appropriate if the 
applicant's evidence raises no genuine issue of material fact. LC. § 19-4906(b), (c). On 
review of a dismissal of a post-conviction relief application without an evidentiary 
hearing, the appellate Court will determine whether a genuine issue of fact existed based 
on the pleadings, depositions and admissions together with any affidavits on file and will 
liberally construe the facts and reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. 
Gilpin-Grubb v. State, 138 Idaho 76, 80, 57 P.3d 787, 791 (2002), citing LaBelle v. State, 
130 Idaho 115, 118, 937 P.2d 427, 430 (Ct.App.1997). 
A court is required to accept the petitioner's unrebutted allegations as true, but 
need not accept the petitioner's conclusions. Ferrier v. State, 135 Idaho 797, 799, 25 P.3d 
110, 112 (2001). When the alleged facts, even if true, would not entitle the applicant to 
relief, the trial court may dismiss the application without holding an evidentiary hearing. 
Stuart v. State, 118 Idaho 865, 869, 801 P.2d 1216, 1220 (1990), citing Cooper v. State, 
96 Idaho 542,545,531 P.2d 1187, 1190 (1975). Allegations contained in the application 
are insufficient for the granting of relief when ( 1) they are clearly disproved by the record 
of the original proceedings, or (2) do not justify relief as a matter oflaw. Jd. 
Bare or conclusory allegations, unsubstantiated by any fact, are inadequate to 
entitle a petitioner to an evidentiary hearing. Roman, 125 Idaho at 647, 873 P.2d at 901; 
Baruth v. Gardner, 110 Idaho 156, 159; 715 P.2d 369,372 (Ct. App. 1986); Stone, 108 
Idaho at 826, 702 P.2d at 864. If a petitioner fails to present evidence establishing an 
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essential element on which he bears the burden of proof, summary disposition is 
appropriate. Mata v. State, 124 Idaho 588, 592, 861 P.2d 1253, 1257 (Ct. App. 1993). 
Where petitioner's affidavits are based upon hearsay rather than personal knowledge, 
summary disposition without an evidentiary hearing is appropriate. Ivey v. State, 123 
Idaho 77, 844 P .2d 706 (1993). 
B. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 
To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the petitioner must prove 
two necessary components: 
First, the defendant must show that counsel's performance was deficient. This 
requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel incompetent and was 
not functioning as the "counsel" guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment. 
Second, the defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. 
To prove prejudice, the defendant must show a reasonable probability that, but for the 
attorney's deficient performance, the outcome of the trial would have been different. Id. 
This requires showing that counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of 
a fair triaL a trial whose result is reliable. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 
(1984) Cited in Workman v. State, 144 Idaho 518, 525, 164 P.3d 798, 805 (2007). 
When the conviction is the result of a plea as compared to a trial; "the defendant must 
show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would not 
have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial." Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 
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52, 59, 88 L. Ed. 2d 203, 106 S. Ct. 366 (1985). See also, Dunlap v. State, 141 Idaho 50, 
59, 106 P.3d 376, 385 (2004). 
"Because of the distorting effects of hindsight in reconstructing the circumstances 
of counsel's challenged conduct, there is a strong presumption that counsel's performance 
was within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance -- that is, 'sound trial 
strategy." Davis v. State, 116 Idaho 401,406, 775 P.2d 1243, 1248 (Ct. App. 1989) 
(quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689-90); Aragon v. State, 114 Idaho 758, 760, 760 P.2d 
1174, 1176 (1988). A petitioner must overcome a strong presumption that counsel 
"rendered adequate assistance and made all significant decisions in the exercise of 
reasonable professional judgment" to establish that counsel's performance was "outside 
the wide range of professionally competent assistance." Claibourne v. Lewis, 64 F.3d 
1373, 1377 (9th Cir.1995) (quoting, Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690). 
C. Legal Standards Specific to Procedurally Barred or Defaulted Claims 
Post-conviction claims in a petition are subject to dismissal if they are barred 
because they were waived in the trial proceeding. Idaho Code Section 19-4908 provides 
in part: "Any ground ... knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently waived in the proceeding 
that resulted in the conviction or sentence ... may not be the basis for an application. In 
addition, any issue which could have been raised on direct appeal, but was not, is 
forfeited and may not be considered in post-conviction proceedings, unless it appears to 
the court, on the basis of a substantial factual showing by affidavit, deposition or 
otherwise, that the asserted basis for relief raises a substantial doubt about the reliability 
of the finding of guilt and could not, in the exercise of due diligence, have been presented 
000092
earlier. LC. § 19-4901(b). Schoger v. State, No. 33976, 2008 Ida. App. LEXIS 107, at 
10-11 (Ct. App. Aug. 26, 2008) Gonzales v. State, 120 Idaho 759, 763, 819 P.2d 1159, 
1163 (Ct. App. 1991 ). This includes claims of judicial error and prosecutorial 
misconduct. Bias v. State, 159 Idaho 696, 365 P.3d 1050, 1056-57 (Ct. App. 2015) 
III. 
Analysis 
A. Forfeited or Barred Claims 
Judicial Errors 
Roberts claims the court erred by violating his right to due process, not giving him a 
fair trial, being bias during the trial and sentencing, and refusing to allow him to present 
expert testimony regarding the force necessary to break a window. Issues involving judicial 
error are of the type that can be raised on direct appeal. Bias v. State, 159 Idaho 696, 365 
P.3d 1050, 1056-57 (Ct. App. 2015). Since Roberts failed to raise these issues on direct 
appeal, he has forfeited them. 
Prosecutorial Misconduct 
Roberts has claimed the prosecutor committed misconduct by improperly vouching 
for the credibility of the witnesses and failing to identify which photos would be used 
during the trial 1. Issues involving prosecutorial misconduct are of the type that can be 
raised on direct appeal. Bias v. State, 159 Idaho 696, 365 P.3d 1050, 1056-57 (Ct. App. 
2015). Since Roberts failed to raise these issues on direct appeal, he has forfeited them. 
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Actual Innocence 
Roberts has claimed he is entitled to post-conviction relief because he is innocent. 
"Actual innocence" is not a basis for post-conviction relief unless a petitioner can point to 
material facts, not previously presented and heard, that require vacation of the sentence "in 
the interests of justice. J.C. 19-490l(a)(4). Roberts claim is bare and conclusory because 
he has completely failed to identify what evidence was not previously presented and heard 
and how hearing that evidence would have raised a substantial doubt as to the reliability of 
the court's verdict. The court must dismiss this claim. 
Insufficient Evidence 
Roberts has claimed he is entitled to post-conviction relief because the evidence was 
insufficient to support his guilt.2 The court must dismiss this claim as applied to the arson 
conviction because it is barred by the doctrines of res judicata and the law-of-the-case. The 
doctrine of res judicata contains both claim preclusion (true res judicata) and issue 
preclusion (collateral estoppel). Hindmarsh v. Mock, 138 Idaho 92, 94, 57 P.3d 803, 805 
(2002). Claim preclusion bars a subsequent action between the same parties upon the 
same claim that was already adjudicated in a valid final judgment on the merits. Id. 
Therefore, to apply claim preclusion, three elements must exist: "(l) same parties; (2) 
same claim; and (3) final judgment." Ticor Title Co. v. Stanion, 144 Idaho 119, 124, 157 
1 Roberts does not claim the prosecutor failed to disclose the photographs. Roberts claim 
is that the prosecutor failed to specifically identify which of the photos included in the State's 
disclosure would be used at the trial. 
2 Roberts alleged "insufficient evidence" but failed to designate which of 
his convictions the evidence was insufficient. Roberts failed to allege insufficient 
evidence on appeal for the Burglary conviction. 
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P.3d 613,618 (2007), Johnson v. State, 158 Idaho 852, 855, 353 P.3d 1086, 1089 (Ct. 
App. 2015). 
Here, Roberts is barred from re-litigating this claim of insufficient evidence on the 
arson conviction because it was litigated in his direct appeal. In Roberts' appeal, the 
parties were the same, the claim was the same, and it was a final judgment as the Court of 
Appeals affirmed the arson conviction in State of Idaho v. Roberts, 2015 Ida. App. 
Unpub. LEXIS 63 7. . The court must dismiss this claim as related to the arson. The court 
must also dismiss any claim of insufficient evidence regarding the burglary conviction 
because issues involving claims of insufficient evidence are of the type that can be raised 
on direct appeal. Bias v. State, 159 Idaho 696,365 P.3d 1050, 1056-57 (Ct. App. 2015). 
Since Roberts failed to raise the issue of insufficient evidence of the burglary conviction 
on direct appeal, he has forfeited it. 
B. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 
Interviewing and Calling Witnesses 
Roberts has claimed his attorney was ineffective for failing to locate, interview and 
call employees of the strip club, Charlie 's Bar and Cold Clean. The court must dismiss 
Roberts' claim as it is bare and conclusory. Roberts has failed to articulate who his 
attorney should have interviewed and called and what they would have said that would 
have changed the outcome of the case. Roberts' claim is conclusory because he 
concludes the outcome would have been different without providing the court any facts of 
what the witnesses would have said to support the basis for such conclusion. 
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The court must also dismiss Roberts' claim as it fails to raise a genuine issue of 
material fact. Even if the court were to conclude Roberts' counsel was deficient, he has 
not raised a genuine issue of material fact as to whether but for the deficiency the 
outcome would have been different. For Roberts to show the outcome would have been 
different, he would have to show witnesses statements would have impeached the 
testimony and evidence that was presented during the bench trial. This would require 
Roberts to actually articulate who would have said what about which element of what 
crime. The court must dismiss this claim. 
Roberts had initially alleged his attorney was ineffective for failing to interview 
and call Harry Reiner as a witness. Roberts voluntarily withdrew this claim in the 
affidavit he filed July 11, 2016. See Pg. JO regarding claim "A) 3" The court must 
dismiss this claim. 
Phone Records 
Roberts has claimed his attorney was ineffective for failing to subpoena phone 
records of Jesse Mcphie and Brandi Degroat between August 31, 2012 and September 1, 
2012. The court must dismiss Roberts' claim as it is bare and conclusory. Roberts has 
failed to articulate what the phone records would show and how they would have changed 
the outcome of the case. Roberts' claim is conclusory because he concludes the outcome 
would have been different without providing the court any facts of what the phone 
records would have shown to support the basis for such conclusion. 
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The court must also dismiss Roberts' claim as it fails to raise a genuine issue of 
material fact. Even if the court were to conclude Roberts' counsel was deficient, he has 
not raised a genuine issue of material fact as to whether but for the deficiency the 
outcome would have been different. For Roberts to show the outcome would have been 
different, he would have to show the data in the phone records would have impeached the 
testimony and evidence that was presented during the bench trial. This would require 
Roberts to actually articulate what the phone records would have shown and how that 
would have impacted an element of what crime. The court must dismiss this claim. 
Photos 
Roberts has claimed his attorney was ineffective for failing to "sanitize" the photo 
evidence included in the State's discovery disclosure. The court must dismiss Roberts' 
claim as it fails to raise a genuine issue of material fact. Even if the court were to 
conclude Roberts' counsel was deficient, he has not raised a genuine issue of material fact 
as to whether but for the deficiency the outcome would have been different. For Roberts 
to show the outcome would have been different, he would have to show the photos the 
State submitted in discovery were seen and considered by the court; admitted into 
evidence. None of the photos Roberts claimed failed to show smoke and fire damage 
were admitted during the bench trial. Roberts could never show "sanitizing" the photos 
would have affected the outcome because they were never admitted into evidence or seen 
by the fact finder. The court must dismiss this claim. 
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Recalling Brandi Degroat 
Roberts has claimed his attorney was ineffective for failing to "recall" Brandi 
Degroat during the defense case. Specifically, Roberts has claimed his attorney should 
have recalled Degroat to question her about whether her son, Jesse Mcphie was lying 
when he testified he did not have children. The court must dismiss Roberts' claim as it 
fails to raise a genuine issue of material fact. Even if the court were to conclude Roberts' 
counsel was deficient for failing to recall Degroat and question her about children her son 
might have, he has not raised a genuine issue of material fact as to whether but for the 
deficiency the outcome would have been different. For Roberts to show the outcome. 
would have been different, he would have to show if his attorney had recalled Degroat as 
a witness it would have changed the outcome of the case. Roberts has provided no 
indication as to how questioning Degroat about whether her son had a child would have 
changed the outcome of the case or affected any of the elements of the crimes of Arson or 
Burglary. The court must dismiss this claim. 
Smelling Gas on Roberts 
Roberts initially claimed his attorney was ineffective for failing to question Degroat 
and Mcphie about whether the source of the gas smell could have actually been from a 
gas station near the strip club. Roberts voluntarily withdrew this claim in the affidavit he 
filed July 11, 2016. See Pg. 12 regarding claims "B.) 2" The court must dismiss this 
claim. 
000098
Admission of Police Report 
Roberts has claimed his attorney was ineffective for failing to admit into evidence a 
police report by Officer Davidson that contained statements Jesse Mcphie made to him 
that were inconsistent with his preliminary hearing and trial testimony. Specifically, 
Roberts claims the police report contained statements made by witness Mcphie that were 
consistent with Mcphie's preliminary hearing testimony, but inconsistent with Mcphie's 
trial testimony. Roberts has claimed that if his attorney had admitted into evidence the 
police report containing the statements consistent with Mcphie's preliminary hearing 
testimony, the outcome of the court trial would have been different. 
The court must dismiss Roberts' claim as it fails to raise a genuine issue of 
material fact because Roberts' counsel did impeach Mcphie with all of his preliminary 
hearing statements that were inconsistent with his trial testimony. Exhibit 1, {Tr. Pg. 33-
35), Exhibit 2, (Tr. Pg. 322-328) Exhibit 3, (Bates 53-58) 
Moreover, the police report would not have been admitted into evidence because it 
was impermissible hearsay. In State ofldaho v. Vivian, 129 Idaho 375 (1996), the 
defendant offered a police report which included an exculpatory statement by him, into 
evidence. The State objected the report was hearsay and the defendant's statement within 
the report was hearsay within hearsay. The trial court ruled the report could be admitted if 
the defendant's statement was excised from it. On appeal, the defendant claimed the trial 
court erred in failing to admit the police officer's report with the exculpatory statement 
made by him. The defendant claimed that under the public records exception to hearsay, 
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I.RE. 803(8)(A), the police report was admissible because it was an investigative report 
made by the police and offered into evidence at trial by the accused. 
The Idaho Court of Appeals disagreed with the defendant's assertion that the report 
was admissible under the public records exception to the hearsay rule. The court held the 
defendant's statement to the officer was hearsay because it was made out of court and was 
offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted in the statement. The court further held the 
defendant's statement was considered double hearsay because his statement was recorded 
within a police report which was also hearsay. Therefore, in order for the defendant's 
statement, contained in the officer's report, to have been admissible at trial, both his 
statement and the report must have conformed to an allowable exception under the hearsay 
rule. 
The court held, a police report offered into evidence by a defendant in support of his 
or her defense may be admissible under either the business records exception, I.RE. 803(6), 
or the public records exception, I.RE. 803(8). However the exculpatory statement within 
the report was properly excluded because it was hearsay and not admissible under a separate 
hearsay exception. The court concluded by holding the statement offered by the defendant 
in the police report was inadmissible on the grounds that it was hearsay within hearsay and 
not within any exception to the hearsay rule. The court must dismiss this claim as Roberts 
failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact. 
Objecting to Prosecutor's Closing Argument 
Roberts has claimed his attorney was ineffective for failing to object to the 
prosecutor's "improper" witness vouching statements during his closing argument. 
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Roberts voluntarily withdrew this claim in the affidavit he filed July 11, 2016. See Pg. 13 
regarding claims "C) 1-4" The court must dismiss this claim. 
Sentencing Claims 
Roberts has claimed his attorney was ineffective for failing to object to the court's 
statements during sentencing about the broken window, failing to present an expert 
during sentencing to rebut the court's assumptions about the window and failing to call 
the bouncer of the dance club as a witness during sentencing. Roberts voluntarily 
withdrew these claims in the affidavit he filed July 11, 2016. See Pg. 13 regarding 
claims "C) 1-4" The court must dismiss these claims. 
Appellate Counsel 
Filing a Reply Brief 
Roberts has claimed his appellate attorney was ineffective for failing to file a reply 
brief that included an assertion that a dance club would not let a non-employee entrance 
to an establishment after it had closed at 4:00 a.m., a copy of Davidson's police report and 
the trial testimony of Ms. Degroat. The court must dismiss this claim because it is bare 
and conclusory. 
To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, Roberts must 
show appellate counsel was deficient and that there is a reasonable probability that but for 
counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the appeal would have been different. 
Appellate counsel is not required to raise every issue available to the defendant. 
Crawfordv. State, No. 43141, 2016 Ida. LEXIS 108, at *29-30 (Apr. 6, 2016) Rather, 
"[t]o demonstrate deficient performance of appellate counsel for failure to raise a claim 
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on appeal, the defendant must show that counsel made an objectively unreasonable 
decision to omit the claim." Dunlap, 159 Idaho at , 360 P.3d at 305. Accordingly, 
appellate counsel is not deficient merely for omitting an argument as "the weeding out of 
weaker issues is widely recognized as one of the hallmarks of effective appellate 
advocacy." Id. (citing Miller v. Keeney, 882 F.2d 1428, 1434 (9th Cir.1989)). "When 
reviewing appellate counsel's performance, we determine whether, but for appellate 
counsel's errors, a reasonable probability existed that the defendant would have prevailed 
on appeal." Id. 
The court must dismiss Robert's claims regarding the assertion about the dance 
club and the police report because they are bare and conclusory. Roberts has failed to 
identify or articulate how an appellate attorney can make a naked factual assertion in an 
appellate brief without pointing to it in the record. Roberts has failed to identify under 
what procedural rule appellate counsel would be able to reference a report that was not or 
would never be permitted into evidence. The court must also dismiss Roberts' claim 
about Ms. Degroat's trial testimony because he has failed to articulate what his appellate 
attorney should have included and why it would have changed the outcome of the appeal. 
The court must dismiss these claims. 
Appealing Court's "Extra Judicial" Opinion 
Roberts has claimed his appellate attorney was ineffective for failing to appeal the 
court's reliance on its own opinion that Robert's body weight could not have broken the 
window. The court must dismiss this claim because it is bare and conclusory and fails to 
raise a genuine issue of material fact. Roberts has failed to articulate where in the record 
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the court relied upon his own knowledge to determine Roberts' body weight could not 
have broken the window. Much like a jury, the court never articulated the basis of its 
verdicts. Additionally, Roberts could never prove that if his appellate attorney had 
raised this issue, the outcome of the appeal would have been different because the court 
of appeals determined there was sufficient evidence to support the court's finding that 
Roberts was guilty of Arson. 
Finally, the issue was never preserved in the trial court. The Idaho Court of 
Appeals has held, for a variety of practical and equitable reasons, that no claim of 
ineffective assistance of appellate counsel lies for failure to raise as fundamental error an 
issue not preserved in the trial court. Mintun v. State, 144 Idaho 656, 661-62, 168 P.3d 40, 
45-46 (Ct. App. 2007). McKay v. State, No. 34271, 2008 Ida. App. LEXIS 75, at *6 n.2 
(Ct. App. July 2, 2008) The court must dismiss this claim because it is bare and 
conclusory and fails to raise a genuine issue of material fact. 
Appealing Prosecutor's Witness Vouching 
In his petition, Roberts has claimed his appellate attorney was ineffective for 
failing to appeal the prosecutor's statements during closing argument which he alleges 
constituted improper witness vouching. In his supplemental affidavit filed July 11, 2016, 
Roberts has abandoned this claim and amended it to allege his appellate attorney should 
have alleged the State manipulated Mcphie' s testimony between the initial report and 
preliminary hearing and the trial. The Idaho Court of Appeals has held, for a variety of 
practical and equitable reasons, that no claim of ineffective assistance of appellate 
counsel lies for failure to raise as fundamental error an issue not preserved in the trial 
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court. Mintun v. State, 144 Idaho 656, 661-62, 168 P.3d 40, 45-46 (Ct. App. 2007). 
McKay v. State, No. 34271, 2008 Ida. App. LEXIS 75, at *6 n.2 (Ct. App. July 2, 2008) 
The court must dismiss this claim because it was not preserved for appeal. 
Reviewing Discovery Photos 
In his petition, Roberts has claimed his appellate attorney was ineffective for 
refusing to review the legality of the photos that were disclosed by the State in discovery. 
Roberts voluntarily withdrew this claim in the affidavit he filed July 11, 2016. See Pg. 16 
regarding claims "D) 4" The court must dismiss this claim. 
WHEREFORE the Respondent requests that this court grant its Motion for 
Summary Disposition of the claims in Roberts' petition. 
DATED this ~ of October, 2016. 
elley W. Akamatsu 
eputy Prosecuting Attorney 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREB y CERTIFY that on this 11 ~h day of O e._, tobo..,r 2016, I 
caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing to be placed in the United States 
mail, postage prepaid, addressed to: 
John Defranco 
1031 E. Park Blvd. 
Boise, Idaho 83712 
Electronically Filed
10/11/2016 4:48:56 PM
Fourth Judicial District, Ada County
Christopher D. Rich, Clerk of the Court
By: Rose Wright, Deputy Clerk
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JAN M. BENNETTS 
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney 
Shelley W. Akamatsu 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
200 West Front Street, Suite 3191 
Boise, Idaho 83 702 
Telephone: (208) 287-7700 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
STEVEN EUGENE ROBERTS, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, 
Respondent. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Case No. CV PC 2016 05792 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
DISPOSTION OF PETITION 
AND ADMISSION OF 
EXHIBIT 1, 2 and 3 
COMES NOW, the State of Idaho, by and through Shelley W. Akamatsu, Deputy 
Prosecuting Attorney and moves for summary dismissal of Roberts' petition for post-
conviction relief pursuant to Idaho Code § 19-4906( c ). 
The respondent moves the court to summarily dismiss the twenty-five claims in the 
petition as they fail to raise a genuine issue of material fact, are bare and conclusory, are 
forfeited, barred and contrary to t 
DATEDthis (p day =of~~~~....lolCl~._oL- 2016. 
iJu.~!La~ Sfuilley W. Akamatsu 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this / / t-h day of c)dnbfu 2016, I 
caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing to be placed in the United States mail, 
postage prepaid, addressed to: 
John DeFranco 
1031 E. Park Blvd. 
Boise, Idaho 83 712 
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IN THE , SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDftBO 
Supreme Court No. 42534 
STATE OF IDAHO, ) 
) 
Plaintiff-Respondent, ) ~ [§~.~-n}!1g@ ) v. ) 
) 7 '. " 
STEVEN E. ROBERTS, III, ) 
) OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAi. 
Defendant-Appellant. ) 
HONORABLE STEVEN HIPPLER, JUDGE PRESIDING 
T R A N S C R I P T O N A P P E A L 
Fourth Judicial District 
Ada County 
APPEARANCES: 
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN 
ATTORNEY GENERAL, Boise, Idaho 
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I THURSDAY, MAY 22, 2014 the June 16 trial date. When you said earlier in the 
• • • week, let's do June 5th at 2:30 . 
I MR. CHASTAIN: Thank you, your Honor. THE COURT: This is State of Idaho v. Steven MR. WITTWER: Your Honor, I'm supposed to be 
Roberts, CRFE12-17029. I have a number of motions 5 doing a sentencing hearing in front of 
I 6 that we have set for this afternoon. Is this the Judge Wetherell. I wonder if you can find another pretrial as well? I'm not sure. time on that day that might work. If not, I can get 
MR. CHASTAIN: It is not, your Honor. The 6 one of my colleagues to cover my cases. 
I pretrial is June 6. THE COURT: Later in the day or earlier? 10 THE COURT: When is trial? 10 MR. WITTWER: Could you do 3:30? 
l l MR. CHASTAIN: June 16. 11 THE COURT: Sure. 
I 12 THE COURT: Okay. 12 MR. WITTWER: So that would be 3:30 on the 13 MR. CHASTAIN: Judge, since we are on that, 13 5th. 
H would the court have any time just earlier in the 14 THE COURT: Let's take an Inventory of what 
I 15 
week of June 6th to do the pretrial? If possible I 15 we have for this afternoon. We have Mr. Chastain 
16 would like to not do - I'll certainly make myself 16 your motion with respect to housing the defendant at 
17 available if the court orders, but if this state and 17 the Ada County Jail in advance of trial? 
16 the court just have any time any day earlier in the 18 MR. CHASTAIN: Yes, your Honor. 
I 19 week for the pretrial, I would appreciate it. 19 THE COURT: What else do we have? We have 20 THE COURT: I'm sure we can squeeze you in 20 your Motion in Li mine also relative to the DNA 
21 one of the afternoon. How about the 12th? 21 databank, is that right? 
I 22 MR. CHASTAIN: Judge, that would be fine. 22 MR. WITTWER: That's my motion. 23 Does that work for you? 2 3 Mr. Chastain has another motion about the clothing of 
24 MR.WITTWER: I believe so. 24 the defendant at trial. I don't object to either of 
I 25 THE COURT: I'm sorry. I was looking from 25 the defense's motions. 
I 7 8 
THE COURT: Okay. The Ada County Jail start him on the 9th. 
I motion, when did you want to have him transported? 2 MR. CHASTAIN: The 9th will be plenty of 3 MR. CHASTAIN: Judge, I was hoping that he time. 
would just stay from the·date that he comes for the THE COURT: Why don't we have him start on 
I pretrial through the end of the trial. And actually the 9th. They run the transport between the south we had the chance, both the state and myself, to talk Idaho facility and jail every day for the most part. 
with the head of transport team yesterday. I give MR. CHASTAIN: I did -- I hope the order got 
I him a head's-up that this motion was coming, and it's through with the motion, if I ask the c:ourt perhaps 9 my understanding, and I think Mr. Wittwer will to interlineate --
10 confirm, that the jail is not opposed to this. 10 THE COURT: I'll just interlineate it. And 
I l1 He's actually still on their books. ll then I'll grant your motion with respect to civllian 12 He's being held on this. He's simply out at the 12 clothing and without shackles. I believe that the 
13 penitentiary because he's got a different sentence 13 marshals do use weighted material under the clothing. 
14 he's serving. So the jail will accommodate this 14 MR. CHASTAIN: That works fine, your Honor. 
I 15 situation. 15 THE COURT: I did notice going way back in 16 THE COURT: Mr. Wittwer. 16 the file there was Rule 609 notice given, and I 
17 MR.WITTWER: I agree. Your Honor, I was 17 haven't seen it specifically notic:ed for hearing. 
I 18 there when Mr. Chastain talked to Sgt Harris at the 1e MR. CHASTAIN: I can address that without 19 jail yesterday. I don't have any opposition to 19 making the state. 
20 either request with regard to housing the defendant 20 Judge, I've met with my client and 
I 21 or how he appears at trial. 21 while we have not made a decision as to whether or 22 THE COURT: I didn't figure you would have 22 not he is going testify, he is fully aware that 
23 an opposition to how he appeared for trial. That's 23 should he testify, at least as to the two prior 
I 24 fine. If you're not going to meet with him on the 24 judgments of conviction for burglary, grand theft, 25 6th, 7th or 8th, I didn't know if it made sense to 25 that the state would be entitled to impeach to the 
I 
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limits imposed by 609(a). 
We are not going to make the state 
3 fight it out in front of the court. We understand, 
we acknowledge that should he decide to testify, that 
the state would question him on that. And so to that 
extent we are put on notice and we understand that 
, the court will doubtless allow them to do so. 
8 MR. WITTWER: Your Honor, could I address 
9 one issue on that? 
10 THE COURT: You may. 
11 MR. WITTWER: I did, I think it was late 
12 last year after I fifed the original notice, I filed 
13 an amended notice that included a couple of other 
14 older convictions, and I told Mr. Chastain I was 
15 going to withdraw that because I didn't·· I filed it 
16 first, but I don't believe that I would be able to 
11 with the time frame, I think they're too old •• 
18 THE COURT: I saw those. I would not have 
19 been inclined to grant those with respect to the time 
20 frame. 
21 MR. WITTWER: Absolutely. So I'll just 
22 withdraw that from the record. 
23 THE COURT: Very well. Mr. Wittwer, then 
24 it's your motion on the DNA. 
25 Just for the record before we get 
accused in this case if they didn't understand there 
2 was that link. 
3 Now, the report that I received from 
the DNA analyst at the state lab spoke in terms of 
5 the convicted offender samples that are contained in 
6 the Codis. When I spoke with her subsequent to my 
filing this notice, I met with her last week at her 
office •• she is an experiences DNA analyst, she has 
testified in many trials - and she told me that the 
Jo way she normally handles this type of testimony at 
J J trial is to speak In very generic terms about a 
12 database of individuals or a database of persons. 
1J I want to indicate to the court that 
14 what I would anticipate the testimony would be, 
15 essentially, is that the DNA profiles were created 
16 from the blood evidence from the scene of the crime, 
11 that that profile was then entered into a database of 
18 individuals and that a match was identified or a 
19 potential match on a DNA sample was identified as 
20 belonging to Mr. Steven Roberts, Ill. And that would 
21 essentially be the extent of what we would address. 
22 But just so we can make that connection 
23 Indicating how we identified the defendant in this 
2• case -
25 THE COURT: To the extent you need to use 
11 
going, the defendant is present in custody. I don't 
think I made that note to begin with. 
MR. WITTWER: Your Honor, I spoke with 
Mr. Chastain just before court and explained to him I 
guess a modification, is how I would characterize it, 
a modification what I propose to introduce at trial. 
According to the notice that I filed, 
basically we have a situation where Mr. Roberts was 
initially Identified as the suspect in this case 
Jo because the police·· state crime lab was able to 
11 create a DNA profile from some blood samples that 
12 were found at the scene of crime. 
13 Those were entered into the Cod is, 
H Combined DNA Index System, and searched against the 
1s DNA profiles contained therein and the lab came back 
16 with a hit, potential match on a DNA sample that had 
11 been previously submitted Into the database belonging 
18 to Mr. Roberts. So that's how he was initially 
19 identified as the suspect in this case. 
20 And the reason why I brought this issue 
21 up is because I think that presenting this testimony 
22 to the jury, initially the police did not have a 
23 suspect, and it would leave a huge hole, I guess, the 
2 4 story and the theory of the case as to how 
25 Mr. Roberts even became to sit in that chair as the 
the actual •• maybe you don't need to use the actual 
DNA results, can you sanitize the printout so it 
omits the offender language. 
MR. WITTWER: Yeah, and actually, your 
Honor, the state, in a lot of DNA cases, we don't 
present any kind of factual physical evidence or 
exhibits. In this case I'm not anticipating 
introducing anything like that to the jury, so it 
would be strictly the testimony of the analyst saying 
10 she entered them into the database, the individuals, 
11 and he was identified as a potential match. 
12 So I would be able to avoid any mention 
1 J or suggestion that he Is a previously convicted 
14 person. And so I think that given kind of the 
15 importance of that evidence to be given to the jury, 
16 I think that balances prejudice and the importance 
11 the probative value of that evidence. So I would ask 
1e the court to allow that testimony to that extent. 
19 THE COURT: Thank you. 
20 Mr. Chastain? 
21 MR,CHASTAIN: Your Honor, I appreciate the 
22 state's efforts to sanitize as much possible. I 
23 think, given how I anticipate the evidence to come 
24 out in this case, the jury is going to be able to 
2~ make their conclusion as to whether or not 
10 
12 
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Mr. Roberts was the source of the blood found at the 
scene of the fire on the broken glass without the 
J necessity of even taking the chance of a jury 
perhaps --
THE COURT: Would you agree that the fact 
• that his blood was found at the scene is relevant in 
terms of identification and placement at the scene? 
8 MR. CHASTAIN: Absolutely. I understand the 
state is going to introduce that. The point I was 
10 going to make is I anticipate the state is going to 
11 bring in testimony from the detective who traveled 
12 down to Louisiana and met with Mr. Roberts, swabbed 
1J his cheek, Mr. Roberts voluntarily gave him the swab, 
14 he didn't resist, and the court will note, as the 
15 state has noted, you're not seeing any DNA experts 
16 listed in our witness list because there are none. 
11 And we are anticipating, honestly, 
18 should the state be able to lay a proper foundation 
19 and their scientist testifies and it's otherwise 
20 accepted into evidence, I think it's pretty clear 
21 that this identity issue is not going to be a large 
22 one. 
2J Again, we're not conceding, we are 
24 going to put the state through its burden in terms of 
25 laying a proper scientific and chain of custody 
are going to find out, A, was this really Mr. Roberts 
blood or was it one of the other one in 660 million 
people who it could be tied to, that's honestly not 
part of the defense. 
THE COURT: I take it what you're saying, so 
6 I have this straight, you're not contesting the idea 
that the DNA evidence would come in, assuming the 
proper foundation can be laid. What you're 
suggesting is that effectively the jury perhaps 
10 believed that that match was made between the swab 
11 taken by the detective in Louisiana versus the blood 
12 that was found at the scene versus the blood that was 
13 found at the scene and the Cod is and --
14 MR. CHASTAIN: I'm fully expecting the state 
15 will be able to have their witness say the blood 
16 found on the broken glass and around the frame of the 
n window matches, based on the DNA testing done 
18 pursuant to taking the swab from Mr. Roberts' cheek, 
19 those individuals are one in the same. 
20 I don't think the state has to go to 
21 Cod is at all. Maybe for a good crime novel you need 
22 to do that sort of thing here. Why take the chance 
23 that a juror extrapolates he's been in prison before. 
24 THE COURT: Sure. Clearly we don't want to 
2s tell the jury for that reason. 
1 3 
1, 
foundation as to the blood, the swabs, etcetera. And 
I know the state has their experts noticed up on 
their witness list. 
I Just don't think the court needs --
the jury doesn't need to know that, "Hey, just like 
on CSI we are doing this really exhaustive' --
1 THE COURT: What is it you're objecting to 
precisely? 
9 MR. CHASTAIN: Judge, it's just the mere 
10 fact I think Codis is well-known enough that it's 
11 known that criminals in the state, convicted felons 
12 are required to have swabs. It's an interesting 
13 lead, but I don't see where the state is hurt if the 
14 detective says, Hey, listen, I had to go to Louisiana 
15 to meet with Mr. Roberts, I swabbed his cheek because 
1. we wanted--
11 THE COURT: Would the •• wel I, what brought 
10 your detectives to Louisiana? 
19 MR. CHASTAIN: An airplane? 
20 THE COURT: Touche. 
21 MR. CHASTAIN: I mean, when the state is 
22 listing 404(b) -- and I appreciate Mr. Wittwer, he 
23 told me before court about the proposed change in 
24 testimony and certainly that is more acceptable. But 
2s this isn't going to be a case where l anticipate we 
MR. CHASTAIN: Should he choose to testify, 
then his felony record becomes a matter of record, 
but that's -· I don't think it needs to be introduced 
before that point. 
THE COURT: Right. 
Do you feel you have the same problem 
if the testimony is that the blood at the scene was 
tested, that blood was ran for a ONA sample, It 
matched Mr. Roberts, and based upon that, the 
10 investigation pursued in that direction. 
11 MR. CHASTAIN: I don't think Codis says 
12 that. I think Codis comes back and say there's a 
13 potential match. And that's certainly better than 
14 what I think the state had first proposed as I read 
u and responded to their motion. 
1s THE COURT: Certainly I don't think I would 
11 have allowed the state to say the match was based 
1a upon a registry of offenders. I think that goes too 
19 far and unnecessarily puts into evidence Mr. Roberts 
20 criminal background. 
21 MR. CHASTAIN: I think In terms of how the 
22 case is going to be tried, the state doesn't need 
23 404(b) evidence when it's my belief, unless their 
24 witnesses don't come to court for whatever reason, 
25 are going to be able to make the establishment 
14 
16 
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]1 18 
I between the cheek swab that was taken directly from understanding of how it is that the detectives went 
I 
my client by local law enforcement In Louisiana, to Louisiana and talked to him. Now, there may be --
transported back to the Idaho State Crime Lab by the I haven't seen the Motion in Limine filed, there's 
Boise detective and tested by local forensic obviously going to be other issues about the fact he 
scientists. Again, if I was able to come up with was in custody in Louisiana, as I understand it. 
I something to fight that, I would have listed it. So That may also be an issue we need to address. 7 far we've not been able to contest the ONA sample. MR. CHASTAIN: Judge, it's an interesting 
THE COURT: Okay. I think I understand what question which I have thought about. However, it's 
I you're saying. At think we're all in agreement the important to the defense that the jury know that my 10 fact that the defendant's DNA was -· I'm going to use 10 client willingly gave a sample without --
11 the word "matched" in a very non-scientific way 11 THE COURT: Right. 
I 12 here -- the fact your defendant's DNA matched the DNA 12 MR. CHASTAIN: So there's a trade off that 13 found in the blood sample at the scene I don't th ink 13 both Mr. Wittwer and I are aware of. Some of it you 
14 it really an issue. 14 can't completely sanitize. I just don't see any 
I 
15 MR. CHASTAIN: That's correct. 1 5 reason for the Codis. 
16 THE COURT: Assuming proper foundation, it's us THE COURT: I understand. 
17 going to come in. The question is what the jury is 17 Mr. Wittwer, if you can address that 
18 told by way of witnesses of how that match was 18 question. What I hear Mr. Chastain saying is why not 
I 19 completed. 1 9 either leave it open or have the jury believe -- it's 2 0 MR. CHASTAIN: And I'm not sure it's 20 one of those white lies we allow juries to believe-· 
2 1 important how it was completed just the fact that it 21 that the match came from the swab versus the Codis 
I 22 was. 22 sample. 23 THE COURT: Where it may be important, and I 23 MR.WITIWER: Right. I can certainly 
2, would like to ask Mr. Wittwer some further questions 2 4 understand that need to, I guess, insulate the jury 
I ?. 5 here, perhaps putting together for the jury an 2 ~ from any unfairly prejudicial testimony or evidence. 
19 20 
But I think what you're hinting at is we can only, I be acceptable to, if we need to find another way to 
I guess, whitewash it so much. And the fact that this do this, to testify that the DNA profile was created DNA profile that was obtained from the blood evidence from the blood evidence and after creating that DNA 
at the scene was entered into Cod is is an essential profile, Mr. Roberts was identified as a suspect and 
I 5 step of the process, that's part of the DNA analysis based on that there was this warrant that was 6 process. And if there's this -- obtained. 
7 THE COURT: Is it acceptable-· let's just I think that -- just also commenting on 
I say we need to get there for foundational purposes, your question about why he's In custody down in because I haven 't heard a stipulation that the DNA Louisian·a, it's my understanding based on the 
10 samples -- a stipulation there's not an objection to 10 timeline that our detectives based on the DNA 
I 11 the DNA evidence as a whole. 11 potential match from Codis, they were able to obtain 1 2 Is it sufficient for your client -- 12 an arrest warrant for Mr. Roberts and that he was 
13 pardon me, your detective or DNA expert to say that ]) arrested in Louisiana related to this case. 
H the blood evidence at the scene was analyzed for DNA 14 THE COURT: Was the swab analyzed? 
I 1 5 and that ONA was tested based upon samples that -- 15 MR. WITTWER: Yes. So what happened then is 1 6 based upon -- that it was tested and it was felt to 16 the detective did go down to Louisiana for the 
17 be a statistical match, or however they phrase it, 17 purposes of -- did try to interview the defendant, 
I 18 for Mr. Roberts. How his sample came to be something 18 but they also wanted to get that swab because the DNA 19 against which it was tested -- 19 analyst said in order to actually confirm this Codis 
20 MR.WITIWER: Right. And I guess the only 20 hit, we need to obtain a known reference sample with 
I 2 1 thing I can speak to for the analyst is what she has 2 1 chain of custody. The Codis samples don't have the 22 told me, and that is she's told me what she actually 22 same chain of custody requirements and so forth, so 
2 3 did. I would have to leave it to her to say what she 23 they're not considered evldentiary in the same way 
I 2 4 would feel comfortable testifying to. 24 the swab would be. 25 I could perhaps speculate that it may 25 So Det. Duggan goes to Louisiana, 
I 
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21 22 
I 
obtains the swab, brings It back and it is submitted there's this big gap that the jury is left scratching 
to the state Jab, it is tested, and the DNA profile 2 their heads about, "I don't really understand how 
I that was taken from Mr. Roberts directly matched the 3 Mr. Roberts came to be a suspect," I th ink that could sample of blood. So perhaps maybe we can leave it at be prejudicial to the state's case unfairly as well . 
that, have the analyst testified: I obtained the DNA I would ask the court to consider that 
I profile from the blood and as a result Mr. Steven E. in making your decision. I would prefer she at least Roberts, Ill, was identified as a suspect. be able to say the database of individuals . But if 
8 THE COURT: Mr. Chastain? the court isn't willing to do that, the other option 
I MR. CHASTAIN: Judge, that's certainly I propose would be acceptable. 10 better. I'm not unmindful that the state needs a 10 THE COURT: Here is rny thought on it, I 
ll narrative, but, again, I'm not sure that Cod ls is 11 think clearly the DNA sample in terms of the DNA 
I 12 relevant to the ultimate question: Is the blood on 12 profile from the blood found at the scene on the 13 the glass and the window frame that of Mr. Roberts. 13 glass with the swab that was taken - the evidentiary 
14 MR. WITTWER: Your Honor, may I make one 14 sample we will call it -- clearly that, assuming 
I 
!5 other additional comment. I think to some extent - 15 appropriate foundation, is going to come in. 
16 and, aga in, I think our DNA analyst would be better 16 The issue, then, really is how do we 
17 at answering this question definitively·· because it 17 get from glass with blood to Mr. Roberts. I think 
18 is a part of the process, I think, how she actually 1 8 that there is some relevance, from what I see so far, 
I 19 went through and ultimately was able to confirm the 19 to the state to be able to give a narrative to the 20 blood at the scene was Mr. Roberts, I think the whole 20 jury about why Mr. Roberts became a suspect. 
21 process explaining that, to the extent we can, to the 2 1 And so I think that there does need --
I 22 jury goes to her credibility and the process that she 22 the relevance of testimony about the investigative 23 goes through in order to obtain those results. 23 process of how he became suspect is relevant. So I 
24 We are obviously trying to convince the 24 think that we can trod down that path. And we need 
I 25 jury that you can reply upon this witness, and if 25 to, in my mind, sanitize as much as we can the fact 
I 23 24 
that that sample -- the reason that he became a something to appeal Mr. Chastain. 
I suspect was, in part, due to the fact that he has a MR. CHASTAIN: All right. Thank you . criminal history. That's the part we need to THE COURT: I understand that you may 
sanitize as much possible. ultimately need to make an objection for purposes 
I I guess what I would suggest to you •• once you get there, but at least you'll have the this is probably not a straightforward answer for 6 opportunity to participate in the process of getting 
you-· is that the two of you try to work together to there. 
I try to come up with a narrative with that in mind and MR. CHASTAIN: As long as I can make that let me know between now and the pretrial and see what record at the appropriate time. Thank you, 
10 you can agree to. 10 your Honor. 
I 11 If you can't come to an agreement, then 11 THE COURT: And then It's my understanding 12 I'll give you a ruling based on your proposals at 12 at this time there's no Motion in Limine by the 
13 that time with the idea of I think you know where I 13 defense with respect to the 609 notice given by the 
I 
14 want to go on this, which is that I think it is H state as to the two felon les from the 2006 time 
15 relevant but I think we need to sanitize it. 15 frame. The older ones are not going to come in . 
16 So how do we best sanitize it in a way 16 I appreciate the state's notice on 
17 that does not unduly impact the state's witness but 17 those but I'm not going to allow those in . I don't 
I 10 does not necessarily or minimizes the risk the jury 18 hear the state suggesting they should come in at the 19 will be aware that sample came because of Mr. Roberts 19 end of the day. I think given the fact they're over 
20 criminal past. 2 0 ten years old, they're a California conviction, and 
I 21 So see what you can work on together. 21 it's not even clear from the face of -- it sound like 22 I think you know at least the theory of where I want 22 joyriding is what it it sounds like. I'm not sure 
23 to go, and I'll let you two try to craft that 23 how old the defendant was at that time, but I'm not 
I 24 narrative in a way that might work for both of you . 24 sure that the materiality of that, the relevance of 25 And then obviously I'll give you a ruling so you have 25 that in terms of veracity is high enough to overcome 
I 
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I the substantial relevance against prejudice. THE COURT: Outline for me. 
The two older ones won't come in based MR. WITIWER: I have a document for the 
I 3 upon the lack of objection at this point. I think court. Mr. Chastain's reading the leaves, those are the MR. CHASTAIN: I have no objection to the 
ones, if the defendant elects to testify, likely court accepting that. 
I would come in. MR.WITIWER: Your Honor, it was on May 19 Is there anything else on this file that I filed this, and it's titled "Motion to Allow 
8 that I need to take up? 0 Admission of Preliminary Hearing Testimony of an 
I MR. WITIWER: Yes, your Honor. Unavailable Witness." 10 Last week I filed with the court a 10 There is a witness who is the 
II motion to allow the admission of the preliminary 11 defendant's ex-girlfriend, who she did testify at the 
I 1 2 hearing testimony of what I believe to be an 12 preliminary hearing. I believe your file probably 1 3 unavailable witness. Did you court receive that? 13 has the preliminary hearing transcript so you can 
14 THE COURT: If we did, I haven't seen it. 1 H review her testimony. She was cross-examined by 
15 MR. CHASTAIN: 
1 
Your Honor, I was going to-· 15 Mr. Chastain at that hearing. And I have learned 
I 16 I told Mr. Wittwer I was going to ask additional 16 that she is pregnant and is scheduled with her 17 time. My client was Just made aware of that today, 17 doctor, and the letter confirms that she is supposed 
18 given the vicissitude of getting mailed and visiting 18 to be having a C-section on June 16th. 
I 1 9 at ICC. So I would like to set that to a different 1 9 And because of that, what she has 20 time. I understand it's a matter of some urgency for 20 represented to me - this letter from her doctor 
21 the state. 21 admittedly is not detailed at all, just confirmed she 
I 2 2 THE COURT: Why don't you •• I don't see 22 is scheduled to have surgery 6/16/14. What she has 23 that in here. 23 informed me is she is scheduled for this C-section, 
24 MR. WITTWER: Your Honor, can I at least 24 and she anticipates being in the hospital for a few 
I 25 today give you an understanding what I'm asking. 25 days, perhaps up to five days. 
I 27 2 8 
I know little or nothing about about that. I don't know about the logistics of 
I C-sections. I looked on-line to see what typical doing that between now and trial, if we would be able 3 recovery t ime is, and it appears it's not unusual to to get that accomplished with her. The testimony 
have anywhere between two and five days in the that I anticipate coming out at trial is virtually 
I hospital following C-sectlon and then it's advisable identical to what was given at the preliminary 6 there's just complete rest after that. Bleeding can hearing. That's why I elected -· 
7 be accompanied with it. It's not unusual for pain THE COURT: I understand, and I'm not 
I medications to be necessary to alleviate pain. ruling, obviously. My concern is in terms of the 9 Based on those circumstances, it's her defendant. Of course the ability to cross-examine at 
10 feeling ·· and I agree with her -- that she would be 10 preliminary hearing is a little different in terms of 
I 11 unable physically to come to court during this week 11 the ability to cross-examine at trial, understanding 12 of trial and testify. And because of that under, 12 the scope of where the bodies are buried •• to sort 
13 Idaho Rule of evidence 804, she can be found by this ll of throw out a phrase, that's probably not 
14 court to be an unavailable witness. I would ask the 14 appropriate, but in the sense of where to 
I 15 court to give some consideration to this. Of course 1 5 cross-examine, I'm concerned that the ability to it 16 we can come back and Mr. Chastain could make his 1 6 fully cross-examine. 
17 arguments. 17 And I understand sometimes this happens 
I 18 I am going to ask the court to find she 18 a witness dies or otherwise becomes unavailable, I'm 19 is unavailable and that it's appropriate to allow her l9 wondering where we know the witness Is going to be 
20 testimony in from the preliminary hearing in lieu of 20 unavailable, there may be an opportunity to give 
I 21 her live testimony. 21 defense the ability to perhaps more meaningfully 22 THE COURT: Has there been consideration 2 2 cross-examine through a videotape deposition. I 
23 given to a Rule 15 deposition. 2) wondering if that could be considered. 
I 2 4 MR.WITIWER: I did give some 2 1 MR. WITTWER: Perhaps we can talk about that 2 5 consideration -- I haven't talked to Mr. Chastain 25 as well. 
I 
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? 9 30 
I THE COURT: Why don't you talk about that. interested in getting the case tried as well. He and 
2 Even if it needs -- if you feel like you need to have I just have not had time to discuss the 
I me there during a deposition to rule on anything that ramifications, and my concern the same as the court. comes up, we can figure that out as well. I was at the preliminary hearing and I was very new 
5 MR.WITIWER: Mr. Chastain did comment, and to the case at that time. 
I 6 I agree that this is an issue that has some urgency I'm going to meet with Mr. Roberts for the state. I need to be able to prepare and know hopefully Wednesday morning, and so we should be 
what I'm going to be presenting at trial and when she able -- actually, if we can get him transported to 
I is technically or legally unavailable. The date of the jail early, I can meet with him here rather than 10 the 5th that we now have for our pretrial, I would IQ have to go out to ICC. 
11 prefer, if we could, to get this issue resolved 11 THE COURT: I see what you're saying. When 
I 12 before then. 12 would you want him transferred? 13 THE COURT: Why don't you talk it over 13 MR. CHASTAIN: If he could be here at 8:30. 
14 and -- how about 2:30 Wednesday the 28th. 14 THE COURT: We will enter -- if you give me 
15 MR. CHASTAIN: Works fine. 15 an order to transport, I'll sign that. 
I 16 MR.WITIWER: Thank you. 16 MR. CHASTAIN: I'll get one, your Honor. 17 THE COURT: Why don't you guys try to work 11 If the court was done with that, I had 
18 it out. I do understand the concern that might exist 18 one other heads-up. 
I 19 in terms of the ability to c;ross-examine perhaps with 19 THE COURT: Okay. 20 better idea of where the c;ase is at now versus then. 20 MR. CHASTAIN: Mr. Roberts has asked a 
21 MR. CHASTAIN: Your Honor, if I might just 2; number of times throughout- since this case has 
I 22 add. Judge, the reason I need some more time is 22 been going on that he is interested in a trial before 23 Mr. Roberts didn't see this motion until then. I 23 the court. And he is -- I have not filed a motion, 
24 will tell the court that Mr. Roberts probably 24 and I will do so, because I think that's his firm 
I 25 actually does not want this trial moved. He is 25 desire. We've talked about that he's got the 
I 31 32 
absolute constitutional right to have a trial by MR.WITTWER: I appreciate the court's 
I 2 jury. He further knows the state has a right to direction on that. Judge, there was -- sorry to keep 3 trial by jury. J you longer than you probably want to, and I think we 
I sprang that on Mr. Wittwer before can dispose of this quickly, I wanted to make the 
I 5 court today. And so I will just let the court know record. I did file a Motion in Limine asking the that Mr. Roberts, I think, is going to insist that I court to rule that the defense is not allowed to 
7 file such a motion, as is his right, and I would raise the defense of alibi, since they haven't 
I 8 probably notice that up for -- I might be able to get complied with the notice. it noticed up for the 28th or the 5th. That's one we And Mr. Chastain told me in other 
10 could deal with at pretrial fairly easily. He's 10 conversations informally that he doesn't intend to 
I 11 thought long and hard about that, if I can paraphrase 11 present any alibi defense in this case except insofar 12 it. 12 as his client has the right to testify. So I wanted 
13 THE COURT: Notice either one you want. 13 to bring that up and I guess have the court dispose 
14 Talk to Mr. Wittwer and see what their position is 14 of that issue finally. 
I 15 ultimately going to be. If Mr. Wittwer is not going 1, THE COURT: Alibi does require notice and 16 to object to that process, I would need to inquire of 16 notice has not been given. The defendant Is 
17 your client. 17 furthermore not asking the court at this point to 
I 18 MR. CHASTAIN: Absolutely. 18 find good cause for the excuse of a notice. I will 19 THE COURT: And Mr. Wittwer, I will tell you 19 grant .the motion based on what I have at this time. 
20 that as you're talking with Mr. Chastain, I would be 20 MR. CHASTAIN: We don't have an alibi 
I 21 thinking about the availability of the witness for a 21 defense, your Honor. 22 further deposition in terms of scheduling. That may 22 MR. WITTWER: Thank you, your Honor. 
23 be perhaps the best answer to this question. I'm not 23 (Proceedings concluded.) 
24 decide anything now, it's kind of a thought I have at 24 ••• I 2S this point. 25 
I 
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REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
COUNTY OF ADA ) 
I, CHRISTIE VALCICH, Certified Court 
Reporter of the County of Ada, State of Idaho, hereby 
certify: 
That I am the reporter who transcribed 
33 
the proceedings had in the above-entitled action in 
machine shorthand and thereafter the same was reduced 
into typewriting under my direct supervision; and 
that the foregoing transcript contains a full, true, 
and accurate record of the proceedings had in the 
above and foregoing cause, which was heard at Boise, 
Idaho. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set 
my haod this 14th day of Jao,·4 
CHRISTIE V CICH, CSR-RPR 
Ada County Courtliouse 
200 West Front Street 
Boise, Idaho 
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l. Incident Topic 
!Arson 1st De!=lree 
3. Address 
5824 W RANDOLPH DR, BOISE 
S. Date Occurred 16. Time Occured 
09101/2012 · I 04:12 
Person w/ MCPHIE, JESSE . 
Knowledge 
Address:BOISE, ID -
Occupation: 
Bus or School: 
' ID 
Person w/ MCPHIE, CHRISTINE . 
Knowledge 
Add 7970 BOBRAN 
ress :
1 
ID _ 
Boise Police Departme,'· 
Narrative Report 
12. Subiect/Victim's Name 
!HOLLEY JENNIFER J 
14.Phone 
I 
/7. Route To 
I Countv Prosecutor 
Race: U 
lbs 
Res Phone: ( ) • 
Cell Phone: (208) 
Bus Phone: ( ) • 
Race: U 
lbs 
Sex: DOB: 
Hair Color: 
SSN: - -
OLN/St: / ID 
Sex: U DOB: 
Hair Color: 
Occupation: Res Phone: ( } • SSN: • -
OLN/St: / ID Bus or School: Cell Phone: (: 
, ID Bus Phone: ( ) • 
Vehicle lnfo:1995 Geo PRI 4D RED 1A3L581 ID MCPHIE, BRANDIE CHRISTINE 
I Narrative · I 
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION: 
RD: 32 jDR# 2012-220521 
Is. Division 
I PROPERTY 
Age: 
Eye Color: 
Relationship: Child of Boy/Girlfriend 
Injury Type: 
Howldent.: 
Age: 
Eye Color: 
Relationship: Boy/Girlfriend 
Injury Type: 
Howldent.: 
Upon reviewing Det. M. Hill's Arson report under DR# 223651 I learned that (S) Steven Eguene Roberts 
Ill may have been living with girlfriend (W) Christine McPhie and her son Jesse McPhie at 7970 Sobran 
in Boise during the time of the Arson on Randolph St. 
INVOLVED PERSONS RELATIONSHIP(S): 
· (S) Steven Roberts 
(PK) Christine McPhie--Girlfriend of (S) Steven Roberts 
(PK) Jesse McPhie--Son of Christine McPhie and son of Christine 
SUSPECT INTERVIEW: 
(S) Roberts left the area and is unavailable for an interview. 
WITNESS INTERVIEW: (PK) Christine McPhie 
I contacted Christine from the information in Det. Hill's report on 11/13/2012 and asked her when Robert5 
had moved in with her at her Sobran residence. Christine states that Roberts moved in on August 27th 
ofthis year, she also stated that he did not stay very long. I explained to Christine that I was 
investigating an incident that occurred during the early morning hours on September 1st of this year, 
Saturday morning, and told her that this would have happened about five days after he had moved in. 
Christine states that she remembers the weekend and states that she woke up sometime between 0100 
jAdmin 
Officer( s) Reporting 
Ofc. Tony Davidson 
Approved Supervisor 
Cpl. Wade Spain 
Ada No. 
642 
Ada No 
435 
Approved Date 
11/14/2012 07:19 
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1. Incident Tonic 
~ rson 1st Deq ree 
3. Address 
5824 W RANDOLPH DR ; BOISE 
5. Date Occurred 16. Time Occured 
os,0112012 I 04:12 
Boise Police Departme·· [;.,; 
Narrative Report 
12. Suf>i ect/Victim's Name 
IHOLLEY, JENNIFER J 
14.Phone 
I 
17. Route To 
I Countv Prosecutor 
RD: 32 IDR# 2012-220521 
18. Division 
I PROPERTY 
and 0300 Saturday morning and found that Roberts was not in bed. Christine states that she called 
Roberts and that he told her that he was at the Eclipse dance club with her son Jesse. Christine told me 
that she was upset because she knows that Roberts is an alcoholic and that she knew he had been 
drinking when she spoke with him. Christine states that Roberts had taken her maroon Geo Prism and 
was driving it. Christine states that Roberts told her that he was with her son Jesse at the dance club. 
Christine states that she told Roberts to come home but that he did not return to her residence until 1900 
hours on Saturday night. Christine states that Roberts explained his absence by claiming that he knows 
he is going back to prison and that he went to Idaho Falls to see his mother prior to be sent back to 
prison. 
I asked Christine if she remembered if Roberts had a cut on his body when she saw him on Saturday 
evening upon returning to her house. Christine states that Roberts did have a cut but did not remember 
where it was on his body. Christine asked her son Jesse where the cut was while she was on the phone 
with me and Jesse told her that the cut was on Roberts' right elbow. Christine suggested that I speak 
with Jesse because he was with Roberts at the dance club and may have more information. Christine 
also stated that when Roberts came back home on Saturday night, he left after they spoke and that he 
never spent another night at her house. 
WITNESS INTERVIEW: Jesse McPhie 
Upon speaking with Jesse McPhie he stated that he was at the Eclipse dance club located at Curtis and 
Overland, about two blocks away from the residence on Randolph St. Jesse states that while he was at 
the club he received a phone call from Roberts who asked what he was doing. Jesse states that he told 
Roberts that he was just hanging out at the club and that Roberts responded to the club around midnight 
on Friday night/ Saturday morning. Jesse states that he paid Roberts entry into the club and that 
Roberts stayed for about an hour and a half and then got up to walk out and told Jesse that he would be 
right back. 
Jesse states that Roberts left the club and then returned about 30 minutes later, and stayed at the club 
for another 20 or 30 minutes and got up to leave again, stating again that he would be back. Jesse 
states that Roberts was gone for about an hour and a half and that when he returned he had a cut on his 
right elbow and ~~the sme!led_like gpsoline. Jesse states that he as-ked-Roberts what hcid happeriea1:o-·· 
nim and that Rqberts claimed that he had been in a fight. Jesse states that he asked Roberts about 
s~Jike gasoline and that Roberts replied, I needed gas for the c9r. Jesse told me that Roberts 
was a~tin...9 ve(Y___neN ous and strange when he returned to the dance _cil!_b with the cut on his elbow and 
~melling like gasoline. ---
It is important to note that Roberts was driving Christine McPhie's maroon Geo Prism that evening/night. 
The vehicle is registered in Ada County and has license plate number 1A3L581. Jesse states that his 
mother, Christine McPhie, called Roberts sometime around 0300 and told him to come home and to · 
bring her car back. Jesse states that he left the dance club at that time and went home but that neither 
bAdmin · I 
fficer(s} Reporting Ada No. 
Ofc. Tony Davidson 642 
Approved Supervisor Ada No Approved Date 
Cpl. Wade Spain 435 11/14/2012 07:19 
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1. Incident Toa ic 
~ rson 1st DeQree 
3. Address 
5824 W RANDOLPH DR , BOISE 
5. Date Occurred 16. Time Occured 
0910112012 I 04:12 
Boise Police Departmer' 1 
Narrative Report 
12. Subiect/Victim's Name 
IHOLLEY, JENNIFER J 
14. Phone 
I 
17. Route To 
I County Prosecutor 
RD: 32 !DR# 2012-220521 
Is. Division 
I PROPERTY 
he nor his mother, Christine, saw Roberts until later Saturday evening, around 9:00 pm. 
INJURIES (VICTIM & SUSPECT): 
{S) Steven Roberts cut his elbow during the course of the arson. This cut was likely caused when he 
was making entry into the Randolph residence after breaking the large window on the north side of the 
house in the patio area. Blood drops were found on the patio surface near the window and also inside 
the house on the wall just inside the window. This blood was collect by K. McDaid and sent to the Idaho 
State Forensics Laboratory for DNA testing. This sample was tested and later matched to (S) Steven 
Eugerie Roberts Ill during a routine CODIS database search. 
DISPOSITION OF PROPERTY/EVIDENCE/WEAPONS: 
All evidence related to this case was collected and processed by K. McDaid with the Boise City Police 
Crime Lab. The blood evidence was sent to the Idaho State Laboratory for DNA testing as stated above. 
CONCLUSION: 
ROUTE TO THE ADA COUNTY PROSECUTORS OFFICE WITH THE ORIGINAL REPORT 
NARRATIVE REQUESTING AN ARREST WARRANT FOR (S) STEVEN EUGENE ROBERTS Ill FOR 
THE CRIME OF 1 ST DEGREE ARSON. 
Admin 
Officer(s) Reporting 
Ofc. Tony Davidson 
Approved Supervisor 
Cpl. Wade Spain 
Ada No. 
642 
Ada No 
435 
Approved Date 
11/14/2012 07:19 
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'· Boise Police Departmer,;··' · 
Narrative Report 
RD: 32 IDR# 2012-220521 
1; Incident Tooic 
~ rson 1st De~ree · 
3. Address 
5824 W RANDOLPH DR , BOISE 
5. Date Occurred rG. Time Occured 
os,0112012 I 04:12 
12. Subiect / Victim's Name 
!HOLLEY, JENNIFER J 
14.Phone 
I 
17. Route To · 
I Countv Prosecutor 
18. Division 
I PROPERTY 
Color Descri tion SerialNoOrlD Value 
om Arson 600 0 
Total $4,600.0( 
I Narrative I 
INITIAL RESPONSE/CONTACT: 
On 11/14/2012 I spoke with M Jennifer Holley and asked her to provide an estimate of the damage 
done to the property on Randolph St. by the Arson which occurred on 09/01/2012. 
Jennifer later called me back and stated that the damage done by the fire was $4600.00, and also stated 
that this damage was additional to the damage done by the initial incident in July. Jennifer stated that 
she is in possession of receipts that support the damage amount and is willing to produce them for court. 
I also asked Jennifer if she was familiar with, or knew, (S) Steven E. Roberts. She stated that she was 
not. 
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION: 
I also responded to the Ada County Courthouse and met with prosecutors and asked for an arrest 
warrant for (S) Roberts. I also told the prosecutors that P&P had information that Roberts was currently 
in Louisiana, according to his credit card use records. Ada County issued an arrest warrant containing a 
$1,000,000.00 bond and nationwide extradition. 
I hand delivered the arrest warrant to Ada County Records and asked that it be entered into NCIC as 
soon as possible. 
INVOLVED PERSONS RELATIONSHIP(S): 
(V) Jennifer Holley 
(S) Steven E. Roberts 
VICTIM INTERVIEW: 
See above. 
SUSPECT INTERVIEW: 
NIA 
WITNESS INTERVIEW: 
~dmin · · I 
icer(s) Reporting Ada No, 
Ofc. Tony Davidson 642 
Approved Supervisor Ada No 
Cpl. Wade Spain 435 
Approved Date 
11/15/2012 09:05 
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1. Incident Ton ic 
Arson 1st Dearee 
3. Address 
5824W RANDOLPH DR, BOISE 
15, Date Occurred 16. Time Occured 
0910112012 I 04:12 
NIA 
INJURIES (VICTIM & SUSPECT): 
See initial report 
Boise Police Departme~· 
Narrative Report 
12. Subiect!Victim's Name 
!HOLLEY, JENNIFER J 
14.Phone 
I 
17. Route To 
I County Prosecutor 
DISPOSITION OF PROPERTY/EVIDENCE/WEAPONS: 
See initial report 
CONCLUSION: 
Route to Ada County Prosecutors Office. 
k4dmin 
ff1cer(s} Reporting 
Ofc. Tony Davidson 
Approved Supeivisor 
Cpl. Wade Spain 
Ada No. 
642 
Ada No 
435 
Approved Date 
11/15/2012 09:05 
RD: 32 IDR# 2012-220521 
18. Division · 
I PROPERTY 
00 57 
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;,. , Boise Police Departmer · 
1. Incident Tonic 
J'\.rson 1st Demee 
3 . Address 
5824 W RANDOLPH DR, BOISE 
15. Date Occurred 16. Time Occured 
0910112012 I 04:12 
I Narrative I 
INITIAL RESPONSE/CONTACT: 
Narrative Report 
12. Subiect/Victim's Name 
!HOLLEY, JENNIFER J 
14. Phone 
I 
17. Route To 
I Countv Prosecutor 
RD: 32 IDR# 2012-220521 
Jn. v,v,.;;,i • ..., •• 
I PERSONS 
On 9/1/2012 I received a call from (AFC) Ayotte informing me of a fire at 5824 W. Randolph. This i! 
the same location of which a homicide/fire occurred on 7/23/2012 (DR# 217-161). Ayotte advised 
me that a second fire had been intentionally set at this location and that Detective's Davidson and 
Hill were on scene as fire investigators. Ayotte informed me that I could respond out to the scene 
as a secondary investigator; related to the homicide. 
Upon my arrival, Detective Davidson provided m~ a brief as to his initial findings. He also 
escorted me around the scene so that I could gain a better understanding of the event. Detective 
Hill and I were able to provide Detective Davidson with historical information regarding the first 
fire as well as the homicide. Given the circumstances, we all decided to work the fire as a crime 
which may be related to the initial fire/homicide. 
AREA SEARCH: I was assigned to conduct an area search of the property for potential evidence. 
This particular property is a large parcel of land with a sloping backyard. The perimeter is 
surrounded with large trees and shrubs while lacking any form of fencing. Additionally, a canal 
runs along the entire northern portion of the property. No items of evidentiary value were 
discovered on this search. 
FOLLOW UP: Detective Davidson informed me that when he arrived on scene, several officers 
were deployed to the area for purposes of conducting an area search. While doing so, many of 
the officers documented their action on the CAD report. Of particular interest, a subject by the 
name of Jeffery Northness and an associated phone number were listed on the CAD report. No 
explanation for the information was listed and therefore required investigative follow up. 
I was able to locate Jeffery Northness at his place of work; : Detective Davidson 
and I interviewed Northness and did not find reason to suspect he had any involvement in the fire, 
Jeffery Northness 
Boise. Idaho 83705 
Contacted via information gained thru his mother: 
Gale Northness 
bAdmin 
fficer(s) Reporting 
Cpl. Nicholas Duggan 
Approved Supervisor 
Sgt. Mark Barnett 
Ada No. 
510 
Ada No 
544 
Approved Date 
09/11/201216:15 
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321 322 
I that beer, he's not allowed to bring outside beer testimony back then was false, is that right? 
into Charlie Brown's, is he? A. Yes. 
I A. No, he's not . MR. CHASTAIN: Your Honor, can I have a copy Q. So he was drinking the beer outside? of the preliminary transcript handed to him or I have 
A. Yes. a partial copy. 
I Q. I just want to make sure that's the THE COURT: Whatever you prefer. case. MR. CHASTAIN: Whatever the court prefers. 
A. Yes. 8 I don't have a complete one for him. 
I Q. Okay. I am confused because back when THE COURT: I've got a copy if he needs my 10 you testified -- do you remember testifying before in 10 copy. 
11 this case? 11 MR. CHASTAIN: Whatever the court wants to 
I 12 A. Yes. 12 do is fine. 13 Q. That was back on September 16, 2013? lJ Q. Mr. McPhie, you've been handed what is 
14 A. Yes. 14 a transcript of your testimony in the preliminary 
I IS 
Q. So at that was about one year after 15 hearing from September 13, 2013. As I understand it 
16 these events took place, is that right? 1& you've read that prior to today's date in preparation 
17 A. Yes. 1 7 for testimony today? 
18 Q, And so you told the state that the 1 8 A. Yes, I have. 
I 19 testimony you gave back then was not accurate, is 19 Q. And you recall on that date you were 2 0 that right? 20 placed under oath to tell the truth, the whole truth 
21 A. Yes. 21 and nothing but the truth by the bailiff in the 
I 22 Q. And that now another nine months later 2 2 courtroom downstairs? 23 you've got better recollection? 23 A. Yes, I was. 
21 A. Yes. 2 4 Q, And you took that oath, is that right? 
I 25 Q, And so what you're saying is that your 2 5 A. Yes, I was -· I did. 
I 323 324 
I 
Q. I would like you to turn to·· there's know that. Thank you. Did you see which way he 
four pages worth ofthe testimony on each of those, I turned?" 
would like you to turn to where It says 33-34, 35-36, 3 Please read your answer there. 
take your time and find it? A. "Yes, he took a right. " 
I A. Yep, got it. Q, "Question: All right." Q. I would like to you take a second and Go ahead and read your answer. 
glance through that and make sure that that's your 7 A. "But I just seen the blinker and I 
I testimony, don't read anything out loud, I'll direct didn't see him turn ." you here in a second. Q. "Question: All right. And then you 
10 A. (Witness complies.) 1 0 headed back in?" 
I 11 Q. Are you satisfied that that is your 11 A. 
"Yes"-· oh, "Yep, and that's when I 
12 testimony from that hearing? 12 turned around" --
13 A. Yes. 13 Q. Go down to 35 and finish the answer . 
I 14 
Q, I would like to direct you to page 34, 14 A. -· "and I walked in the building." 
I S that will be in the upper right-hand corner. Are you 15 Q. "Question: What time of day did you 
16 at that? 1 6 think it was at this point?" 
17 A. Yep. 17 A. "This was around midnight or this was 
I 1 8 Q. I'm going to ask you to go through some 1 8 around like 1:00ish:" 19 of the testimony that you gave, I'm going to read the 19 Q. "Okay. Charlie Brown's, the bar, was 
20 question and I want you just to read your answer 20 still open?" 
I 21 verbatim. All right? 21 A. "Yes." 22 A. Okay. 22 Q, "Question: Still serving alcohol, 
23 Q. So if you come down it says, 2 3 right?" 
I 24 "question," and this is on page 34, its line 17. 24 A. "Yes." 25 "Question: Okay. All right. I didn 't 2S Q. "Okay. When did you see him again?" 
I 
000125
325 326 
I A. "Around almost 2:00, around closing, A. "Um-hmm, (response)." 
last call." Q. You went un-hmm, does that sound right? 
I 3 Q, "Okay. And where were you at that 3 A. Yeah. point?" Q I'm going to ask you to turn to the 
A. "I was inside the strip club." next page. 
I Q. "Question: All right. And where did Do you see page 39, lower left? Mr. Roberts come from?" A. Yep. 
A. "He had called me again and I would Q All right. I'm going to direct you to 
I meet him back out," or, "he had called me again and I line 25. 10 would meet him back out front of the building." 10 "Question: Okay. And you are pretty 
11 Q. "Question: All right. And so you 11 sure this is right about 2:00, last call?" 
I 12 would come out. Is Charlie Brown's done serving 12 
Go over to page 40 and read your 
13 alcohol at this point?" 13 answer? 
14 A. "Yes. Well, people -- it was on last 14 A. "Yes." 
I 
15 call, so people would come and some were leaving and 15 Q. "Are you familiar with Charlie Brown's? 
16 some of them, you know, were just hanging out there 16 Have you been a customer there before?" 
l 1 for a little bit longer." 17 A. "No, only about once or twice. But I 
18 Q. "Question: And if I understand ie lived in the Park Apartments right across the street, 
I 19 correctly, the strip club, the Eclipse, stays open 19 so I just walked across the street." 20 longer?" 20 Q. "Question: Okay. I am not accusing 
21 A. "Yes, Until 4:00." 21 you of doing anything wrong, I just want to -- ln 
I 22 Q. "Question: Okay." 22 terms of the time frame, was Charlie Brown's pretty 23 A. "Yes, two hours." 2 3 good about shutting the bar down at 2:00?" 
24 Q, "Question: And even though Charlie 24 A. "Yes." 
I 25 Brown's is shut down, it keeps going, right?" 25 Q. "All right. So when he drives away the 
I 327 328 
I 
second time, do you see him again that night?" Q, Okay. So your testimony is is that you 
A. 11No." remember better now than you did back on September --
Q. "Question: Or that morning, I guess, 3 A. I'm not as nervous, sir, yes. 
it is the early morning hours. You don't -- he Q. All right. So when Mr. Roberts comes 
I doesn't come back?" to the bar the first time, you say his phone goes A. 11No." off? 
Q, "Question: What time do you go home A. Yes. 
I 8 finally?" Q. And you can tell it's your mom? A. "I go home about -- I stayed until A. Yes. 
10 close at the Eclipse." 10 Q. And you can tell she's pretty upset? 
I 11 Q, "Question: All right. Several hours 11 A. 
Yes. 
12 longer, is that right?" 12 Q. Can you hear the end of the 
13 A. 11 Ves. 11 13 conversation? 
I 
14 Q. That's the testimony you gave back in 14 A. No, I can't hear the conversation. 
15 September of 2013, is that right? 15 Q. Can yo~ hear her voice at all? 
16 A. Yes, sir, it is. 16 A. Oh, yeah -- I can just hear the sound, 
11 Q. You've given a diametrically opposed 11 I know what her voice sounds like when she's mad, but 
I 1 8 version of that today? 18 I can't hear what she's saying. 19 A. What? 19 Q. It's fair to say she was pretty PO'd? 
20 Q. You've given a different version here 20 A. Yeah. 
I 21 on the stand today? 21 Q, And she was screaming at Mr. Roberts? 22 A. Uhm -- it has more -- to me it wasn't 22 A. Yes. 
23 changed, but a little bit because the fact that my 23 Q, And she was threatening? 
I 24 nervousness in the courtroom being first time up on a 24 A. No. 25 jury trial or a jury -- stand here. 25 Q, She wanted her car back, didn't she? 
I 
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NOTICE OF HEARING
TO: STEVEN EUGENE ROBERTS and John DeFranco, his Attorney of Record, 
you will please take notice that on the 3rd day of January, 2017, at the hour of 3:00 of said day, 
or as soon thereafter as counsel can be heard, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney Shelley W. 
Akamatsu, will move this Honorable Court regarding the State’s Motion for Summary 
Disposition in the above-entitled action.
DATED this _____day of December, 2016.
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Ada County Prosecuting Attorney
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Office of the Ada County Prosecutor.
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JOHN C. DEFRANCO, ESQ. ISB 4953 
ELLSWORTH, KALLAS & DEFRANCO, P.L.L.C. 
1031 E. Park Blvd. 
Boise, ID 83712 
Phone: (208) 336-1843 
Fax: (208) 345-8945 
 
Attorney for Petitioner 
 
 IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF   
   THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
STEVEN EUGENE ROBERTS, ) 
   ) 
  Petitioner, )        )         Case No. M0514180 
   ) Case No.  CV PC 2016 05792 
vs.   )       
   ) BRIEF IN RESPONSE TO   
STATE OF IDAHO, ) STATE’S MOTION FOR     
   )  SUMMARY DISPOSITION   
  Respondent. )   
____________________________________) 
 
 
 Petitioner Steven Eugene Roberts, by and through his attorney of record, John C. 
DeFranco, of the firm Ellsworth, Kallas & DeFranco, PLLC, submits this brief in 
response to the State’s Motion for Summary Disposition of Mr. Roberts’ Petition for 
Post-Conviction Relief.  The Court should deny the State’s Motion and keep this matter 
set for an evidentiary hearing to resolve genuine disputes of material facts, for the reasons 
explained below.   
I. Factual and Procedural Background 
 This case arises out of an unfortunate event occurring in the early morning hours 
of September 1, 2012 --- a fire at a residence on Randolph Drive in Boise.  An unrelated 
murder and previous fire occurred at the same residence only about six weeks before, on 
July 23, 2012.  Petitioner Steven Eugene Roberts (“Mr. Roberts”) was charged with 
Electronically Filed
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Fourth Judicial District, Ada County
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By: Rose Wright, Deputy Clerk
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burglary and first degree arson related to the September 1, 2012 fire. 
A. The September Fire  
 Officer Robert Cook of the Boise City Police Department was dispatched to the 
Randolph residence on September 1, 2012 around 4:00 a.m.  Tr., p. 67.  Officer Cook 
arrived and proceeded to the back patio of the house where he noticed a fire under a 
barbecue grill’s propane tank.  Tr., pp. 74, 82.  The Boise City Fire Department was 
dispatched to the fire at 4:11 a.m.; firefighters arrived at the Randolph Drive residence 
about three to four minutes later and extinguished the fire.  Tr., pp. 89-90, 92, 102, 116.   
 Multiple individuals on the scene observed (1) fire or fire damage in the back 
patio area, (2) a broken house window1 in that same area, and (3) a planter pot with 
gasoline in it and three red plastic portable gas canisters around and in the pot, just inside 
the house by the broken window.  Tr., pp. 94, 108, 123-24, 147, 199.  A police officer 
also found in four locations reddish brown stains that turned out to be blood, including 
one stain on the outside of the broken window’s window sill and another on a wall inside 
the home near the broken window.  Tr., pp. 207-09, 213-16.  The homeowner, Jennifer 
Holley, testified that she had been at the residence on August 31, 2012 between 7:00 and 
8:00 p.m. to feed a cat.  According to Ms. Holley, at that time the window was not 
broken, nor was there a ceramic pot on the floor inside the window or any gasoline 
canisters in the house.  Tr., pp. 442-43, 445, 450-52.   
 A fire investigator testified that the fire burned for only six to eight minutes, Tr., 
pp. 133, 157, and that it was “incendiary in nature”, which means it was intentionally set 
                                                
1  See Tr., p. 442 (homeowner Jennifer Holley’s testimony that the window was “new 
damage”); Tr., pp. 97-98, 122 (firefighter testimony); Tr., p. 191 & Ex. 25 (police officer 
testimony); Tr., p. 388 (Detective Nicholas Duggan’s testimony that the window was not 
broken in the July fire).   
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under circumstances where the person who lit the fire knew it shouldn’t be.  Tr., pp. 151, 
174-75.  Considering this testimony and that firefighters were on scene by about 4:15, the 
fire would have been started after 4:00 a.m. on September 1, 2016.   
B. The Charges 
 The DNA from the blood stains near the broken window matched Mr. Roberts’ 
DNA and the State charged him with arson in the first degree, Idaho Code § 18-802; 
burglary, Idaho Code § 18-1401; and as a persistent violator under Idaho Code § 19-
2514.  Mr. Roberts requested a bench trial at which he testified in his own defense.  The 
trial was held between June 11 and September 2, 2014, almost two years after the fire.   
C. Mr. Roberts’ Trial Testimony 
 According to Mr. Roberts, he left home to meet his girlfriend’s son, Jesse 
McPhie, between 10:00 and 10:30 p.m. on August 31, 2012 because Mr. McPhie asked 
him to bring McPhie’s Adderall prescription.  Tr., p. 500.  Mr. Roberts testified he took 
his girlfriend’s car and met Mr. McPhie about ten minutes later in front of some trailers 
near the Charlie Brown bar (the “Bar”) and the Eclipse2 dancing/strip club (“the Club”) 
located at the Curtis and Overland Road intersection.  Tr., pp. 503-04.  At the trailer, he 
met a woman who wanted to go to a haunted house and Mr. Roberts expressed interest in 
going to see it with her and a man who lived in the trailer.3  Tr., pp. 506-08.   
 Mr. Roberts nonetheless left to meet Mr. McPhie and they went into the Club 
around 11:00 or 11:15 p.m.  Tr., p. 510.  Mr. Roberts testified that McPhie introduced 
him to a dancer that he says McPhie claimed was the mother of McPhie’s daughter.  Tr., 
                                                
2  The Eclipse also is referred to as “Erotic City”, see e.g., Tr., p. 509.  For ease of 
reference, the dancing/strip club is referred to as “the Club” in this brief. 
3  Mr. Roberts could not recall these individuals’ names. 
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p. 510.  Mr. Roberts excused himself about 20 minutes later to go and find the woman he 
met at the trailer.  Id.  He ended up going to a nearby convenience store and buying and 
drinking beer, then returning to the Club where he sat with Mr. McPhie for approximately 
20 additional minutes.  Tr., pp. 513-14.  Mr. Roberts later went to the convenience store 
again to get more beer and sat in the car for about 30 to 40 minutes until he saw the man 
who lived in the trailer standing outside the Club.  Tr., pp. 515-16.   
 They and the woman Mr. Roberts met at the trailer walked to the Randolph 
residence.  There were two other men present in the back yard at the residence.  Tr., pp. 
517-24.  If Mr. Roberts’ testimony is credited, he was behind the Randolph Drive 
residence visiting with the woman he met and then they got “spooked” and ran; as they 
ran, he tripped at the back patio and fell through the house window.  Tr., pp. 525-28, 551.  
He cut his arm and was bleeding, so he went back to the car he left parked by the Club, 
tried to fix the wound he received from falling through the window, and then drove to 
visit his mother in American Falls.  Tr., pp. 533, 537-39.  When he returned to the car 
after falling through the window it was before 4:00 a.m. and he never went back to the 
Randolph residence.  Tr., pp. 537-38.   
D. Christine DeGroat’s Testimony  
 Mr. Roberts’ former girlfriend, Christine DeGroat4, also testified at the trial.  She 
testified that she woke up around 1:00 a.m. on September 1, 2012 and noticed Mr. 
Roberts was not in the house.  Tr., p. 16.  When she phoned Mr. Roberts he told her he 
was with her son, Jesse McPhie, and they were at Jesse’s friend’s trailer.  She later 
learned they may have been at the Bar.  Tr., p. 17; pp. 50-52.  She was angry with Mr. 
                                                
4  Ms. DeGroat also is known as Brandi McPhie. 
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Roberts and their conversation lasted only about fifteen minutes.  Tr., p. 19.  She talked 
to Jesse about thirty to sixty minutes later (or around 1:30 to 2:00 a.m.).  Tr., p. 41.     
 Ms. DeGroat’s trial testimony was largely consistent with the statements she 
provided to Officer Tony Davidson on November 13, 2012.  See St.’s Discovery, pp. 53-
54.  Specifically, she reported that she had noticed that Mr. Roberts was no longer in bed 
with her sometime between 10:00 p.m. on August 31, 2012 and 3:00 a.m. on September 
1, 2012.  Id. at p. 54.  She then called Mr. Roberts and he told her he was at the Club with 
Jesse.  Id.  She did not see Mr. Roberts again until about 7:00 p.m. on September 1st.  Ms. 
DeGroat recalled that Mr. Roberts had a cut when she saw him, but could not at first 
recall where on his body it was located.  Id.   
 She also testified consistently at the preliminary hearing that she called Mr. 
Roberts and spoke to him around 1:00 a.m., and then was able to talk to Mr. McPhie 
about 30 minutes to an hour later (around 1:30 or 2:00 a.m.).  P.H.5 Tr., pp. 48, 50, 58.   
E. Jesse McPhie’s Testimony 
 In contrast, Jesse McPhie’s trial testimony was inconsistent with his prior 
statements and testimony.  At trial McPhie estimated that it was after midnight when Mr. 
Roberts met him at the Bar and testified that they then went to the Club and were together 
for about 45 minutes or so.  Tr., pp. 297, 318.  After that (which would be around 1 p.m.), 
Mr. Roberts was gone “about an hour [or] two” and then came back to ask Mr. McPhie 
for gas money (which would be between 2:00 and 3:00 a.m.).  Tr., p. 300.  Mr. McPhie 
testified that he was with Mr. Roberts for only about five to fifteen minutes that second 
time and that he refused to give Mr. Roberts money.  Tr., p. 391.  Mr. McPhie then 
                                                
5  Citations to “P.H. Tr.” refer to the preliminary hearing transcript. 
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reported that Mr. Roberts came back a third time after he had been gone for “at least a 
couple hours, three or four, couple hours”, he did not know.  Tr., p. 301.  Mr. McPhie 
then estimated that Mr. Roberts came back to the Club about five minutes before it was 
closing, “about 4:00” a.m. and he had a cut on his elbow that was bleeding.  Tr., pp. 301-
02.  Mr. McPhie also testified that Mr. Roberts had a “very strong but faint” smell of 
gasoline.  Tr., p. 305.  Mr. McPhie said he gave Mr. Roberts some gas money for his 
mom’s car at that time.  Tr., p. 304.  Mr. McPhie confirmed that Mr. Roberts spoke to 
Ms. DeGroat first and then McPhie talked to her later. 
 On cross examination, Mr. McPhie changed the timeline, testifying that he first 
arrived at the Bar around 9:00 or 10:00 p.m. on August 31st and then first saw Mr. 
Roberts about 30 or 40 minutes later (which would be between 9:30 and 10:40 p.m., not 
midnight).  Tr., p. 319.  Then on re-direct he changed course again and, upon questioning, 
told the prosecutor that he first heard from Mr. Roberts around midnight.  Tr., pp. 335-36. 
 McPhie’s trial testimony not only was internally inconsistent, but it varied vastly 
from his preliminary hearing testimony and statements made to Boise Police Officer 
Tony Davidson.  McPhie changed his mind on (1) the times and duration of his 
encounters with Mr. Roberts on August 31st and September 1st; (2) the number of times he 
was with Mr. Roberts that night and the next morning; (3) whether he was asked for or 
gave Mr. Roberts money; (4) if he gave Mr. Robert’s money, what time he did so; and (5) 
the location of their visits, i.e., the Bar, the Club, the parking lot.   
 Mr. McPhie acknowledged at the trial that he had reviewed his preliminary 
hearing testimony and, after additional time to reflect, believed some of his testimony at 
that hearing was not accurate.  Tr., pp. 307-08; 344-45.  Indeed, some of his preliminary 
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hearing testimony was “false” or “incorrect”.  Tr., pp. 321-22, 336.  McPhie blamed the 
discrepancies on his nervousness at being in the courtroom for the first time at the 
preliminary hearing.  McPhie reported that he was not as nervous at trial and he 
remembered better at trial than he had at the preliminary hearing, even though that 
hearing was held closer to the time the events in this case occurred.  Tr., pp. 327-28. 
 Specifically, at the preliminary hearing on September 16, 2013 – one year after 
the fire and about nine months before Mr. Roberts’ trial -- Mr. McPhie testified that Mr. 
Roberts came to visit him at the Bar, right next to the Club, around midnight or 1:00 p.m. 
to “ask for gas money”.  P.H. Tr., pp. 18-20.  Then they went to the Club and McPhie 
paid for Roberts’ entry fee where they “hung out for a little bit” before Roberts left.  P.H. 
Tr., p. 20.  Mr. McPhie testified that he gave Mr. Roberts about four dollars to get a 
gallon of gas at that time.  P.H. Tr., pp. 20-21.   
 Later in his preliminary hearing testimony, Mr. McPhie revised his story, stating 
that (1) it was the second time he saw Mr. Roberts the morning of September 1st that 
Roberts asked for gas money and (2) he saw Roberts the second time around 2:00 a.m., 
when the Bar closes.  P.H. Tr., pp. 21-22.  McPhie then testified that Roberts left after he 
obtained gas money and he did not see Roberts again that night.  P.H. Tr., pp. 22, 40.   
 McPhie then again switched the story, saying that he gave Mr. Roberts gas money 
the first time he saw Roberts.  P.H. Tr., pp. 25, 31, 37.  And, he stated that Mr. Roberts 
was with him for about an hour at the Club during the first visit.  P.H. Tr., p. 31.  He also 
testified on cross examination again that he saw Mr. Roberts for the second time around 
2:00 a.m., when the Bar was closing.  P.H. Tr., pp. 35, 40.  Then he stated that this 
second time he saw Mr. Roberts (around 2:00 a.m.) Roberts’ elbow was bleeding and he 
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had a “not very strong” odor of gasoline.  P.H. Tr., p. 38.  Mr. McPhie also testified at the 
preliminary hearing that his mom called him around the second time he saw Mr. Roberts, 
around 2:00 a.m., and that she was upset.  Tr., pp. 22-23.  He stated that the second visit 
with Mr. Roberts lasted only about five to fifteen minutes.  Tr., p. 25.  This testimony – 
that he last saw Mr. Roberts at 2:00 a.m. – if credited and considered with the fire 
investigator’s testimony as to the timing of the fire, see Tr., pp. 133, 157, would mean 
that Mr. Roberts could not have set the fire. 
 Mr. McPhie told Officer Davidson a different story on November 12, 2012 – just 
about two and one-half months after the September fire.  At that time, McPhie reported 
that his mother called him around 3:00 a.m. and told him to come home so he left the 
Club “at that time and went home” and neither he nor his mother saw Mr. Roberts again 
until Saturday evening around 9:00 p.m.  St.’s Discovery, p. 54.  If McPhie’s statements 
in this report are the accurate version of events he could not have seen Mr. Roberts at the 
Club around 4:00 a.m. smelling of gasoline and with a cut on his arm.   
F. The Verdict & Appeal 
 After the State rested its case, Mr. Roberts’ trial counsel moved for acquittal 
under Idaho Criminal Rule 29, arguing all the state had shown was that Mr. Roberts was 
merely present at the Randolph residence the morning of the fire and not that he was 
present at the time the fire started.  Tr., p. 472.  The district court denied this Motion and 
later found Mr. Roberts guilty of both charges.  Mr. Roberts admitted to being a 
persistent violator.   
 The court imposed a unified thirty-year sentence with ten years fixed on the arson 
conviction and a concurrent unified ten-year sentence with five years fixed on the 
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burglary conviction.  Mr. Roberts timely appealed, arguing that the State presented 
insufficient evidence to support his arson conviction.  State v. Roberts, No. 42534, 2015 
Unpublished Op. No. 637 (Sept. 17, 2015), *3.  The Idaho Court of Appeals affirmed Mr. 
Roberts’ conviction, determining that the following evidence supported the district 
court’s finding that Mr. Roberts set the fire: 
• Mr. Roberts did not dispute he was at the residence and broke the window; 
• DNA evidence confirmed his presence at the scene, near the fire’s origin; and  
• Mr. Roberts failed to show that the witnesses’ time estimates precluded his setting 
the fire. 
Id. at p. 4.  Looking at the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, as required, 
the Court of Appeals determined that the “minimal time discrepancy in the witnesses 
‘estimates is not so significant as to nullify the State’s evidence of Roberts’ guilt in light 
of the other evidence against him (i.e., being on the property and smelling of gasoline).”  
Id.  The Court of Appeals did not address the burglary conviction because Mr. Roberts’ 
appellate counsel did not appeal that conviction.  Id. at *2, n.1. 
G. The Post-Conviction Petition 
 On March 25, 2016, Mr. Roberts timely filed a pro se Petition and Affidavit for 
Post-Conviction Relief alleging several claims, including that he had been deprived of the 
effective assistance of counsel, a right guaranteed by the Sixth and Fourteenth 
Amendments to the United States Constitution.  See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 
668 (1984); Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387 (1985).  The Court appointed counsel to 
represent Mr. Roberts on April 1, 2016.  Mr. Roberts filed a pro se supplemental affidavit 
in support of his Petition on July 11, 2016 (“Roberts July Aff.”) providing additional 
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details to support his claims. 
 On October 11, 2016, the State filed its Motion seeking summary dismissal of all 
Mr. Roberts’ claims.  A status conference is set for January 10, 2017 and an evidentiary 
hearing for January 17, 2017.  Order 8/2/16, p. 1.  Mr. Roberts requests that the Court 
deny the State’s Motion and allow the evidentiary hearing to go forward because genuine 
disputes of material fact remain. 
II. Legal Standards for Summary Dismissal 
 A petition for post-conviction relief initiates a proceeding civil in nature and the 
petitioner must prove by a preponderance of evidence the allegations upon which his 
request for post-conviction relief is based.  Bias v. State, 159 Idaho 696, 701, 365 P.3d 
1050, 1055 (Ct. App. 2015), review denied (Mar. 3, 2016); see also I.C. § 19–4907.  
A district court may summarily dismiss a petition for post-conviction relief if it appears 
from the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions and 
agreements of fact, together with any affidavits submitted, that there is no genuine issue 
of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  Bias, 159 
Idaho at 702, 365 P.3d at 1056.  “Claims may be summarily dismissed if the petitioner’s 
allegations are clearly disproven by the record of the criminal proceedings, if the 
petitioner has not presented evidence making a prima facie case as to each essential 
element of the claims, or if the petitioner’s allegations do not justify relief as a matter of 
law.”  Id.  In doing so, however, the “district court must construe disputed facts in the 
petitioner’s favor,” although “the court is not required to accept either the petitioner’s 
mere conclusory allegations, unsupported by admissible evidence, or the petitioner’s 
conclusions of law.”  Id.  The “court is free to arrive at the most probable inferences to be 
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drawn from uncontroverted evidence.”  Id.   
 In short, summary dismissal is appropriate when the court can conclude, as a 
matter of law, that the petitioner is not entitled to relief even with all disputed facts 
construed in the petitioner’s favor.  Id.  Conversely, “if the petition, affidavits, and other 
evidence supporting the petition allege facts that, if true, would entitle the petitioner to 
relief, the post-conviction claim may not be summarily dismissed.”  Id. at 702, 365 P.3d. 
at 1056 (citing Charboneau v. State, 140 Idaho 789, 792, 102 P.3d 1108, 1111 (2004); 
Sheahan v. State, 146 Idaho 101, 104, 190 P.3d 920, 923 (Ct.App. 2008)).  “If a genuine 
issue of material fact is presented, an evidentiary hearing must be conducted to resolve 
the factual issues.”  Id. (emphasis added). 
III.   Analysis 
 For ease of discussion, Mr. Roberts will address his claims in the order raised by 
the State in the brief supporting its Motion. 
A. Alleged Forfeited or Otherwise Barred Claims 
 The State argues that several of Mr. Roberts’ claims are barred because he did not 
raise them on direct appeal.  Mr. Roberts’ acknowledges that a “claim or issue which 
could have been raised on appeal may not be considered in post-conviction proceedings.”  
Bias, 159 Idaho at 702, 365 P.3d at 1056; see also I.C. § 19–4901(b).  However, if Mr. 
Roberts demonstrates that “the asserted basis for relief raises a substantial doubt about 
the reliability of the finding of guilt and could not, in the exercise of due diligence, have 
been presented earlier” the court may grant post-conviction relief on an issue not raised 
on direct appeal.  See Bias, 159 Idaho at 702, 365 P.3d at 1056; Gonzales v. State, 120 
Idaho 759, 763, 819 P.2d 1159, 1163 (Ct.App. 1991). 
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1. Judicial Errors 
 The Fourteenth Amendment ensures a criminal defendant’s “due process right to 
a fair trial in a fair tribunal.”  State v. Norton, 151 Idaho 176, 181, 254 P.3d 77, 82 (Ct. 
App. 2011).  Mr. Roberts asserts in Claims A(1) and A(2) of his Petition6 that the district 
court violated his right to a fair trial because the judge (1) acted as an expert witness for 
the state at the sentencing hearing, and (2) failed to ask clarifying questions at the bench 
trial about how the window broke and instead relied on the judge’s own opinion that it 
was “physically impossible” for Mr. Roberts’ body weight to break the window.  Pet. 
Attach. A, p. 1.   
 Mr. Roberts understands that a claim or issue which could have been raised on 
appeal might not be considered in post-conviction proceedings, but submits he comes 
within an exception to this bar because his judicial error claims raise substantial doubt 
about the reliability of the finding of guilt, and the claims could not have been presented 
at trial.  Bias, 159 Idaho at 702, 365 P.3d at 1056.  Specifically, Mr. Roberts could not 
have known about the trial court’s view of Mr. Roberts’ testimony about how the window 
broke until after the trial and after he was convicted because the court did not explain its 
reasoning until the sentencing hearing.  At the sentencing hearing the district court 
explained: 
[F]rankly I found your testimony . . . pushing the limits of 
physical impossibility.  Given where the window was 
                                                
6 Although Mr. Roberts is addressing the claims in the same order as the State’s brief, the 
claims also are referred to by letter and number as they appear in Attachment A to the 
Petition for Post-Conviction Relief to assist in locating the claims in the Petition.  Mr. 
Roberts also refers to his ineffective assistance of counsel claims by letter and number as 
they appear in the Petition, but these references include “IAC” to differentiate them from 
the other claims and to signify they are in the “ineffective assistance of counsel” portion 
of Attachment A.   
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broken at, the thickness of the window, how much running 
speed you could have gotten up to in those few feet from 
your chair to where your window was, you would have 
almost to have jumped on a trampoline and had a helmet on 
and tried to go through the window like a spear at a level 
well above what you would be at just running.  It was clear 
that the physics of where the window was broken, how 
thick it was, the fact that you claim you broke the window 
by running and tripping headfirst into the window, I don’t 
find that credible.  I don’t find it frankly practicable to have 
happened that way at all. 
 
Tr., p. 693 (Sentencing Hearing) (emphases added).  Thus, it was only at the sentencing 
hearing that Mr. Roberts learned the judge had relied on his own knowledge of physics to 
inform his decision about Mr. Roberts’ guilt.  This is precisely the type of “scientific, 
technical, or other specialized knowledge” that should come from expert opinion 
testimony.  Idaho R. Evid. 702.  And, because the issue of intent to enter the dwelling is 
relevant to both the burglary and arson convictions,7 the trial court’s comments about 
how the window might have broken raise a substantial doubt about the reliability of its 
findings of guilt.   
 Mr. Roberts also raised this issue as an ineffective assistance claim, so even if the 
court determines it is barred from consideration because it was not raised on direct 
appeal, the issue should be considered in determining the efficacy of counsel’s assistance.  
See Pet. Attach. A, p. 5, IAC Claim C(2); Section III(B)(9)(b), infra. 
2. Prosecutorial Misconduct 
 Mr. Roberts’ trial counsel did not object to the prosecutor commenting during 
closing arguments that witness Jesse McPhie had “no reason to lie” and that the court 
                                                
7 See Idaho Code § 18-1401 (requiring the entry be “with intent to commit any theft or 
any felony” for burglary); Idaho Code § 18-1401 (requiring the damage to be done 
“willfully and unlawfully, by fire or explosion” for arson).   
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should credit McPhie’s trial testimony instead of his inconsistent preliminary hearing 
testimony.  See Pet. Attach. A, pp. 1-2, Claims C(1) & (2).  The issue also was not raised 
on appeal.  Mr. Roberts acknowledges the Idaho Court of Appeals has stated that “the 
proper way for a defendant to challenge an unpreserved trial error is to assert ineffective 
assistance of trial counsel in a post-conviction proceeding.”  Bias v. State, 159 Idaho at 
703, 365 P.3d at 1057.  Although Mr. Roberts initially raised this issue as an ineffective 
assistance claim, he later withdrew that claim.  See Pet. Attach. A, p. 5, IAC Claim C(1). 
See also Section III(B)(7), infra.  Counsel acknowledges that this withdrawal impacts his 
ability to go forward with the prosecutorial misconduct claim.  See also Rodgers v. State, 
129 Idaho 720, 725, 932 P.2d 348, 353 (1997) (explaining that prosecutorial misconduct 
issues could be raised on direct appeal and, therefore, are not appropriate in a post-
conviction proceeding). 
3. Actual Innocence 
 The State argues that to assert an actual innocence claim Mr. Roberts must point 
to material facts, not previously presented and heard, sufficient to find the sentence 
should be vacated in the interests of justice.  State’s Br., p.8 10; see also Idaho Code § 19-
4901(a)(4).  This is precisely why Mr. Roberts asks the Court to allow an evidentiary 
hearing, so he can present evidence in support of his claims.   
4. Insufficient Evidence 
 Mr. Roberts’ Petition asserts sufficiency of the evidence claims based on (1) the 
prosecutor not entering into evidence any object that could have broken the window; (2) 
the “weight of the evidence” that placed him at the Club when the arson was committed; 
                                                
8  Because the State’s brief is not numbered, the page number references in this brief are 
made by numbering the State’s brief starting with the caption page as page one. 
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and (3) his claim that he could have “smelled like gas” because he was in a parking lot 
only yards from a gas station.  Pet. Attach. A, p. 2, Claims D(1)-(3); Roberts July Aff., 
p.7.  Mr. Roberts withdrew the third argument as it related to the ineffective assistance of 
counsel portion of his Petition and counsel agrees that it should not be considered in 
relation to the instant claim also.  Additionally, that there may be alternative theories as 
to why Mr. Roberts allegedly smelled of gasoline does not by itself demonstrate 
insufficient evidence to support the arson and burglary convictions.   
 With regard to the first argument – that the prosecutor did not introduce any 
evidence about what object could have broken the window – counsel acknowledges that 
there is no legal authority requiring a prosecutor to introduce certain evidence at trial and 
counsel was unable to identify any potential Brady v. Maryland violation here.  See id., 
373 U.S. 83 (1963); Strickler v. Green, 527 U.S. 263, 280-82 (1999) (explaining that the 
government may violate due process by failing to turn over evidence that is favorable to 
the accused).  Mr. Roberts’ claim relates to evidence he thinks should have been 
admitted, but there are no facts indicating that the prosecutor had this evidence and did 
not disclose it.   
 However, Mr. Roberts’ second argument in support of his insufficiency claim 
relates to the timing of the fire and Mr. Roberts’ whereabouts at the time it started --- the 
critical issue in this case.  The Idaho Court of Appeals, in affirming Mr. Roberts’ 
conviction, determined that he had failed to show that the witnesses’ time estimates 
precluded his setting the fire.  State v. Roberts, No. 42534, 2015 Unpublished Op. No. 
637 (Sept. 17, 2015), *3.  That is precisely what Mr. Roberts’ Petition attempts to 
demonstrate – that the timing of events as set forth in various individuals’ testimony 
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demonstrates he could not have set the fire. 
a. Arson Conviction 
Mr. Roberts challenged his arson conviction on direct appeal as based on insufficient 
evidence.  State v. Roberts, No. 42534, 2015 Unpublished Op. No. 637 (Sept. 17, 2015).  
The Idaho Court of Appeals upheld the conviction and the State argues its decision 
precludes this court from considering the insufficient evidence claim again in a 
subsequent action between the same parties.  State’s Br., 10.  There is case law to support 
this argument.9  However, to the extent the new evidence and different arguments made 
now undermine the original grounds for the sufficiency of the evidence determination, 
Mr. Roberts requests that the Court consider his claim.  
b. Burglary Conviction 
The Court of Appeals did not address the burglary conviction because Mr. Roberts 
did not appeal that conviction.  State v. Roberts, No. 42534, 2015 Unpublished Op. No. 
637 (Sept. 17, 2015) *2, n.1.  Accordingly, res judicata should not bar a sufficiency of the 
evidence post-conviction claim.  Additionally, trial counsel submitted a motion for 
acquittal under Idaho Rule of Criminal Procedure 29 at the close of the State’s case, so 
the issue was preserved for appeal, but Mr. Roberts’ counsel did not raise it on appeal.  
Accordingly, this claim is more properly presented as an ineffective assistance of counsel 
                                                
9  See Knutsen v. State, 144 Idaho 433, 439, 163 P.3d 222, 228 (Ct. App. 2007) (“Knutsen 
already challenged the length of his sentence on state law reasonableness grounds in his 
direct appeal. The principles of res judicata apply when an applicant attempts to raise the 
same issues previously ruled upon on direct appeal in a subsequent application for post-
conviction relief.”); State v. Beam, 115 Idaho 208, 210–11, 766 P.2d 678, 680–81 (1988) 
(explaining that “the trial court correctly refused to relitigate those issues because they 
had previously been decided on direct appeal and thus were res judicata”); Rendon v. 
State, No. 43048 (Idaho Ct. App. Aug. 12, 2016) (determining that post-conviction 
petitioner was barred under the doctrine of res judicata from relitigating whether his 
initial counsel had a conflict of interest at the time petitioner entered his guilty plea). 
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claim.  In that regard, appellate counsel provided ineffective assistance by not 
challenging Mr. Roberts’ burglary conviction on appeal.  The right to effective assistance 
of counsel extends to the defendant's first appeal as a matter of right.  Evitts v. Lucey, 469 
U.S. 387, 396 (1985).  And, while an indigent defendant does not have a constitutional 
right to compel appointed appellate counsel to press all arguments that the defendant 
wishes to pursue, see Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751 (1983); Mintun v. State, 144 
Idaho 656, 661, 168 P.3d 40, 45 (Ct. App. 2007); here, Mr. Roberts asserts his counsel 
should have challenged the burglary conviction based on the testimony about Mr. 
Roberts’ lack of intent in entering the house. 
B. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims 
 A defendant in a criminal case is guaranteed the effective assistance of counsel 
under both the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and 
Article 1, § 13 of the Idaho Constitution.  A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, 
whether based upon the state or federal constitution, is analyzed under Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).  See also Hassett v. State, 127 Idaho 313, 316, 900 
P.2d 221, 224 (Ct.App. 1995). 
 To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, Mr. Roberts must show 
that his attorney’s performance was deficient and that he was prejudiced by the 
deficiency.  Bias, 159 Idaho at 703, 365 P.3d at 1057; Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 
668, 687–88 (1984).  Mr. Roberts has the burden of showing that his attorney’s 
“representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness” to establish the 
deficiency requirement.  Bias at 703, 365 P.3d at 1057.  To establish prejudice, he “must 
show a reasonable probability that, but for the attorney’s deficient performance, the 
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outcome of the trial would have been different.  Id.  Tactical or strategic decisions of 
counsel are not second-guessed “unless those decisions are based on inadequate 
preparation, ignorance of relevant law, or other shortcomings capable of objective 
evaluation.”  Id. 
1. Interviewing and Calling Witnesses10 
 Mr. Roberts’ Petition alleged that his trial counsel should have located and 
interviewed employees of the Club and the Bar, because those employees could provide 
information about the timing of his visits to the Club, whether he was ever at the Bar, and 
if he smelled like gasoline.  Pet. Attach. A, p. 4, Claim A(1).  Petitioner averred that he 
“stressed to his [trial] counsel that these employees were at the dance club” on the 
night/morning in question, and that counsel should interview them.  Roberts July Aff., p. 
9.   
 Mr. Roberts also alleges his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to locate and 
interview employees of Cold Clean, the company restoring the Randolph residence after 
the first fire.  Pet. Attach. A, p. 4, IAC Claim A(2); see Tr., pp. 455-56.  At trial, the 
homeowner testified that a gas grill, planter, and some canes were moved between when 
she last visited and when she returned after the second fire.  Cold Clean employees could 
have shed additional light on where the items in question were located in and around the 
house and may have provided different information than the homeowner recollected.  
 Unfortunately, due to the amount of time that has elapsed since the September 
2012 fire and this post-conviction proceeding, none of the employees of the Club or Cold 
                                                
10 Counsel agrees that IAC Claim A(3)---alleging ineffective assistance for counsel 
failing to interview Harry Reiner---should be withdrawn.  See Pet. Attach. A, p. 4; 
Roberts July Aff., p. 10.   
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Clean have yet been located.  And, counsel recognizes that strategic decisions are often 
found to be virtually unchallengeable.  But, this is only if the decisions were made after a 
“thorough investigation of the law and facts relevant to plausible options.”  State v. 
Dunlap, 155 Idaho 345, 384, 313 P.3d 1, 40 (2013) (citation and internal quotation marks 
omitted).11   
 Mr. Roberts submits that failing to search for potential witnesses amounts to a 
failure to investigate relevant facts at all and, thus, amounts to ineffective assistance.  See 
Roberts July Aff., pp. 9-10.  Moreover, Mr. Roberts was prejudiced by this failure to 
investigate because the timing of his actions that night is critical to whether he could have 
started the fire, and the trial and appellate courts relied on testimony that he smelled of 
gasoline in convicting him and upholding his convictions.  Under these circumstances, 
trial counsel should have investigated whether there were other witnesses to Mr. Roberts’ 
actions that night who could be questioned, particularly because “ineffective assistance 
claims based on a duty to investigate must be considered in light of the strength of the 
government's case,” Eggleston v. United States, 798 F.2d 374, 376 (9th Cir. 1986) and, 
here, Mr. McPhie’s testimony was inconsistent and yet relied on by the trial and appellate 
courts. 
2. Phone Records 
 Mr. Roberts submits that his trial counsel should have subpoenaed the telephone 
records of Jesse McPhie, Christine DeGroat, and Mr. Roberts to confirm the timeline of 
events Mr. Roberts testified to that night and dispute that proposed by Jesse McPhie’s 
                                                
11  Decisions “made after less than complete investigation” may still be reasonable to the 
extent “that reasonable professional judgments support the limitations on investigation.”  
Id. 
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inconsistent testimony.  Pet. Attach. A, p. 4, Claim A(4); Roberts July Aff., p. 10.  Mr. 
Roberts averred that he asked his trial counsel to obtain those records.  Roberts July Aff., 
p. 10.   
 Again, the timing of the events in this case was critical to the issue of whether 
Roberts could have started the fire given the fire investigator’s testimony that the fire 
lasted only about only six to eight minutes, Tr., pp. 133, 157, and that firefighters were 
dispatched at 4:11 a.m.  In other words, the testimony indicates that the fire would have 
started around 4:03 a.m. at the earliest.  Knowing exactly when Mr. Roberts was at the 
Club for the last time could explain whether it was physically possible for him to have set 
the fire.  Accordingly, knowing the timing of the phone calls12 would set the timeline for 
the events more clearly and shed light on the veracity of Mr. McPhie’s testimony.  
Counsel’s failure to investigate prejudiced Mr. Roberts for the reasons explained above.  
See Section III(B)(1), supra. 
3. Photos 
 Mr. Roberts avers that the State’s decision to produce in discovery photos 
showing damage from the earlier July fire at the Randolph house prompted him to agree 
to a bench trial instead of exercising his right to a jury trial.  Pet. Attach. A, p. 4, IAC 
Claim A(5); Roberts July Aff., p. 11.  “Trial by jury has been established by the 
Constitution as the normal and . . . preferable mode of disposing of issues of fact in 
criminal cases.”  Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24, 35 (1965) (citation and internal 
quotation marks omitted).  Although someone charged with a serious crime “may 
dispense with his Constitutional right to jury trial,” this action should be taken with 
                                                
12  Counsel is attempting to obtain these telephone records, but as of the filing of this brief 
they had not been obtained. 
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“express, intelligent consent, where the Government also consents, and where such action 
is approved by the responsible judgment of the trial court.”  Id. at 34.  
 Here, Mr. Roberts and his trial counsel were worried that the jury’s emotions 
would be stirred by seeing the internal smoke damage done by the July fire related to the 
murder at the Randolph residence.  But, had his counsel objected to the photos or asked 
that they be modified to hide images of the smoke damage from the July fire, Mr. Roberts 
would have asked for a jury trial instead of agreeing to a court trial.  Roberts July Aff., p. 
11.  Thus, even though none of the July fire/murder photos were introduced into evidence 
at the trial, see St.’s Br., p, 13, the prejudice to Mr. Roberts was that he forfeited his 
Constitutional right to a jury trial.  Mr. Roberts submits that his counsel was ineffective 
for letting him waive his right to a jury trial, without first determining whether he could 
exclude from a jury trial photos of the July fire and murder scene.   
4. Recalling Brandi DeGroat 
 Mr. Roberts thought his counsel should have recalled Brandi DeGroat in response 
to Jesse McPhee’s testimony that he did not think he had a child.  Pet. Attach. A, IAC 
Claim B(1); Roberts July Aff., pp. 11-12.  Ms. DeGroat testified that she had a picture of 
a child a woman claimed was Jesse’s child, although she did not think it was his child.  
Mr. Roberts submits this information is important because the woman who claimed Jesse 
was the father of her child was the woman working at the Club and visiting with Jesse 
when Mr. Roberts was with him.  Roberts July Aff., p. 12.  Mr. Roberts argues this 
woman could have testified about whether he smelled like gasoline.  Thus, Mr. Roberts’ 
claim on this issue ties in with his claim that his trial counsel should have investigated 
whether there were other witnesses to his state of being at the Club and the timing of his 
r W l W t
 i f
ti  i  l r
i l
i l
l r
’ , t
ti  j
j Wi t r i W t
j l r
 . ll
l
ti t
( ); l 1 —12 ti f
i ’ i l i
i Vi i
l
ti W t l l  
W Wi f
’ i
000150
Response to State’s Motion for Summary Disposition     22
patronage there.  He asserts he was prejudiced because the alleged mother of McPhie’s 
child could have testified that he did not smell like gasoline on his last visit to the Club.  
Had his trial counsel done more investigation or sought more information through 
examining witnesses at trial, then he could have identified additional witnesses to testify 
about the events. 
5. Smelling Gasoline on Roberts 
 Counsel concedes that Mr. Roberts’ claim that his trial counsel was ineffective for 
failing to question witnesses about whether the gasoline smell could have come from a 
nearby gasoline station (and not Mr. Roberts’ person) should be withdrawn and IAC 
Claim B (2) summarily dismissed.  See State’s Br., p. 14; Roberts July Aff., p. 12. 
6. Police Report 
 Mr. Roberts argues that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to use a police 
report (St.’s Discovery, pp. 53-55) to impeach Jesse McPhie’s trial testimony.  See Pet. 
Attach. A, p. 5, IAC Claim B(3); Roberts July Aff., pp. 12-13.  The State argues that the 
police report is inadmissible hearsay; thus, there is no prejudice.  See State’s Br., p.16.  
However, Mr. Roberts does not contend that the report should have been admitted to 
show the truth of the matter asserted, but rather to impeach McPhie’s changed 
testimony.13  Mr. Roberts asserts that his trial counsel had adequate time to prepare for 
                                                
13 To the extent Mr. Roberts’ July Affidavit can be read to argue that statements in the 
report would bolster his own testimony and should have been admitted for that purpose, 
counsel agrees that State v. Vivian, 129 Idaho 375 (1996) appears to preclude using police 
reports to that end.  See also Hansen v. State, No. 35778, at *12 (Idaho Ct. App. May 6, 
2010) (determining that the petitioner had failed to demonstrate statements within the 
police report itself would have been admissible because, while “there is an exception to 
the hearsay rule for public records and reports pursuant to Idaho Rule of Evidence 
803(8), there remains an issue of hearsay within hearsay, I.R.E. 805, with respect to the 
statements” made to the police and the petitioner would have to show that the statements 
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the trial and should have been aware of the inconsistent statements and used them to 
impeach McPhie.  Roberts July Aff., p. 12.   
 “Any party, including the party calling the witness, may attack the credibility of a 
witness.”  State v. Hoover, 138 Idaho 414, 420, 64 P.3d 340, 346 (Ct. App. 2003) (citing 
I.R.E. 607 and 613(b) and explaining that statements are not inadmissible as hearsay 
where the testimony is not offered for the truth of the facts asserted and its sole 
evidentiary purpose is to impeach credibility).  See also State v. Agafonov, No. 38764, at 
*4 (Idaho Ct. App. Nov. 27, 2012) (explaining that the state offered the officer’s report 
for impeachment purposes and agreeing with the district court that is a permissible basis 
for admission of police report statements because the questions were relevant as they 
tended to make it more or less probable that the acquaintance was testifying truthfully).  
 As noted, the timing of the events in this case was critical to the convictions.  In 
particular, the fact finder relied on Mr. McPhie’s testimony about when Mr. Roberts 
came into and then left the Club the final time.  Also, Mr. McPhie’s testimony that Mr. 
Roberts smelled of gasoline was relied on by the trial and appellate courts as evidence 
supporting the convictions.  Mr. McPhie told different stories about the events to Officer 
Davidson, as reported in Davidson’s report, and at the preliminary hearing, but then 
changed his testimony at trial.  Although trial counsel did impeach Mr. McPhie with his 
preliminary hearing testimony, it is relevant to the credibility of his trial testimony that 
the story he told Officer Davidson close in time to the events in question also did not 
have Mr. Roberts showing up at the Club around 4:00 a.m., but rather had Mr. McPhie 
leaving the Club around 3:00 a.m. and not seeing Mr. Roberts again until the evening.  
                                                                                                                                            
themselves “conform with an exception to the hearsay rules” in order to have them 
admitted into evidence).   
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See Section I.E supra.  
 Whether to impeach a witness is a tactical decision.  State v. Yakovac, 145 Idaho 
437, 447, 180 P.3d 476, 486 (2008).  And, ordinarily, tactical decisions are not second-
guessed on appeal unless they result from inadequate preparation, ignorance of the 
relevant law, or other objective shortcomings.  Howard, 126 Idaho at 233, 880 P.2d at 
263.  Mr. Roberts submits that his trial counsel’s decision was not a legitimate strategy 
because McPhie’s testimony was the lynchpin for his convictions.  There is no strategic 
reason to refrain from questioning McPhie about all of his inconsistent statements, given 
that the trial court relied on his testimony on timing and how Mr. Roberts smelled when 
convicting Roberts. 
7. Prosecutor’s Closing Argument  
 Mr. Roberts argues that his trial counsel should have objected to the following 
comments made by the prosecutor during closing arguments, i.e., that (1) witness Jesse 
McPhie had “no reason to lie” and (2) the court should credit McPhie’s trial testimony 
instead of his inconsistent preliminary hearing testimony.  See Pet. Attach. A, pp. 1-2, 
Claims C(1) & (2) & p. 5, IAC Claim C(1).  Counsel agrees that this claim should be 
withdrawn, as Mr. Roberts indicated in his July 11, 2016 Affidavit.  See Roberts July 
Aff., p. 13.14 
 
                                                
14  See, e.g., Giles v. State, 125 Idaho 921, 924, 877 P.2d 365, 368 (1994) (“[C]ounsel’s 
choice of witnesses, manner of cross-examination, and lack of objection to testimony fall 
within the area of tactical, or strategic, decisions. . . .” (citation and internal quotation 
marks omitted)); State v. Baker, No. 41590, at *8 (Idaho Ct. App. Oct. 18, 2016) (“Both 
sides have traditionally been afforded considerable latitude in closing . . . and are entitled 
to discuss fully, from their respective standpoints, the evidence and the inferences to be 
drawn therefrom.”).   
ti L
Wi i
i ri nd— 
l ti f
r
l i i t t
ti t
ti l f t
ti l
t r
i
 I ( ) Wi
“  li  ( ) i ti
l I ti tt 1—2,
(l  ( ) 1 (l
t l id l
. 13.14 
‘  l t  ]0
Wi —examinati ti l
f t i . . .” 
»  t *  
i i l f t . . . m
i t t i ere
r f
’ i
000153
Response to State’s Motion for Summary Disposition     25
8. Sentencing Claims 
 Counsel also agrees that most of Mr. Roberts’ sentencing claims should be 
withdrawn, as Mr. Roberts requested in his July 11, 2016 Affidavit, but with one 
exception.  See Roberts July Aff., p. 13.  To the extent Mr. Roberts argues his trial 
counsel was ineffective for failing to probe whether it impacted the trial court’s verdict 
that the court had apparently relied on its own knowledge of physics to determine how 
the window could/could not have broken, and his appellate counsel’s failure to raise the 
issue on appeal, counsel submits this claim should not be withdrawn.  See Section 
III(A)(1), infra.  And, because Mr. Roberts was represented by counsel when he filed the 
July Affidavit, the court should recognize only his counsel’s right to withdraw claims.15   
9. Appellate Counsel’s Performance 
a. Failure to File a Reply Brief 
 Mr. Roberts claims his appellate counsel should have filed a reply brief pointing 
out that (1) the Club would not allow a non-employee to be in the Club after the 4:00 a.m. 
closing, (2) the testimony on timing of events provided by Mr. McPhie and Ms. DeGroat 
                                                
15 Although in an unpublished disposition, the Idaho Court of Appeals has explained that 
“[w]hen a party is represented, every pleading, motion, or other paper filed on behalf of 
the party must be signed by an Idaho licensed attorney.”  Moen v. State, No. 40600, at *5 
(Idaho Ct. App. Oct. 15, 2014) (citing I.R.C.P. 11(a)(1)).  In making this statement, the 
Court of Appeals in Moen relied on a Pennsylvania Supreme Court decision: “We will 
not require courts considering [post-conviction] petitions to struggle through the pro se 
filings of defendants when qualified counsel represent those defendants.”  Id. (quoting 
Commonwealth v. Pursell, 724 A.2d 293, 302 (Pa. 1999)).  The Court of Appeals in 
Moen concluded that “the district court did not deny [the petitioner] due process by not 
considering his pro se filings while he was represented.”  See also State v. Estep, No. 
40646, at *4 (Idaho Ct. App. Sept. 18, 2014) (“When a defendant is represented by 
counsel, it is generally held to be within the discretion of the trial court to require all 
documents to be filed through and by the defendant’s legal representative.”).  
Accordingly, counsel submits that the court should consider the factual information Mr. 
Roberts provided in his July Affidavit, but that any legal conclusions or arguments should 
be left to his appointed counsel. 
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demonstrates Mr. Roberts could not have set the fire, and (3) the Davison police report 
contains statements undermining the sufficiency of the evidence used to convict Mr. 
Roberts.  Pet., Attach. A, pp. 6-6; Roberts July Aff., pp. 13-14.  Roberts asserts that he 
asked his appellate counsel to include this information in a reply brief and that he was 
prejudiced by its omission because the Idaho Court of Appeals relied on the timing of 
events---as testified to by Mr. McPhie---in upholding Roberts’ conviction.   
 Counsel recognizes that “[w]hether to file a reply brief—a decision dependent on 
the strength of the appellate issues and nature of the arguments presented in response—is 
a patently strategic decision within the professional discretion of appellate counsel,” 
Heilman v. State, 158 Idaho 139, 146, 344 P.3d 919, 926 (Ct. App. 2015), review denied 
(Mar. 31, 2015), but submits that, because the timing of events was so critical in this 
case, appellate counsel should have replied to the State’s brief on appeal and pointed out 
the factual information supporting Mr. Roberts’ insufficient evidence argument. 
b. Appealing Trial Judge’s Comments on How the Window Broke 
 As explained above, the trial court discussed at sentencing its view of the trial 
evidence, in part, explaining how it viewed the physical impossibility of Mr. Roberts’ 
testimony as to how the window broke.  See Section III(A)(1), infra.  Thus, although not 
stated when the court delivered its verdicts, the court did explain its fact finding and part 
of the basis for its verdict at the sentencing hearing.  Tr., p. 693.  And, the court relied on 
its own view of physics and how the window could have broken.  Trial counsel did not 
object at trial because it was unknown until sentencing that the court had relied on its 
own view of physics to consider how the window broke.  Appellate counsel could have 
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raised the issue as a fundamental error.16  A contemporaneous objection could not be 
made at trial because the trial court did not reveal its rationale until the sentencing 
hearing.   
c. Appealing Prosecutor’s Alleged Witness Vouching 
 Mr. Roberts asserts his counsel provided ineffective assistance on appeal by 
failing to challenge the prosecutor “vouching” for Mr. McPhie’s credibility at trial.  Pet. 
Attach. A, p. 6, IAC Claim D(3).  Mr. Roberts withdrew this claim as it related to trial 
counsel’s failure to object at trial to the prosecutor’s comments.  See Roberts July Aff., p. 
13.  Counsel agrees that his claim should be withdrawn as to both trial counsel and 
appellate counsel because appellate counsel could have raised the issue only as a 
fundamental error, but Roberts withdrew any challenge to his trial counsel’s actions.  See 
also State v. Baker, No. 41590, at *8 (Idaho Ct. App. Oct. 18, 2016) (“Both sides have 
traditionally been afforded considerable latitude in closing . . . and are entitled to discuss 
fully, from their respective standpoints, the evidence and the inferences to be drawn 
therefrom.”).   
d. Appealing Review of Photos Taken During Discovery 
Mr. Roberts initially claimed that his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing 
to challenge the prosecutor’s decision to include in the discovery materials photos of the 
July fire at the Randolph residence.  Pet. Attach. A, p. 6, IAC Claim D(4).  Counsel 
concedes that this claim should be withdrawn as Mr. Roberts requested in his July 
                                                
16  When an “alleged error was not followed by a contemporaneous objection, it shall 
only be reviewed by an appellate court under Idaho’s fundamental error doctrine.”  State 
v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 228, 245 P.3d 961, 980 (2010).  To fall within that doctrine, the 
error must be one that violates one or more of the defendant’s unwaived constitutional 
rights; the error must plainly exist; and the error must not be harmless.  Id. 
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Affidavit, but as to appellate counsel only.  See State’s Br., p. 20; Roberts July Aff., p. 
16; Section III(B)(3), infra. 
C. Cumulative Error 
 Mr. Roberts’ Petition also included a claim arguing that there exists a “cumulative 
effect of errors not singularly prejudicial.”  Pet. Attach. A, p. 3, Claim G.  Under the 
cumulative error doctrine, a series of errors, harmless in and of themselves, may in the 
aggregate show the absence of a fair trial.  State v. Adamcik, 152 Idaho 445, 483, 272 
P.3d 417, 455 (2012).  If the court finds more than one error, Mr. Roberts requests the 
court consider applying the doctrine of cumulative error in this case.  
IV.  Conclusion 
 For all these reasons, Mr. Roberts respectfully requests that the Court allow an 
evidentiary hearing in this case. 
DATED:  December 14, 2016. 
 
 
ELLSWORTH, KALLAS & DEFRANCO, P.L.L.C. 
 
 
         
   John C. DeFranco 
   Attorney for Petitioner 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
 
The undersigned hereby certifies that on December 14, 2016, a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing document was served upon counsel as follows: 
 
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney      
Dep. PA Shelley Akamatsu      ___  U.S. Mail 
200 W. Front Street      ___  Hand Delivery 
Boise, Idaho 83702      ___  Facsimile:  287-7709 
 
 
    
 
     ___________________________ 
     Elisabeth Grinder, Legal Assistant 
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JAN M. BENNETTS 
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney 
Shelley W. Akamatsu 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
200 West Front Street, Suite 3191 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Telephone: (208) 287-7700 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRJCT OF 
THE ST A TE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
STEVEN EUGENE ROBERTS, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
THE ST A TE OF IDAHO, 
Respondent. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Case No. CV PC 2016 05792 
REPLY TO RESPONSE TO 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
DISPOSITION 
COME S NOW, the State of Idaho, by and through Shelley W. Akamatsu, Deputy 
Prosecuting Attorney and does hereby reply to the petitioner' s response to the motion for 
summary disposition. 
A. Conceded, Withdrawn, Amended Claims 
The respondent has conceded or withdrawn the following claims in his response: 
C laim 5: The prosecutor improperly vouched for witnesses. 
Claim 16: His attorney fai led to ask witnesses questions about their ability to smell gas 
on him. 
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Claim 19: His attorney did not object to the court' s statements during the sentencing 
about the broken window. 
Claim 21: His attorney failed to call the bouncer of the dance club as a witness during 
sentencing. 
Claim 24: His appellate counsel failed to challenge the improper witness vouching by the 
prosecutor. 
Claim 25: His appellate counsel refused to review the legality of the photos that were not 
admitted at trial but were disclosed by the state in discovery. 
The court must dismiss claims 5, 16, 19, 2 I 24, and 25 as the defendant has either 
withdrawn or conceded them in the pleadings. 
The respondent has amended the following claim in his response: 
Claim 20: Amended to his attorney failed to "probe" the judge during sentencing. The 
respondent is not permitted to amend his petition without leave of the court. Accordingly, 
the original claim must be dismissed. 
B. Forfeited or Barred Claims 
Judicial Errors 
In his response, Robert ' s alleged the claims of judicial error couldn't have been 
presented "earlier". Specifically, he alleges, "earlier" means, "during the trial" so the 
court's statements at the sentencing hearing couldn't have been presented "earlier"' because 
sentencing didn ' t happen unti I after the trial. See Response pg. 12 Respondent has failed 
to cite any authority which stands for the proposition "earlier" means "during the trial." 
Robert's argument completely ignores the context of the statement. The language about 
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"presenting the issue earlier" is in the context of whether it (the issue) could have been 
presented during the appeal. If the issue could have been raised on direct appeal, it could 
have been presented "earlier" . If it could have been presented earlier, it is forfe ited. The 
statements of which Roberts complains were made during the sentencing. He has 
completely failed to allege why he could not have presented this appellate issue earlier than 
a lleging it in his petition. The court must dismiss the claims of judicial error because they 
should have been raised on his direct appeal. Bias v. State, 159 Idaho 696, 365 P.3d 1050, 
1056-57 (Ct. App. 2015). Since Roberts failed to ra ise these issues on direct appeal, he 
has forfeited them. 
Prosecutorial Misconduct 
Roberts has w ithdrawn his claim the prosecutor committed misconduct by 
improperly vouching for the credibility of the witnesses and it appears 1 also, and failing to 
identify which photos would be used during the triaJ2 . 
Actual Innocence 
Roberts has claimed he is entitled to post-conviction relief because he is innocent. 
Idaho has not adopted an "actual innocence'· claim as enunciated by the U.S. Supreme 
Court. See Rhoades, 148 Idaho at 253, 220 P.3 d at l 072, cited in Matthews v. State , No. 
4206 1, 2015 Ida. App. Unpub. LEXIS 306, at 7 (Ct. App. Aug. 27, 20 15), citing Schlup v. 
1 Roberts completely failed to address why his c laim regarding the photos should not be 
forfeited pursuant to Bias. 
2 Roberts does not claim the prosecutor fai led to di sclose the photographs. Roberts claim is that the 
prosecutor fai led to specifically identify which of the photos included in the State's disclosure would be used c 
the trial. 
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Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327, 115 S. Ct. 851, 130 L. Ed. 2d 808 ( 1995). Under the standard 
for "actual innocence" as enunciated by the U.S. Supreme Court, "the petitioner must 
show that it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him in 
the light of the new evidence." Rhoades v. State, 148 Idaho 247, 253, 220 P.3d 1066, 
I 072 (2009). 
Even if the court decided to apply the actual innocence standard, Roberts has not 
articulated or identified what new evidence would have made it more likely than not any 
reasonable juror would not have convicted him. Robert's response is to invite the court to 
use the evidentiary hearing as a fishing expedition to " find and discover" whether there is 
any new evidence that would fit the standard. This is precisely what the court is not 
allowed to do without finding the petitioner has made a prima facie case. This claim 
should be dismissed. 
Insufficient Evidence 
Roberts has claimed he is entitled to post-conviction relief because the evidence was 
insufficient to support his guilt.3 Roberts makes a ve iled concession he is barred from re-
litigating this claim of insufficient evidence on the arson conviction because it was 
litigated in his direct appea l. Roberts makes not response to the State's contention the 
cla im regarding the burg lary conviction is barred because it could have been ra ised on his 
direct appeal. Bias v. State, 159 Idaho 696, 365 P.3d 1050, 1056-57 (Ct. App.2015). 
3 Roberts alleged "insufficient evidence" but fail ed to designate wh ich of hi s convictions 
the evidence was insufficient. Roberts failed to allege insufficient evidence on appeal for the 
Burglary conviction. 
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B. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 
Interviewing and Calling Witnesses 
Roberts has claimed his attorney was ineffective for failing to locate, interview and 
call employees of the strip club, Charlie's Bar and Cold Clean. In its motion, the State 
moved for dismissal because Roberts failed to identify the names of any of the employees 
and to provide affidavits of what their testimony would have been. Robert' s response 
was to simply repeat the bare and conclusory claim rather than to provide the specific 
names and specific testimony that would factually support the claim and it should 
therefore be dismissed. 
Phone Records 
Roberts has c laimed his attorney was ineffective for fai ling to subpoena phone 
records of Jesse Mcphie and Brandi Degroat between August 3 1, 2012 and September I , 
20 12. In its motion, the State moved for dismissal because Roberts fai led to what phone 
records and how they would have changed the outcome of the case. Robert's response 
was to simply repeat the bare and conclusory claim rather than to provide the specific 
records and that would factually support the cla im and it should therefore be dismissed. 
The State also moved for dismissal because the claim fai led to raise a genuine 
issue of material fact. Roberts made no attempt to response to this basis for dismissal. 
Photos 
Roberts initially c laimed his attorney was ineffective for fail ing to "sanitize" the 
photo evidence included in the State's discovery disclosure. In his response, he has 
attempted to amend this c la im by alleging he and his attorney made a strategic decision to 
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have a bench trial. Specifically, the tactical decis ion of waiving the jury trial was because 
the jurors emotions could ' ·have been stirred" had they seen the photos of smoke damage. 
Even the morphed claim fails to raise a genuine issue of material fact. Even if the 
defendant had a jury trial , the jurors would have been instructed, " the law require[ d] that 
(their] decision be made solely on the evidence." Exhibit I, Pgs. I 74-59, lines I 7-2 1. 
Further, "neither sympathy nor prejudice should influence (them] in their deliberations. 
Id. Where a trial court has instructed a jury, it is presumed that the jury obeys the court 's 
instruction entirely. State v. Grantham, 146 Idaho 490, 498, 198 P.3d 128, 136 (Ct. App. 
2008). The jurors would have been presumed to have followed the instructions. 
Further, Roberts has described a tactical or strategic decision. Tactical and 
strategic decisions by tria l counsel will not be second-guessed and "cannot serve as a 
basis for post-conviction relief unless the decision is shown to have resulted from 
inadequate preparation, ignorance of the relevant law, or other shortcomings capable of 
objective review." State v. Shackelford, 150 Idaho 355 , 382-83, 247 P.3d 582, 609- 10 
(20 10). In the absence of evidence that a strategic decision was "the product of 
inadequate preparation or ignorance of the relevant Jaw," this Court cannot find deficient 
performance. Johnson v. State , 156 Idaho 7, 11 ,3 19 P.3d 491 , 495 (2014); State v. 
Dunlap, 155 Idaho 345,384, 3 13 P.3d 1, 40 (2013). 
Recalling Brandi Degroat 
Roberts has claimed his attorney should have recal led Degroat to question her 
about whether her son, Jesse Mcphie was lying when he testified he did not have children. 
The State moved to dismiss because Roberts had failed to raise a genuine issue of fact on 
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whether the outcome would have been different. Robert's response completely failed to 
address this argument and continued to claim counsel was deficient. The court must 
dismiss this claim as Roberts has completely failed to identify or articulate how the 
outcome would have been different. 
Admission of Police Report 
Roberts has claimed his attorney was ineffective for failing to admit into evidence a 
police report by Officer Davidson that contained statements Jesse Mcphie made to him 
that were inconsistent with his preliminary hearing and trial testimony. Specifically, 
Roberts claims the police report contained statements made by witness Mcphie that were 
consistent with Mcphie's preliminary hearing testimony, but inconsistent with Mcphie's 
trial testimony. 
In his response, Robert's correctly cites Yakovac for the proposition that the 
decision to impeach a decision is a tactical decision that will not be second guessed unless 
it results from inadequate preparation, ignorance of the relevant law or other objective 
shortcomings. Roberts further contends the strategy was not a legitimate strategy. 
However, the court is not allowed to second guess counsel's strategy unless Roberts is 
able to point to evidence his counsel was not prepared to impeach the witness, his counsel 
was ignorant of the law related to impeachment of witnesses, or other objective 
shortcomings. Robert's contention the strategy was not legitimate is at best a subjective 
allegation based solely on his opinion. More is required before a court is allowed to 
second guess counsel's strategic decisions. 
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Sentencing Claims 
Roberts initially claimed his attorney was ineffective for fa iling to object to the 
court's statements during sentencing about how the window broke. Roberts amended this 
claim in his response to now allege his attorney should have " further probed" the court 
regarding the basis for the court 's verdict so that the issue could have been raised on 
appeal. F irst, Roberts is not permitted to amend his petition further without leave of the 
court. Second Robert is basically alleging there was insufficient evidence for the court to 
base its guilty verdict upon. The court must dismiss this claim as it relates to both 
convictions for the same reasons stated in the section discussing forfeited or barred 
claims. 
Appellate Counsel 
Filing a Reply Brief 
Roberts has claimed his appellate attorney was ineffective for failing to file a reply 
brief that included an assertion that a dance club would not let a non-employee entrance 
to an establishment after it had closed at 4:00 a.m., a copy of Davidson' s police report and 
the trial testimony of Ms. Degroat. The State moved for summary disposition on the 
grounds the claim was bare and conclusory. Robert's reply failed to address the State's 
assertion the claims were bare and conclusory, but acknowledged that filing a reply brief 
is clearly a tactical decision . 
However, Robert's reply failed to include that the standard for tactical decisions of 
appe llate counsel are the same as they are for trial counsel: unless those decisions are 
based on inadequate preparat ion, ignorance of relevant law, or other shortcomings 
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capable of objective evaluation, they are not to be second guessed or questioned. 
Howard, 126 Idaho at 233, 880 P.2d at 263, cited in Heilman v State, 153 Idaho 139 
(Ct.App. 2015) The court must dismiss these c laims related to filing a reply brief because 
Roberts has failed to make any showing that appellate counsel's decisions were made 
because of inadequate preparation, ignorance of relevant low or other shortcomings 
capable of objective evaluation. 
WHEREFORE the Respondent requests that this court grant its Motion for 
Summary Disposition of the claims in Roberts ' petition. 
DATED this ;Z D day of December, 2016. 
Shelley W. Akamatsu 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this d I s+- day of ~rnbe.£ 2016, I 
caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing to be placed in the United States mail, 
postage prepaid, addressed to: 
John Defranco 
I 031 E. Park Blvd., Boise, Idaho 83712 
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03:24:45 PM I Judge j if this was a jurors comment 
03:24:.59 .. PM. -- I why would it be any_d_i-ffe_r_e_n_t? ________ _ 
. -- ----· .. ....... . . -------1 
03:25:08 PM . Defranco I wouldn't be if it was analyzed in that light 
03:26:00 PM I stand on written material at this point ---------· 
03:2.6: 07 PM : Judge-! we have a hearing soon 
03:26: 11 PMt-· I 1·11 get you a written decision soon 
03:26:35 PM; if court grants the summary dismissal, court will vacate that hearing 
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JAN 1 0 2017 
r THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTR~OP 
8 
HER D. RICH, Clerk 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA yE~Hrto 
STEVEN EUGE E ROBERTS, 
Pet itioner, 
vs. 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, 
Respondent. 
I. I TROD CTIO 
Case r o. CV-PC-2016-05 792 
MEMORANDUM DECISIO AND ORDER 
RE: MOTION FOR SUMMARY DISMISSAL 
The Petitioner. Steven Eugene Roberts ("Roberts") was charged with one count of arson in 
the first degree burglary, and a persistent violator enhancement. 1 After a bench trial, during 
which Robert was represented by attorney Robert Chastain, this Court found Roberts guilty of 
the burglary and arson charge , and Roberts then admitted to being a persistent violator. The 
Court impo cd a unified thirty-year sentence with ten years determinate for arson in the first 
degree, and a concurrent unified ten-year sentence with five years determinate for burglary. 
Repre ented by Jason Pintlcr, Robert appealed the arson conviction on grounds of insufficiency 
of evidence. The Court of Appeals affirrned.2 
On March 25, 2016, Robert timely filed a Petition and Affidavit for Post-Conviction Relief. 
Although counsel was subsequently appointed at Roberts' request, no amended petition was 
filed . However, Roberts did file an additional pro-se affidavit in support on July 11 , 2016 which 
clarified, amended and/or withdrew some of his claims. On October 11, 2016, the State filed a 
motion for summary dispo it ion. A hearing on the motion was held on January 3, 2017 after 
\ hich the Court took the matter under advi ement.3 
1 State , .. Roberts. Ada County Ca~c o. CR-FE-20 12-17029. 
2 State\.'. Rober/. 2015 WL 5511096 (Idaho Ct. App. Sept. 17. 2015). 
~Pursuant to lRE 201 {c). the Court take JUdic1al nollce of the tran cript on appeal m Swte \'. Robert • CR-FE-20 I 2-
17029. Idaho upreme Court Docker o. 42534 (699 page ). 
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II. FACT AL BACKGROU D" 
On September I, 2012, at 4: 11 a.m., the Boise City Fire Department responded to a report of 
a fire at a residence at 5824 W. Randolph in Boise ("Randolph Property). Firefighters were on 
scene within three to four minutes. Boi e firefighters extinguished the fire located on a patio in 
the back of the house and observed several canisters near the fire's origin that smelled of 
gasoline. 
A fire investigator observed a broken windo, near the fire damage, wruch appeared to have 
been broken from outside the residence. The inve tigator also ob erved canisters containing 
gasoline placed around a flower pot with one of the cani ter's nozzle placed directly into the pot. 
The valve of a fire-damaged propane tank attached to a barbeque grill on the patio was turned to 
the "on" position. Based on the e ob ervations, the fire investigator concluded that an ignitable 
liquid was poured onto a part of the patio and the fire was intentionally set, but that the fire 
largely burned itself out before it reached the interior of the house. He te tified that the fire 
burned for approximately ix to eight minutes before it was extinguished. 
Boise police investigator found blood stain around the broken window. Several sample of 
the stain were collected and ent to the Idaho State Lab forte ting, which pre umptively 
matched the D A of Steven Roberts. The officers then obtained a D A ample from Roberts, 
which confirmed his D A at the cene of the fire. Roberts was charged with one count of arson 
in the first degree, Idaho Code§ 18- 802; burglary, LC. 18- 1401; and a persi tent violator 
enhancement, LC. § 19- 2514. 
On June 5, 20 14, Roberts waived hi right to a jury trial and requested a bench trial. At trial , 
Roberts te tified in his own defense. He testified that on the night in question, he took a car 
belonging to his girlfriend, Brandi Christine McPhie (now DeGroat) without her permission and 
met up with Brandi ' on, Jesse McPhie, at a bar. After meeting up with Je se, he went to the 
Randolph Property with a woman he had met earlier that night and who told him the house was 
haunted. He testified that something fiightened him while he wa there o he ran, tripped, and 
fell through the window on the back porch, cutting hi arm. He then returned to the bar to meet 
up with Jesse. Robert denied setting a fire or touching any gasoline cans while at the re idencc. 
Jesse al o testified at trial , stating that Roberts left the bar everal times during the evening, 
including a couple of hours before clo ing time. He te tified that Roberts last returned to the bar 
• fhe followmg factual rec11a11on I taken pnmanly from the Coun of Appeals dcc1s1on in Roben.s ' criminal case. 
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at approximately 3:55 a.m. He also testified that Roberts melled of gasoline and had a cut on his 
arm. When asked, Roberts told him he had been in a fight. Brandi DeGroat testified that he told 
her he cut his arm by falling again ta dumpster. 
The Court found Robert guilty uf burglary and ar on in the first degree. Roberts then 
admitted to being a persistent violator. Roberts appealed hi arson conviction on grounds that the 
State presented insufficient evidence in upport. amcly, he relied on the time estimates 
provided by the responding firefighter, who opined that the fire was set between 4:07 and 4: 11 
a.m., and that provided by Jes e, who testified that Roberts re-appeared at the bar around 3:55 
a.m. Thus, Robert argued he could not have been pre ent when the fire was started. The Court 
of Appeals affirmed the conviction, noting that the "minimal discrepancy in the witnesses' 
estimate is not so significant as to nullify the State's evidence of Roberts' gui lt in light of the 
other evidence against him (i.e .. being on the property and smelling of gasoline)." 2015 WL 
5511096, * 2. 
Ill. TA OARD 
A petition for po t-conviction relief commence · a civil, rather than criminal proceeding, 
which is governed by the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. State v. YakO\'ac, 145 Idaho 437. 443, 
180 P.3d 476, 482 (200 ). The petitioner must prove by a preponderance of evidence the 
allegation upon which the request for post-conviction relief is based. I.C. § 19-4907; Schultz , .. 
State, 153 Idaho 791 , 795-796, 291 P.3d 474, 478-479 (Ct. App. 2012), review denied (Dec. 14. 
2012). A petition for post-conviction relief differs from a complaint in an ordinary civil action, 
however, in that it must contain more than "a short and plain tatement of the claim" that would 
suffice for a complaint under l.R.C.P. 8(a)( I). State v. Payne, 146 Idaho 548, 560, 199 P.3d 123, 
135 (2008). The petition must be verified with re peel to facts within the personal knowledge of 
the petitioner, and affidavits, record or other evidence supporting its allegations must be 
attached, or the petition must state why uch supporting evidence i not included. LC. § 19-4903. 
ln other words, the petition must present or be accompanied by admissible e idence supporting 
its allegation , or it will be subject to dismissal. Wolf, ·. Stare, 152 Idaho 64. 67, 266 P.3d 1169, 
1172 (Ct. App. 2011); Roman v. State, 125 Idaho 644,647, 73 P.2d 898,901 (Ct. App. 1994). 
Idaho Code § 19-4906 authorizes summary dismissal of an application for post-
conviction relief, either pursuant to motion of a party or upon the trial court' own initiative. 
Summary dismissal of an application is the procedural equivalent of summary judgment under 
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I.R.C.P. 56. Yakomc, 145 Idaho at 444, 180 P.3d at 4 3. Summary di missal is permissible only 
when the applicant' evidence has raised no genuine issue of material fact that, if resolved in the 
applicant's favor, would entitle the applicant to the relief requested. Id. "A material fact ha 
'some logical connection with the consequential facts[ ,]' ... and therefore is determined by its 
relationship to the legal theories presented by the parties.'' Id .. quoting Black's Law Dictionary, 
991 (7th Ed. l 999). Jf such a factual i sue is presented, an evidentiary hearing must be 
conducted. Id. 
Although the district court must construe di puled facts in the petitioner's favor, the coun 
is not required to accept either the petitioner's mere conclusory allegations, unsupported by 
admis ible evidence, or the petitioner's conclusions of law. Payne, 146 Idaho at 561 , 199 P.3d at 
136; Roman, 125 Idaho at 647, 873 P.2d at 901. Moreover, because the district court rather than 
a jury will be the trier of fact in the event of an evidcntiary hearing, the district court is not 
constrained to draw inferences in the petitioner's favor. but is free to arrive at the mo t probable 
inferences to be drawn from the evidence. Yakovac, 145 Idaho at 444, 180 P .3d at 483; Wolf. 152 
Idaho at 67, 266 P.3d at I I 72.5 
Claim may be ummarily di mi ed if the petitioner's allegations arc clearly disproven 
by the record of the criminal proceedings, if the petitioner has not presented admis ible evidence 
making a prima facie case as to each essential element of the claims, or if the petitioner's 
allegations do not j u tify relief as a matter of law. Kelly v. State, 149 Idaho 517, 521. 236 P.3d 
1277. 1281 (20 I 0); McKay \'. State, 148 Idaho 567, 570, 225 P .3d 700, 703 (2010). Thus, 
summary dismi sal of a claim for post-conviction relief is appropriate when the court can 
conclude, as a matter of law, that the petitioner is not entitled to relief even with all disputed 
fact construed in the petitioner' favor. For thi reason, summary dismissal of a post-conviction 
petition may be appropriate even when the State does not controvert the petitioner's evidence. 
Payne, 146 ldaho at 561. 199 P .3d at 136; Roman. 125 Idaho at 64 7, 873 P .2d at 90 I . 
On appeal from an order of summary dismissal, the reviewing court applies the same 
standards util i.le<l by the trial courts and examines whether the petitioner's admissible e idence 
asserts facts which, if true, would entitle the petitioner to relief. Ridgley v. State, 148 [daho 6 71, 
' Such inference will not be di ru.rbcd on appeal if the uncontrovened evidence i uffic1cn1 10 Justify them. Chal't•= 
,,. Bam,s. 146 Idaho 212. 218, I 92 P 3d 1036, I 042 (2008). 
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675,227 P.3d 925,929 (2010). Over questions of law, it exercises free review. Rhoades v. State, 
148 Idaho 247,250, 220 P.3d 1066, 1069 (2009). 
IV. ALYSI 
Taken together, Robert ' initial petition and ubsequent affidavit in support allege several 
claims, including judicial mi conduct, prosecutorial misconduct, insufficient evidence supporting 
conviction, actual innocence. ineffective a sistance of trial and appellate counsel, and cumulative 
error. The State moves for summary dismi al of each of the claims. 
A. Judicial 1i conduct 
I . Improper Inferences 
Roberts contends that Court improperly relied on its own cientific assumptions in rejecting 
Roberts' tory that he broke the window by tripping and falling through it. amely, the Court 
stated at sentencing: 
[F]rankly I found your te timony . .. pu hing the limits of physical impossibility. 
Given where the window was broken at, the thickness of the window how much 
running peed you could have gotten up to in tho e few feet from your chair to 
where your window was, you would have almost to have jumped on a trampoline 
and had a helmet on and tried to go through the window like a spear at a level 
well above what you would be at just running. It was clear that the phy ics of 
where the window was broken, how thick it was, the fact that you claim you 
broke the window by running and tripping headfirst into the window, I don't find 
that credible. r don't find it frankly practicable to have happened that way at all . 
Tr., p. 693:8-23. 
Robert contend that there was no evidence pre ented at trial through which the Court 
could reasonably make thi inference. amely, there was nothing pre ented regarding the 
thick.ne s of the window, Roberts' body weight, the speed required to break the window, or 
supporting the idea that the location of the break was incompatible with the law of physics. 
Robert argue that this evidence is the type of" cientific, technical , or other specialized 
knowledge" that must be presented by an expert, not imply assumed. 
The State aq,'llcs the claim i barred as forfeited ince it could have been raised upon direct 
appeal. Bias"· State, 159 Idaho 696, 702, 365 P .3d 1050, I 056-67 (Ct. App. 2015). Roberts 
acknowledges that this is the general rule, but points out that there is an exception to this rule 
where "the as ·crtcd basis for relief raises a substantial doubt about the reliability of the finding of 
guilt and could not, in the exercise of due diligence, have been presented earlier." Id. Robert 
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contends that his claim falls under this exception becau e he was not aware of the Court's 
reliance on its own assumptions until sentencing. Howe er, while this may have precluded 
Roberts from objecting at trial, it in no way precluded him from being able to raise the i ue on 
direct appeal. He filed the appeal after the.: st!ntencing hearing and, therefore, could have raised it. 
Consequently, the claim i ummarily dismi sed. 
2. Denial of Right to Pre ent Defense 
Roberts also argue the Court erred by denying Roberts the opportunity to call an expert 
witness regarding how the window was broken and provide opinion that Roberts' body could not 
have broken the window. Along this same vein, Robert further complains that the Court asked 
clarifying que tions of State's witnesses regarding how the window broke, but did not ask 
similar questions of Roberts. Had the Court asked, Robert contends he could have responded to 
the Court' concerns. 
Again, the tate correctly argues that the claim is barred because it could have been 
raised on direct appeal. Bias. supra. Roberts has offered no reason why, in the exerci e of due 
diligence, it could not have been raised at the time of appeal. Thus, it is ummarily dismi sed. 
8 . Prosecutorial Mi conduct6 
Some of the photos disclosed by the State prior to trial included those from a prior 
murder/arson investigation at the Randolph Property. Roberts contends that the prosecutor's 
failure to identify prior to trial which photos would be used at trial prohibited Roberts ' coun el 
from calling an expert witness and mounting an affirmative defen e. 
The State correctly argue that the claim i barred as forfeited since it could have been raised 
upon direct appeal. Bias, supra. Roberts has not e tablished why the claim could not have been 
raised earlier; indeed, he does not address the State's argument at all. Consequently, it is 
summarily dismisscd.7 
0 A second basis a.,,cned by Robt:TL, for ''pro ecutonal misconduct" wa,; the prosecutor":- act of "\ouclung·· for 
k!>...C McPh1e·s cred1b1hty at tnal. de:-ptte Lhe foci Lhat Jesse had given connicung te timony at the prelimmary 
hearing. Robcns ub cquently wuhdrew Lhis claim. 
' In add11ton, whale the Coun doe not rely on thi:- ground for dismi-.sal. there i..! no duty on the part of the prosecutor 
10 reveal . equence of prosecution; 1f 11erns were discovered, then defense has all notice tt need to defend again t 
charge . 
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C. Actual Innocence 
Roberts argues that the facts pre ented at trial support his innocence, and the prosecution 
failed to establish motive. The State contends that "actual innocence" is not a basis for post-
conviction relief unle he can point to material facts not previously pre ented and heard. 1n this 
regard, the State argues the claim is bare and conclusory becau ·e he did not identify which 
evidence was not presented or how introduction of it would have raised a ubstantial doubt about 
the verdict. The State al o points out that Idaho has not adopted an "actual innocence" claim. 
The State is correct that "actual innocence" is not grounds for post-conviction relief. Section 
19-4901 (a) of the Idaho Code lists the type of claim for which post-conviction relief can be 
granted. Sub ection (6) authorizes a limited actual-innocence claim, but it must be based upon 
fingerprint or foren ic D Ate t results that establish innocence. It applie when the petitioner 
claim , ''[s]ubject to the provision of section l 9-4902(b) through (g), Idaho Code, that the 
petitioner is innocent of the offense." LC.§ 19-4901(a)(6); Fields v. State, 151 Idaho 18, 22. 253 
P.3d 692,696 (2011). Further, in Snowball\-'. State, the Court of Appeals held that there was no 
right to review of the freestanding claim of actual innocence as post-conviction relief because 
Idaho docs not recognize a freestanding claim of actual innocence. 2013 WL 6506172 ( Idaho Ct. 
App. 2013) (unpublished). 
ln addition, Roberts has fa iled to identify any evidence which would support an ''actual 
innocence" claim, even if it were grounds for po t-conviction relief. Therefore, the claim is 
ummarily di missed. 
D. Insufficiency of Evidence 
Robert asserts that, in light of his own trial te timony, considered with that of Brandi 
DeGroat and Jesse McPhie's preliminary hearing testimony and statements to police, there is 
insufficient evidence to ·upport a finding that he was at the Randolph Property when the fire was 
allegedly et. The State argue that claim mu t be dismissed because it wa addre ed in the 
appeal and, therefore, barred by res judicata. Knutsen ,,. State, 144 Idaho 433, 439, 163 P.3d 222, 
228 (Ct. App. 2007)('"The principles of re judicata apply when an applicant attempts to rai e the 
ame is ues previously ruled upon on direct appeal in a ubscquent application for po t-
conviction relief.") Roberts acknowledges that res judicata would bar the claim if it was based on 
the ame arguments made on appeal; however, he argues that "to the extent the new e idence 
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and different argument made now undennine the original grounds for the sufficiency of the 
evidence detcnnination" his claim should proceed. Resp. to State's Mtn., p. 16. 
Res judicata prevents the litigation of causes of action which were finally decided in a 
previous suit. Gubler By and Through Gubler v. Brydon , 125 Idaho 107, I t O 86 7 P .2d 981, 984 
(1994). As a general proposition, res judicata prevent litigants who were parties in a prior action 
from bringing or having to defend a claim arising from the transaction or scrie of transactions 
giving rise to the first sujt. Jd. Res j udicata covers both claim preclusion (true res judicata) and 
issue preclusion (collateral estoppel). Id. For claim preclusion to bar a sub equent action there 
arc three requirements: (I) ame parties; (2) same claim; and (3) final judgment. Ticor Title Co. 
v. Stanion, 144 Idaho 119, 124, 157 P.3d 613,618 (2007). Claim preclusion bars adjudication not 
only on the matters offered and received to defeat the claim, but al o as to "every matter which 
might and hould have been litigated in the fir t uit." Id. at 126, 157 P .3d at 620. 
Roberts ' claim on appeal is the same claim as that raised in this petition - insufficiency of the 
evidence. Although Roberts now bases his claim on slightly different grounds, i.e., the 
que ·tionable reliability of Jesse's trial testimony as to time estimates, this does not preclude the 
operation of res judicata since it is a matter which could have been raised on direct appeal. 
Johnson v. State, 158 Idaho 852, 856, 353 P .3d 1086, I 090 (Ct. App. 20 I 5)("claim preclusion 
bars [petitioner] from asserting different theories in support of the claims already adjudicated.'') 
Con equently, he i barred from pursuing that claim through post-conviction relief. The claim is 
ummarily dismissed. 
E. Ineffective Assi tance of oun el 
A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is a penni sible claim under Idaho's post-
conviction act. 1/o}Jman v. State, 153 Idaho 898,903,277 P.3d 1050, 1054 (Ct. App. 2012); 
Baxter v. State, 149 ldaho 859,862,243 P.3d 675,678 (Ct. App. 2010). In order to succeed on 
the claims, Roberts must meet the two-prong test set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 
668 ( 1984): 1) counsel' perfonnance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and; 2) 
there i a reasonable probability that, but for counsel' errors, the result would have been 
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different. Mitchell, •. State, 132 Idaho 274, 277, 971 P.2d 727, 730 (1998). citing Strickland, 466 
U.S. at 687-88.8 
In applying the first Strickland prong, a court must extend significant deference to trial 
counsel. "There is a strong presumption that counsel's perfonnance fell within the wide range of 
professional assistance." State ,,. Hairston, 133 Idaho 496, 511 , 988 P .2d 1170, 1185 ( 1999), 
internal quotations and cite · omitted. Importantly, trial counsel's trategic and tactical decision 
may not be second-guessed and such decisions cannot erve as a basi for post-conviction relief 
unle s the decision is shown to have resulted from inadequate preparation, ignorance of the 
relevant law or other hortcomings capable of objective review. Prall v. Stare. 134 Idaho 581, 
584. 6 P.3d 831 , 834 (2000). As noted by the U.S. Supreme Court, 
'Surmounting Strickland' s high bar is never an easy task.' Padilla v. KenwcJ..y . 
559 U.S. ----,---- (130 S.Ct. 1473, 1485, 176 L.Ed.2d 284) (2010). An 
ineffective-as i tance claim can function as a way to escape rules of waiver and 
forfeiture and raise issue not presented at trial [ or in pretrial proceedings], and ·o 
the Strickland tandard mu t be applied with scrupulous care, lest 'intrusive post-
trial inquiry' threaten the integrity of the very adversary process the right to 
counsel is meant to serve. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689-690 [ 104 S.Ct. 2052]. Even 
under de no,·o review, the standard for judging coun et • representation i a mo t 
deferential one. Unlike a later reviewing court, the attorney observed the relevant 
proceedings, knew of materials outside the record, and interacted with the client, 
with opposing counsel, and with the judge. It is 'all too tempting' to 'second-
gue s counsel's assi tance after conviction or ad erse sentence.' Id .. at 6 9 [ 104 
S.Ct. 2052] ; see also Bell v. Cone. 535 U.S. 685, 702, 122 S.Ct. 1843, 152 
L.Ed.2d 914 (2002); Lockhart v. Fretwell. 506 U.S. 364, 372, 113 S.Ct. 838, 122 
L.Ed.2d 180 (1993). The question is whether an attorney's representation 
amounted to incompetence under ' prevailing professional nonns,' not whether it 
deviated from best practice or most common custom. Strickland, 466 U.S., at 
690, I 04 S.Ct. 2052. 
Premo , •. Moore. 562 U.S. 115, 122 (20 I I). 
As for the ·econd Strickland prong, the applicant must how by a preponderance of the 
evidence "a reasonable probability that, but for coun el 's unprofe ional errors, the result of the 
proceeding would have been different." Estrada, .. State, 143 Idaho 558, 565, 149 P.3d 833, 840 
(2006), quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. "[R]easonablc probability is a probability sufficient 
to undennine confidence in the outcome." Id. As tated by the U.S. Supreme Court in 
s Notably. a court i~ not required to analyze \\hether a tnal counsel's performance wai, deficient before examining 
the preJud1ce ru pect. Stnckland, 466 U. S. al 697. If I.be peuuoner fails 10 demonstrate prejudice, It doe. nor matter 
whether trial counsel", perfonnance fell below 1he ~tandard of reasonablene Id. 
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Strickland: "(i]n making this detennination (referring to the prejudice prong], a court hearing an 
ineffectiveness claim must consider the totality of the evidence before the judge or jury." 466 
U.S. at 696. Further: 
An error by counsel, even if professionally unreasonable, docs not warrant setting 
aside the judgment of a criminal proceeding if the error had no effect on the 
judgment. Cf United States v. Morrison, 449 U.S. 361, 364-365, 101 S.Ct. 665, 
667-668, 66 L.Ed.2d 564 (1981). The purpose of the Sixth Amendment guarantee 
of counsel is to ensure that a Petitioner has the as istance neces ary to justify 
reliance on the outcome of the proceeding. Accordingly, any deficiencies in 
counsel' perfonnance must be prejudicial to the defense in order to constitute 
ineffective assistance under the Constitution . 
••• 
It is not enough for the Petitioner to show that the errors had ome conceivable 
effect on the outcomw of the proceeding. Virtually every act or omission of 
counsel would meet that test, cf United States v. Valenzuela-Berna/, 458 U.S. 
858, 866-867, 102 S.Ct. 3440, 3446-3447, 73 L.Ed.2d 1193 (1982). and not every 
error that conceivably could have influenced the outcome undennines the 
reliability of the result of the proceeding. Respondent suggests requiring a 
howing that the errors ' impaired the presentation of the defense.' That standard, 
however, provides no workable principle. Since any error, if it i indeed an error, 
'impairs' the pre entation of the defense, the proposed ·tandard is inadequate 
because it provide no way of deciding what irnpainncnt are sufficiently seriou 
to warrant setting aside the outcome of the proceeding. 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691-93. 
I . Pretrial Errors 
a. Failure to locate, interview and call witncsse 
Roberts contends that his counsel, Mr. Chastain, was ineffective by failing to call the 
employees and owners of the Eclip e Club becau e they would have been able to rebut Je e's 
testimony that Roberts smelled like gasoline while at the Eclipse Club and could have provided 
infonnation about the timing of Roberts' visits to the club. Roberts asserts that he "stres ed" to 
his coun el that the e employee hould be interviewed, yet his counsel failed to do so. ln 
addition, Roberts contend that Mr. Chastain should have interviewed employees of Cold Clean, 
who were hired by Jennifer Holley, the owner of the Randoply Property, to renovate the home 
prior to the arson. Roberts assert that the employees could ha e shed light on M . Holley' trial 
testimony that some of the objects on the porch (i.e., ga grill, planters and canes) had been 
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moved between when he had last visited the home and the evening of the arson. Roberts 
believes the employees likely would have testified that they moved the objects. 
The State argues that Petitioner' s claims are bare and conclusory. arnely, Roberts did 
not cite to who should be called, what they would have said or how it would have changed the 
outcome. The State al o contends the claim fails to raise a genuine issue of material fact because 
even if coun el was deficient, he has failed to show that but for the deficiency, the outcome 
would have been different. 
Determining whether an attorney's pretrial preparation falls below a level of rea onable 
performance constitutes a question of law, but i essentially premised upon the circumstances 
urrounding the attorney's investigation. Ste\·ens v. State, 156 ldaho 396, 412, 327 P .3d 3 72, 388 
(Ct. App. 2013), review denied (July 1, 2014). This Court may not second-gue s trial counsel in 
the particularities of trial preparation. id. In Stevens, the Idaho Court of Appeals set forth the 
standard to be applied to complaints regarding pretrial preparation: 
The duty to investigate requires only that counsel conduct a reasonable 
inve ligation. In assessing the reasonableness of counsel's investigation, the court 
must consider not onJy the quantum of evidence known to counsel, but also 
whether the known evidence would lead a reasonable attorney to investigate 
further. Strategic choices made after thorough investigation of law and facts 
relevant to plausible options are virtually unchallengeable; and strategic choice 
made after less than complete in cstigation are reasonable precisely to the extent 
that reasonable professional judgments support the limitations on investigation. 
Id. at 412-13, 327 P.3d at 388-89, internal cites omitted. 
To create a genuine issue of material fact, Roberts mu t show beyond his own 
·peculation that if counsel had investigated these witnes es, the result would be different. 
Relevant here is the requirement that Roberts' petition pre ·ent or be accompanied by admissible 
evidence supporting its allegations. I.C. § 19-4903. Although this Court must construe disputed 
facts in Roberts' favor, it is not required to accept his mere conclu ory allegations, unsupported 
by admissible evidence. Pay ne. 146 ldaho at 561, 199 P .3d at 136; Roman, 125 ldaho at 647, 873 
P.2d at 901. Rather, Robert must support his petition with written statements from these 
witnesses regarding facts within their knowledge or othcn.vi e based upon verifiable information. 
Balda·in v. State, 145 Idaho 148, 155, 177 P .3d 362, 369 (2008). "Absent witne ses or 
verifiability of the facts to which they could te tify, the application fail to raise material issues 
of fact sufficient to justify an evidentiary hearing." Id. 
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Having failed to submit statements by these witnesses regarding their recollections, 
Roberts ' contention that counsel was ineffective by failing to interview and call them at trial is 
insufficient to raise a material issue of fact demonstrating Mr. Chastain was remiss in his pretrial 
investigation of these witnesses. Therefore, the claim is summarily di missed. 
b. Failure to subpoena Jesse and Brandi 's phone records 
Robens also contends Mr. Chastain was ineffective by failing to subpoena Jesse and 
Brandi DeGroat 's phone record from the night in question. He states that the records were 
"solid proor• that Roberts was not in Boise at the time of the arson. but on his way to his 
mother's home in American Falls. 
Again, the State contends the claim is bare and conclusory. amely, Roberts fails to 
cstabli h what the phone records would show and how they would change the outcome. Further, 
the State argues the claim fails to raise a genuine is ue of material fact because even if counsel 
was deficient, he has failed to show that but for the deficiency, the outcome would have been 
different. 
As\ ith Roberts ' claim regarding counsel's failure to interview witnesse , this claim 
likewise require that Robert produce evidence demonstrating that the phone records at issue 
would have altered the result of his conviction. He has not presented this Court with any such 
evidence. Consequently, the claim is summarily dismi ed. 
c. Failure to Object to or anitize Photographs9 
Through discovery, Roberts knew prior to trial that the State had photos from the prior 
murder/arson investigation at the Randolph Property, which showed extensive damage to the 
home. He contends that he was worried a jury would be swayed against him after viewing the 
photo and, consequently, asked Mr. Chastain to attempt to "sanitize" or object to the admis ion 
of the photos to avoid having them introduced at trial. Because his counsel failed to do so, 
Roberts opted to give up hi right to trial by jury. I le submits Mr. Chastain was ineffective by 
allowing him to waive this right without first attempting to exclude the offending photos from 
admission at trial. 
The State contends that the claim fails to raise a genuine issue of material fact because 
even if counsel was deficient, Roberts failed to show that but for the deficiency, the outcome 
~ The nine photo!> at I sue arc auached to Roberu.' July 11. 2016 Affidavi1 submitted in this case. None were actually 
inlroduced al trial. 
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would have been different. The State points out that. had there been a jury trial , the jury would 
have been instructed that "neither sympathy nor prejudice should influence [them] in their 
deliberations" and that their decision had to be based "solely on the evidence." Further, the State 
argues that counsel's decision not to object to the photos was a tactical or strategic decision 
which "cannot serve as a basis for post-conviction relief unless the decision is shown to have 
re ulted from inadequate preparation, ignorance of the relevant law, or other shortcomings 
capable of objective review." State v. Shackelford, I 50 Idaho 355, 382-82, 247 P .3d 582, 609- I 0 
(2010). 
Initially, it strains the bounds of credulity that Roberts would waive his right to a jury 
trial simply becau e the State produced in discovery some photos of the prior murder/arson 
investigation. However. even talcing this assertion as true, Roberts must show that had Mr. 
Chastain brought a motion in limine to exclude or anitize the photos, the motion would have 
been granted and that a jury would have acquitted him. Hoskins v. State, I 49 ldaho 8 I 5, 8 I 6, 242 
P .3d I 5, 186 (Ct. App. 20 I 0). He cannot do so. The photos were not offered into evidence at 
trial and, therefore, had no effect on the Court's ultimate finding of guilt. There is no rational 
reason a jury, when faced with the same evidence as the Court, would have come to a different 
conclusion. Therefore, even a suming counsel had brought the motion and it was granted, 
Roberts cannot establish prejudice. Consequently, the claim is summarily di missed. 
2. Trial Errors 
a. Failure to recall Brandi DeGroat 
Because Ms. DeGroat was chedulcd to have a child via cesarean-section, she was called 
early in the case. During her testimony, she stated that Jc se had a child but she did not know 
who the mother was. Later, Jes c testified at trial that he did not have a child. Roberts contends 
that Mr. Chastain should have stayed the trial in order to wait for Ms. DcGroat to have her baby 
and then re-call her to rebut Jesse's testimony that he did not have a child. Roberts argues he 
was prejudiced by this failure because M . DeGroat 's rebuttal testimony would have ervcd to 
further di credit Je e's testimony. 
According to the State, the claim fails to raise a genuine issue of material fact because 
even if counsel was deficient, Roberts has note ·tablished that, but for the deficiency, the 
outcome would have been different. Namely, he fails to how how questioning Ms. D<..-Groat 
about whether he son did or did not have a child would have affected any of the element of the 
13 
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charged crimes. The State is correct. Whether or not Jesse was impeached on his tatement that 
he did not have a child is irrelevant. The conviction did not tum entirely on Jesse's testimony 
and, therefore, it is inconsequential whether Jesse was being truthful about having a child. 
Further, counsel's decision to proceed with trial rather than seek to stay the trial based on an 
ultimately insignificant impeachment opportunity is a reasonable because it is unlikely a stay 
would have been granted. Having failed to establish prejudice, Roberts' claim is summarily 
dismissed. 
b. Failure to impeach Jesse McPhie with statements made to law 
enforcement 
Although Roberts acknowledges that Mr. Chastain attempted to impeach Je se's trial 
te timony with his contradictory te timony from the preliminary hearing, Roberts faults his 
counsel for not al o impeaching Jesse with statements he made to law enforcement. amely. 
contrary to hi trial testimony stating he last saw Roberts at the Club at approximately 3:55 a.m., 
Jesse told law enforcement that the time was .. omctime around 0300." State's Exh. 2. 10 Roberts 
contends he was prejudiced by his coun el's failure to use the police report for impeachment 
pu.rpo es because the report would have encouraged the Court toque tion Jes e's testimony. 
The State contends that Roberts ' claim fails to raise a genuine issue of material fact. 
Indeed, whether to impeach a witness is a tactical decision. Yakovac. 145 Idaho at 44 7, 180 P .3d 
at 486. Ordinarily. tactical decisions are not second-guessed on appeal unless they are shown to 
re ult from inadequate preparation, ignorance of the relevant law, or other objective 
shortcomings. Hoimrd \'. State, 126 Idaho 231, 233, 880 P .2d 26 I, 263 (Ct.App.1994). It is the 
petitioner' affirmative duty to provide evidence that the deci ion was not a legitimate strategy. 
Yakovac. supra. 
Herc, Mr. Chastain opted to impeach Jesse with his preliminary hearing testimony that he 
last saw Roberts at 2 a.m. Tr. 321 :9-328:3. To further impeach Jesse using his statements to 
police that he last saw Roberts "sometime around 0300" would add little additional ammunition 
in furtherance of impeachment. otably, Jes e's preliminary hearing testimony was much more 
inconsi tent with his trial testimony than his tatements to police. Becau e Roberts has not 
10 Attached as Exrub11210 the State's Mo11on for Summary D1sm1ssal i Officer Tony David on ' arra1ive Repon 
containing his w1tnes mtel'1ews with Je: ·e McPh.ie and Brandi OeGroat. 
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demonstrated that Mr. Chastain ' decision was the result of inadequate preparation, ignorance of 
the relevant law, or other objective hortcomings, the claim is summarily dismissed. 
3. Sentencing Errors 
Roberts ' final complaint against Mr. Chastain is that he was ineffective by failing to 
object to the Court's "extrajudieial opinion and quasi expert assumptions" expressed during 
sentencing regarding the broken window. While Roberts cxpre sly withdrew this claim in his 
second affidavit in support of post-conviction relief, his current counsel argues Roberts' 
withdrawaJ of the claim through a pro-se filing while represented by counsel hould be 
disregarded. The State object to the revival of the claim. asserting that Roberts must formally 
seek leave to amend hi petition. 
Whether or not the Court should accept or reject a pro-se filing by a party while 
represented by counsel is reviewed for abuse of discretion. lira-Lopez v. State, 2013 WL 
6009148 (Idaho Court of Appeals, July 25, 2013)(unpubli hed). To thi end, the Court mu t 
perceive the issue as discretionary, act within the outer boundaries of its discretion consistent 
with applicable legal standards, and reach its deci ion through the exercise of reason. Hansen v. 
Roberts, 154 Idaho 469, 472, 299 P.3d 7 I, 784(2013). Initially, the Court notes that Roberts' 
current po ition is decidedly contradictory considering that he seeks to have the Court consider 
the majority of assertions within his second affidavit with the exception of one. While the Court 
has the discretion to disregard a party's pro- e filing when the party is repre ented by counsel , 
the Court cannot very well cherry pick which claims to accept and which to disregard when they 
are contained within the same filing. It is only reasonable that this Court either disregard the 
filing in its entirety or accept the filing in its entirety. 
There are important considerations which b'llide thi Court's conclusion that the econd 
affidavit, including Roberts' withdrawal of claims as stated therein, should be considered. First, 
in addressing the State's motion, both the State and Roberts drew extensively from his second 
affidavit. To now disregard the entire affidavit on grounds that it was filed pro-se would derail 
the efforts et forth thus far by the parties and the Court. Further, the second affidavit was filed in 
July of 2016. Roberts had several months during which he could have moved to withdraw the 
second affidavit in order to file it through counsel, yet did not make any such effort. Finally. 
Roberts simply has not asked this Court to di regard the entire filing. Consequently, it within this 
Court 's discretion to consider the second affidavit in its entirety and accept Roberts ' waiver of 
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his claim for ineffective assistance of coun el for failure to object to the Court's commentary at 
entencing. 
That said, even if the Court allowed Roberts to revive the claim, it is not a basis for post-
conviction relief. Beyond the Court's own expressed disbelief as to Roberts' account of hi fall 
into the window, there was sufficient evidence to upport a conviction, as confirmed by the 
Court of Appeals. Indeed, in affirming the conviction, the Court of Appeals did not cite to the 
Court's observations; rather, it relied on the evidence in the record. Consequently, Roberts 
cannot establish that his counsel's failure to object to the Court's ob ervations at sentencing 
caused prejudice. Therefore, even if not waived, the claim would be summarily dismis ed. 
4. Appellate Errors 
Recently, the ldaho Supreme Court commented on the duty of appellate counsel to 
criminal defendants, noting: 
Appellate counsel is not required to rai ·e every issue avai lable to the defendant. 
This Court has recogni:led the United State Supreme Court precedent that 
appellate coun el does not have a constitutional duty to rai e every non-frivolous 
issue requested by defendant. Rather to demonstrate deficient performance of 
appellate counsel for failure to raise a claim on appeal, the defendant must show 
that counsel made an objectively unreasonable decision to omit the claim. 
Accordingly, appellate counsel is not deficient merely for omitting an argument as 
the weeding out of weaker issues is widely recognized a one of the hallmarks of 
effective appellate advocacy. When reviewing appellate counsel's performance, 
we determine whether, but for appellate counsel' errors, a reasonable probability 
exists that the defendant would have prevailed on appeal. 
Cra'rtford v. State, 160 Idaho 586,377 P.3d 400, 411 (2016), internal quotes and cites omitted. 
ln addition, the Court has noted: 
Indeed, it i difficult to demonstrate that coun el was incompetent based on 
failure to raise a particular claim on appeal. Only when ignored issue are clearly 
stronger than those presented will the strong presumption of effective as istance 
of coun el be overcome. 
Heilman v. State, 158 Idaho 139, 146, 344 P.3d 919, 926 (Ct. App. 2015), internal cites omitted. 
a. Failure to file reply brief 
Roberts contends his appellate counsel erred by failing to file a reply brief at the appellate 
level. The arguments Robert wanted appellate counsel to make in reply included: I) that the 
Eclipse Club would not allow a non-employee to be in the club after it closed at 4:00 a.m.; 2) 
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that the testimony on the timing of events provided by Jesse and Brandi DeGroat demonstrate 
Roberts could not have set the fire, and; 3) Jesse's statements to law enforcement undermine the 
sufficiency of evidence used to convict Roberts. The State argues that Roberts ' claim is bare and 
conclusory. 
"Whether to file a reply brief.- a decision dependent on the trength of the appellate 
ues and nature of the arguments presented in response-is a patently strategic decision within 
the profc ional discretion of appellate counsel." lleilman, 158 Idaho at 146, 344 P.3d at 926. 
Initially, as noted by the State, an appellate attorney cannot make a naked factual as crtion to an 
appellate court unless it is in the record. The Eclip e Club ·s entrance policy was not in the 
record, nor was the police report. Further, appellate counsel did argue that witne s testimony 
about the timing of the events indicated that Roberts did not set the fire; the fact that counsel 
relied on different testimony to support the argument is a tactical decision which is not grounds 
for po t-conviction relief unle Roberts can show the decision "re ulted from inadequate 
preparation, ignorance of the relevant law, or other shortcomings capable of objective review." 
I lei/man. supra. He has not. 
In addition, Roberts has not demonstrated a reasonable probability that he would have 
prevailed on appeal had appellate coun el made the arguments Roberts advances. The Court of 
Appeals evidently found more persuasive the fact that Roberts admitted to being at the residence 
and breaking a window and, further, that D A evidence confirmed his presence at the scene, 
"near the fire's origin." 20 15 WL 5511096, •2. Roberts' proffered argument on appeal would 
not affect the e facts the Court of Appeals found persuasive. Con equently, Roberts ' claim is 
ummarily dismis ed. 
b. Failure to raise issue of judicial abuse of discretion 
Roberts contends his appellate counsel failed to challenge the Court 's abuse of discretion 
by relying on its own application of subjective scientific standards to reject Robert 'account of 
his fall through the window. He contends that, e en though his trial counsel did not object to the 
Coon's statements, appellate counsel could have raised this issue as fundamental error. The State 
contends that Roberts may not rai e this claim again t appellate counsel. The State is correct. 
In Minhm v. State, the Court of Appeals rejected the attempt by the petitioner to assert an 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim against appellate counsel for failure to raise a 
"fundamental error" on appeal. I 44 Idaho 656, 662, 168 P .3d 40 46 (Ct. App. 2007). The Court 
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cited to four reasons for this decision. First, a rule deeming appellate counsel ineffective for 
failing to raise an issue of fundamental error would force appellate attorneys to raise on appeal 
nearly all possible errors, whether preserved by objection in the trial court or not, to avoid the 
ri k of being declared ineffective. Id. Second, it is often not to a criminal defendant's advantage 
to raise an issue of fundamental error on direct appeal because the record in the criminal 
proceeding may not be adequately developed for a full presentation of the defendant's claim. Id. 
Third, a trial attorney's failure to object to inadmissible evidence or other potential errors may be 
done for legitimate strategic or tactical purposes, and the record on appeal would rarely show this 
trategy. Id. Fourth, allowing such a claim against appellate counsel is unneces ary to protect a 
defendant' rights becau e the defendant can bring the same claim of impropriety in the trial 
proceedings as a claim of ineffective assistance of his trial counsel for failing to object to the 
alleged error in the trial court. Id. 
Under Mintun Roberts' claim against appellate counsel for failure to raise judicial abuse 
of discretion cannot proceed. The claim is dismissed. 
C. Failure to Appeal Burglary Conviction 
In his response to the State's motion, Roberts argues for the first time that his appellate 
counsel was ineffective for failure to appeal his burglary conviction based on Roberts' own 
testimony about his lack of intent in entering the house.11 The State doe not addre s this new 
argument, likely because it was never raised in the initial petition or in Roberts' subsequent 
affidavit. To raise this claim, Roberts mu t file a motion for leave to amend his petition. The 
deadline for amending his petition was September 9,2016. Even if Roberts did bring a motion to 
amend, he could not establish good cause for altering the scheduling order deadlines. This new 
claim is not based on new evidence and could have been asserted long ago. 
In addition, the claim is meritless. Roberts must how that his appellate counsel made an 
objectively unreasonable deci ion to omit the claim and establish a reasonable probability that 
Roberts would have prevailed on the claim on appeal. Cranford, supra . Given that the Court of 
Appeals found sufficient evidence to affinn Roberts' arson conviction, Roberts cannot 
reasonably argue that the Court would have rever ed the burglary conviction based on lack of 
11 Robens docs not elaborate o n what m1en1 tc ·tunony he i relying on; pre.umably, he 1s referring t0 lus uip and 
fall story. To this end, hi claim i bare and conclusory because he fails to explain how tbe te timony . upports lack 
ofmtent. 
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evidence of entering the home with intent to commit a felony. Thus, even if the claim were 
properly raised, it would be subject to summary dismis al. 
D. Cumulative Error Denying Right to Fair Trial 
Roberts' final argument is that when all errors are combined the effect is that he\: as denied 
right to fair trial. The State does not pecifically address the cumulative error argument. 
However, under the doctrine of cumulative error, a eries of errors, harmless in and of 
themselves, may in the aggregate show the absence of a fair trial. Bias, 159 Idaho at 705, 365 
P.3d at I 059, citing State v. Adamcik, 152 Idaho 445,483,272 P.3d 417,455 (2012). A 
ncce ary predicate to the application of the doctrine is a finding of more than one error. id. 
Because there has been no finding of error, the claim is summarily dismi sed. 
1 . C0 1 CL SIO 
For the foregoing reason , the state's motion for summary dismis al is GRANTED. 
O(( 
IT SO ORDERED and dated this =z__::ciay of January, 2017. 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on this ~ day of January, 2017, I emailed (served) a true and correct copy 
of the within instrwnent to: 
Shelley Akamatsu 
Ada County Deputy Prosecutor 
acpocourtdocs@adaweb.net 
John Defranco 
Defense Attorney 
jcd@greyhawkJaw.com 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
CHRISTOPHER D. RlCH 
Clerk of the District Court 
By: 2) . c.£.M 
Deputy Court Clerk 
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NO·--~--::::"":=-----
AM /C>~S::I F~----
JAN 1 0 2017 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, I A D FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA By E~ HILD 
STEVE EUGENE ROBERTS, 
Petitioner, 
V. 
THE ST A TE OF IDAHO, 
Respondent. 
JUDGME TISE TERED AS FOLLOWS: 
Case o. CV-PC-2016-05792 
JUDGME T 
Petitioner's petition for post-conviction relief is dismi ed in its entirety with prejudice. 
cz~ IT SO ORDERED and dated this day of January, 2017. 
District Judge 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAJLJ G 
I hereby certify that on this __jQ_ day of January, 2017, I emailed ( erved) a true and correct copy 
of the within instrument to: 
Shelley Akamatsu 
Ada County Deputy Prosecutor 
acpocourtdocs@adaweb.net 
John Defranco 
Defense Attorney 
jcd@greyhawklaw.com 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
CHRISTOPHER D. RlCH 
Clerk of the District Court 
By: L.~ 
Deputy Court Clerk 
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JOHN C. DEFRANCO, ESQ., ISB #4953 
ELLSWORTH, KALLAS & DEFRANCO P.L.L.C. 
1031 E. Park Blvd. 
Boise, ID 83712 
Phone: (208) 336-1843 
Fax: (208) 345-8945 
ATTORNEY FOR PETITIONER 
NO·---~iii:n'--::=---;---
FILEo ?:' 1 D A.M·- - --P.M. _;VJ, 
FEB O 6 2017 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk 
By AMANDA PARKER 
DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
STEVEN E. ROBERTS, III, ) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
Case No. CV PC 2016 05792 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, 
Respondent. 
TO: THE ABOVE NAMED RESPONDENT, STA TE OF IDAHO, AND THE CLERK OF 
THE ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT. 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT : 
1. The above-named Defendant appeals against the State of Idaho to the Idaho Supreme 
Court from the Judgment entered against him on January 9th, 2017 , by the Honorable 
District Court Judge , Steven Hippler. 
2. The party has a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the Judgment 
described in paragraph one (I) above is appealable pursuant to l.A.R. 11 ( c )( 1 ). 
3. Defendant requests the entire reporter's standard transcript as defined in Rule 25(a), 
I.A.R. 
4. Defendant requests that the Clerk 's Record contain only those documents 
automatically included as set out in l.A.R. 28(b)(l). 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
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5. I certify: 
a. That a copy of this "Notice of Appeal" has been served on the reporter. 
b. That the Defendant is exempt from paying the estimated transcript fee because 
he is an indigent person and is unable to pay said fee. 
c. That the Defendant is exempt from paying the estimated fee for preparation of 
the Clerk's Record because he is an indigent person and is unable to pay said 
fee . 
d. That the Defendant is exempt from paying the appellate filing fee because he 
is indigent and is unable to pay said fee. 
e. That service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant to 
I.A.R. 20. 
6. Defendant anticipates raising the following issue: 
a. Under Idaho Law did Judge Hippler err when he granted State's Motion for 
Summary Dismissal of Petitioner's Post-Conviction Relief Action. 
DATED this 6th day of February, 2017. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
John C. DeFranco 
Attorney for Petitioner 
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CERTFICATE OF SERVICE 
The undersigned hereby certifies that on this 61h day of February, 20 I 7, a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing document was served upon counsel as follows : 
Ada County Prosecutor's Office, Deputy S. Akamatsu 
200 West Front Street 
Boise, ID 83702 
_ U.S . Mail _ Overnight Mail _Facsimile~ Hand delivered 
Idaho State Appellate Public Defender's Office 
322 E. Front Street, Suite 570 
Boise, ID 83702 
Fax# (208) 334-2985 
_:/u.s. Mail _ Overnight Mail 
Trial Court Administrator 
_i-u.s. Mail _ Overnight Mail 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
Facsimile Hand de! i vered 
Facsimile Hand del ivered 
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MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT OF STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER 1 
JOHN C. DEFRANCO, ESQ., ISB #4953 
ELLSWORTH, KALLAS & DEFRANCO, P.L.L.C. 
1031 E. Park Blvd. 
Boise, ID  83712 
Phone: (208) 336-1843 
Fax:     (208) 345-8945 
 
ATTORNEY FOR PETITIONER / APPELLANT 
 
 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
STEVEN E. ROBERTS, III,   ) 
      ) 
  Petitioner-Appellant,  ) Case No.:  CV PC 2016 05792 
) 
vs.      ) MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT 
      ) OF STATE APPELLATE  
STATE OF IDAHO,    ) PUBLIC DEFENDER 
      )   
Respondent.   ) 
                                                                        ) 
 
 COMES NOW the Petitioner, by and through counsel of record, and hereby 
moves the Court to enter an Order appointing the Idaho State Appellate Public Defender 
as Attorney of Record on appeal in the above-entitled case. 
 Petitioner moves the Court on the basis that the Petitioner is indigent, and is 
currently represented by conflict counsel for the Ada County Public Defender. 
  
 DATED this 8th day of February, 2017. 
 
 
 
 
                                                      
    John C. DeFranco 
    Attorney for Defendant 
 
 
Electronically Filed
2/8/2017 9:24:46 AM
Fourth Judicial District, Ada County
Christopher D. Rich, Clerk of the Court
By: Rose Wright, Deputy Clerk
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MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT OF STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER 2 
 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
 
 I hereby certify that on this 8th day of February, 2017, I served a true and correct 
copy of the within and foregoing document by the method indicated below and addressed 
to the following: 
 
 Ada County Prosecuting Attorney   ____ US Mail 
 200 W. Front Street, Ste. 3191   ____ Hand Delivery 
 Boise, Idaho 83702     ____ Facsimile:  287-7709 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                  
      Elisabeth Grinder, Legal Assistant 
 
I
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ORDER  1 
JOHN C. DEFRANCO, ESQ., ISB #4953 
ELLSWORTH, KALLAS & DEFRANCO, P.L.L.C. 
1031 E. Park Blvd. 
Boise, ID  83712 
Phone: (208) 336-1843 
Fax:     (208) 345-8945 
 
ATTORNEY FOR PETITIONER / APPELLANT 
 
 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
STEVEN E. ROBERTS, III,   ) 
      ) 
  Petitioner-Appellant,  ) Case No.:  CV PC 2016 05792 
) 
vs.      ) ORDER FOR APPOINTMENT 
      ) OF STATE APPELLATE  
STATE OF IDAHO,    ) PUBLIC DEFENDER 
      )   
Respondent.   ) 
                                                                        ) 
 
 
 Upon motion of the Petitioner, the Court hereby finds the Petitioner indigent and 
appoints the State Appellate Public Defender to represent the Petitioner/Appellant on 
appeal in the above-entitled case.  
 DATED this ____ day of February, 2017. 
 
 
 
 
            
     Honorable Deborah A. Bail  
     District Court Judge  
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ORDER  2 
 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
 
 I hereby certify that on this ____ day of February, 2017, I served a true and 
correct copy of the within and foregoing document by the method indicated below and 
addressed to the following: 
 
 Ada County Prosecuting Attorney   ____ Interdepartmental Mail 
 200 W. Front Street, Ste. 3191   ____ Hand Delivery 
 Boise, Idaho 83702     ____ Facsimile:  287-7709 
 
 Idaho State Appellate Public Defender  ____ Interdepartmental Mail 
 3647 Lake Harbor Lane    ____ US Mail 
 Boise ID  83703     ____ Facsimile:  334-2985 
 
John C. DeFranco     ____ US Mail 
Ellsworth, Kallas & DeFranco   ____ Hand Delivery 
1031 E. Park Blvd.     ____ Facsimile:  345-8945 
Boise, Idaho 83712 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                  
      Clerk  
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ERIC D. FREDERICKSEN 
State Appellate Public Defender 
I.S.B. #6555 
SALLY J. COOLEY 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
I.S.B. #7353 
322 E. Front Street, Suite 570 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Phone: (208) 334-2712 
Fax: (208) 334-2985 
NO . .....:·-----:;-;;iim~;-·2t.: A.M. _,~ M._.:::? -·· , ···-
MAR .0 7 2017 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clark 
By KELLE WEGENER 
DEPUTY 
ORIGINAL 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUPICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR ADA COUNTY 
STEVEN EUGENE ROBERTS, Ill, 
Petitioner-Appellant, 
V. 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Respondent. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
~ ) 
) 
) 
CASE NO. CV-PC-2016-5792 
S.C. DOCKET NO. 44817 
AMENDED 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
TO: THE ABOVE-NAMED RESPONDENT, STATE OF IDAHO, AND THE 
PARTY'S ATTORNEYS, JAN M. BENNETTS, ADA COUNTY PROSECUTOR, 
200 WEST FRONT STREET, BOISE, ID 83702, STATEHOUSE MAIL, AND THE 
CLERK OF THE ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT: 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT: 
1. The above-named appellant appeals against the above-named 
respondent to the Idaho Supreme Court from the Judgment entered in the above-
entitled action on the 9tn 1Qth day of January, 2017, the Honorable Steven J. 
Hippler, presiding. 
2. That the party has a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the 
judgments or orders described in paragraph 1 above are appealable orders 
under and pursuant to Rule 11 (a), I.A.R. 
AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL - Page 1 
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3. A preliminary statement of the issues on appeal, which the appellant then 
intends to assert in the appeal, provided any such list of issues on appeal shall 
not prevent the appellant from asserting other issues on appeal. is/are: 
(a) Did the district court err in dismissing the appellant's Petition for 
Post-Conviction Relief? 
4. Reporter's Transcript. The appellant requests the preparation of the 
entire reporter's standard transcript as defined in I.AR. 25(c). The appellant 
also requests the preparation of the additional portions of the reporter's 
transcript: 
(a) Summary Dismissal Hearing held on January 3, 2017 {Court 
Reporter: Christie Valcich, no estimation of pages is listed on the Register 
Of Actions). 
5. Clerk's Record. The appellant requests the standard clerk's record 
pursuant to I.AR. 28(b)(1). The appellant requests the following documents to 
be included in the clerk's record, in addition to those automatically included under 
I.AR. 28(b)(1): 
(a) Order Granting Motion for Appointment of Counsel filed April 1, 
2016; 
(b) Motion for Extension of Time for State to File Answer filed April 12, 
2016; 
(c) Motion for Waiver of Attorney- Client Privilege filed April 12, 2016: 
(d) Order Extending Time for State to File Answer filed April 19, 2016; 
(e) Order for Waiver of Attorney- Client Privilege filed April 21, 2016; 
AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL - Page 2 
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. (f) Stipulation to Allow Additional Time to File Amended Petition filed 
June 30. 2016; 
(g) Affidavit of Support for Attorney for P.C.R. filed July 11. 2016; 
(h) Order Setting Status Conference. and Evidentiary Hearing filed 
August 2. 2016; 
(i) Brief in Support of Motion for Summary Disposition filed October 
11. 2016; 
0) Motion for Summary Disposition filed October 11. 2016; 
(k) Brief in Response to State's Motion for Summary Disposition filed 
December 19. 2016; 
(I) State's Reply to Response to Motion for Summary Disposition filed 
December 21. 2016; 
(m) Orders filed on January 10. 2017; 
(n) Any items the district court took judicial notice; and 
(o) Any exhibits. affidavits. objections. responses. briefs or 
memorandums. including all attachments or copies of transcripts. filed or 
lodged. by the state. the appellate. or the court in support of. or in 
opposition to. the dismissal of the post-conviction petition: except that any 
pictures or depictions of child pornography necessary to the appeal need 
not be sent. but may be sought later by motion to the Idaho Supreme 
Court. 
6. I certify: 
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(a) That a copy of this Amended Notice of Appeal has been served on 
the Court Reporter(s), Christie Valcich; 
(b) That the appellant is exempt from paying the estimated fee for the 
preparation of the record because the appellant is indigent. (1.C. §§ 31-
3220, 31-3220A. I.C. § 19-4904, I.AR. 27(0); 
(c) That there is no appellate filing fee since this is an appeal in a post-
conviction case (I.C. §§ 31-3220, 31-3220A. I.AR. 23(a)(10)); 
( d) That arrangements have been made with Ada County who will be 
responsible for paying for the reporter's transcript, as the client is indigent, 
(I.C. §§ 31-3220. 31-3220A. I.AR. 24(h)); and 
(e) That service has been made upon all parties required to be served 
pursuant to I.AR 20. 
DATED this 7th day of March, 2017. 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 7th day of March, 2017, caused a true 
and correct copy of the attached AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL to be placed 
in the United States mail, postage prepaid, addressed to: 
STEVEN EUGENE ROBERTS Ill 
INMATE #83033 
ISCC 
PO BOX 70010 
BOISE ID 83707 
CHRISTIE VALCICH 
COURT REPORTER 
200 W FRONT STREET 
BOISE ID 83702 
STATEHOUSE MAIL 
JOHN C DEFRANCO 
ELLSWORTH KALLAS & DEFRANCO PLLC 
1031 E PARK BLVD 
BOISE ID 83712 
JAN M BENNETTS 
ADA COUNTY PROSECUTOR 
200 WEST FRONT STREET 
BOISE ID 83702 
STATEHOUSE MAIL 
KENNETH K JORGENSEN 
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL - CRIMINAL DIVISION 
Hand delivered to Attorney General's mailbox at Supreme Court 
SJC/mal 
0a~ 
MAR¥--Al5fN LARA 
Administrative Assistant 
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1 
2 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
Supreme Court No. 44817 ~ 
3 STEVEN EUGENE ROBERTS, III, ) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
4 Petitioner-Appellant, 
5 v. APR 13 2017 
6 STATE OF IDAHO, CHRISTOPHER 0. FIIOH Cl By ARIC SHANI( I 8rk 
DliPUTv 
7 Respondent. 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
NOTICE OF TRANSCRIPT LODGED 
Notice is hereby given that on April 13, 2017, I 
lodged a transcript, 18 pages in length, for the 
above-referenced appeal with the District Court Clerk of 
Ada County in the Fourth Judicial District. 
Dates: 
.::-:..-~~-------------------------
(Signature of Reporter) 
Christie Valcich, CSR-RPR 
April 13, 2017 
January 3, 2017 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
STEVEN EUGENE ROBERTS, III, 
Petitioner-Appellant, 
vs. 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Respondent. 
Supreme Court Case No. 44817 
CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS 
I, CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk of the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of 
the State ofldaho in and for the County of Ada, do hereby certify: 
There were no exhibits offered for identification or admitted into evidence during the 
course of this action. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said 
Court this 14th day of April, 2017. 
,,, .... ,,,, 
,,,, ,,,, 
...... ~s1RICr ,{./. ,,, 
............ \) ··•···• ,,,/) ,, .. 
.. .V e• •e ·.ro .. ~ ,~ ••CJJ •• v ':. 
.. (.i.f- • ,!. .. 
E·:O! ~ , e~~HERD.RICH 
: 2 : en c-0• erk if~! District Court : • ul • Lt.. -
\f\ 'f. . ~  
-:.:& • • .,,.,o .• ·~ . 
.... ..r._ ••• • , .... )£ C 
.. , .-:,r? ••••• ' 
,,,;,,o:J rn:{i-;;;; Clerk ~ 
,,,, ........ . 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
STEVEN EUGENE ROBERTS, III, 
Petitioner-Appellant, 
vs. 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Respondent. 
Supreme Court Case No. 44817 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, the undersigned authority, do hereby certify that I have 
personally served or mailed, by either United States Mail or Interdepartmental Mail, one copy of 
the following: 
CLERK'S RECORD AND REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT 
to each of the Attorneys of Record in this cause as follows: 
STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER 
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT 
BOISE, IDAHO 
Date of Service: APR 1 4 2017 
--------
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
LA WREN CE G. WASDEN 
ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENT 
BOISE, IDAHO 
,, ....... ,,, 
,,, ,,, 
...... , \)\STRic.r ',, 
...... ~'v •• • • • ••• ,{«, ,,, 
~ 6 ... t..J ••• ~ ,~ 
.. .._, • ' • 0 .. 
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=~: ~ I O ~ ,4.,:. 
:..._,: rn u...:i:: :~: 
~ ~ ~ t ql~ST(:P~¥R D. RICH 
; 
4 
•.. ~ Clerk of.4h~Qistrict Court 
.. '<',. • 0 • -::- .. 
.. .-v •• •• .,. .. 
.. ,,,··?o ·······~· ~ ~ 
,, J 'l'11 .... . 
,,,, <t.. a ,,, 
t,,,, y .. ,)12~ 
Deputy Clerk 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
STEVEN EUGENE ROBERTS, III, 
Petitioner-Appellant, 
vs. 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Respondent. 
Supreme Court Case No. 44817 
CERTIFICATE TO RECORD 
I, CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk of the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of the 
State of Idaho, in and for the County of Ada, do hereby certify that the above and foregoing record in 
the above-entitled cause was compiled under my direction and is a true and correct record of the 
pleadings and documents that are automatically required under Rule 28 of the Idaho Appellate Rules, 
as well as those requested by Counsel. 
I FURTHER CERTIFY, that the Notice of Appeal was filed in the District Court on the 
6th day of February, 2017. 
CERTIFICATE TO RECORD 
,, ........ . ,,, ,,, 
.... ,,, \)\S'f RIC; -r 11,,, 
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.... ~-· •. -?o', 
.... cj.•t.J.J •• v,:, 
.. --.;• E- • ~-
f 2 f ~ CB~T<l_rfla D. RICH 
.--.. Q <!. -~-
: ~ 4: ~ Cr~rkS)f ~ ttiEtrict Court 
:~·· ~ .-~: 
-:. •• '-0 •• ~= 
,:, <c+·· ~
',, '··?. ··i .. ·· ,. .... e,~ 
,,,,, O.J ~l'cl C 
,,,,, ftPU~tlerk 
